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Introduction
Behavioral economics is a blessing and a curse. A large body of evidence from behavioral
economics suggests that individuals often behave in ways that contradict the predictions of
rigid rational choice models. These discoveries have made economics more scientific, and they
have lead to fruitful efforts to build more realistic theories of decision-making. In the policy
sphere, discoveries from the field behavioral economics have introduced powerful new tools
for influencing behavior. All of these promising developments come with a catch, though.
Economists’ conception of optimal policymaking always relies in one way or another on the
principle that preferences are revealed by choices. When we lose rational choice, we also lose
revealed preference. As a result, there is intense controversy over how to use the powerful
new policy tools introduced by behavioral economics, and also a lingering concern that our
old reasoning about conventional policies might be fundamentally flawed.
How do we understand welfare when some choices do not reveal preferences? What should
we do with all these new policy tools? For that matter, what do we really know about our
old policy tools? In many ways, these questions have been a long time coming. When critics
of economics dismiss the the field and its research agenda because “people are clearly not
rational,” they mean, not that choices cannot be explained by a complete and transitive
relation on the menu of available objects in the positive sense, but rather that choices often
do not reveal normative preferences. The controversy in behavioral welfare economics is
really an older controversy about rationality. The evolution of behavioral economics has
merely brought that debate inside the discipline of economics.
In the chapters that comprise my dissertation, I will attempt to shed some new light on
this issue. I do so not by laying out a set of normative assumptions I believe that everyone
should always make, but rather describing several lines of argument that could be applied to
choice data and describing the conditions under which each of them lead to valid inference
about preferences and optimal policy. After all, a long tradition in public economics defers
ultimate normative judgements, such as the value of economic equality, to policymakers, but
nevertheless to describe how policymakers with particular beliefs about welfare can design
optimal policies.
The first chapter contained herein examines the use of revealed preference analysis in
1
situations where choices depend on seemingly arbitrary features of the decision-making en-
vironment, called frames. Frames could be, for example, default options, the order in which
options are displayed, or the degree to which options or features of the options are made
salient. Many of the new policy tools introduced by behavioral economics can be thought
of as a deliberate manipulation of frames by policymakers. How to recover preferences is
an important first step towards understanding the welfare consequences of these policies.
The key insights of this work are that 1) information on the preferences of persons immune
to frames can be recovered even with limited data, and, given this finding, that 2) the
preferences of persons who are influenced by frames can be regarded as a familiar sample
selection problem. Though they often prove difficult to solve, economists have developed a
deep understanding of sample selection problems, such as those arising in the presence of
missing data, self-selected samples, and selection into treatment. Viewing the behavioral
revealed preference problem through this lens leads one to several new tools for addressing
the problem, described in this chapter. Some of these tools are then applied to perhaps
the most well-known policy tool introduced by behavioral economists: automatic enrollment
into retirement savings plans. The resulting analysis suggests that while most individuals
prefer participation in employer-sponsored retirement savings plans, and thus would be made
better-off by automatic enrollment, the majority of younger, low-income individuals do not.
This finding raises questions about whether policymakers should automatically enroll such
individuals in retirement savings plans.
The second chapter applies similar methods to the question of how to analyze survey
data characterized by framing effects. In the survey context, frames could encode the order
in which answers or questions are provided, or the wording of questions. While a large lit-
erature, summarized below, documents the existence of framing effects, no formal work has
considered how to extract useful information from surveys despite framing effects, perhaps
for the same reason that the optimal policy problem in behavioral economics has proven
difficult to address. One ubiquitous technique for attempting to accommodate framing ef-
fects, used by researchers across the social sciences and many prominent survey and political
polling organizations, is to randomize respondents across frames and then to pool the data
in estimation. This chapter shows that this technique does not actually solve the problem in
any meaningful way. The results from randomizing and pooling will instead be a confused
mixture of the distribution of the quantity the survey was designed to measure and the distri-
bution of the effects of framing. As in the first chapter, however, careful statistical reasoning
can provide preferable techniques for extracting useful information from surveys. The second
chapter lays out several of these techniques and discusses their underlying assumptions and
usefulness in the survey context.
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The third chapter concerns the implications of behavioral economics findings for a more
conventional topic in public economics: optimal tax policy. A large and growing literature has
shown that individuals are often inattentive to tax incentives when making decisions, or they
mis-perceive tax schedules. One might be tempted to conclude that taxes that individuals
ignore are actually desirable policies. For example, policymakers often worry that taxing
people will cause them to work less, but if people do not realize they are being taxed, then
they may not work less, which makes the tax more like the canonical ideal of a “lump-sum”
tax. This paper generalizes this reasoning to any type of misperception, points out two
important caveats, and argues that these caveats deserve greater attention in the empirical
examination of these topics. The first caveat concerns what happens when individuals are
selectively attentive to higher-stakes incentives, i.e. they may be more attentive when the
hidden tax is larger than when it is smaller. In this case, attempting to exploit mistakes
for social gain, by relying more heavily on under-perceived taxes, can backfire. The social
consequences of this backfiring, called the “curse of debiasing,” can reverse the conclusion of
whether policymakers should exploit inattention to taxes, especially when attention is costly
for individuals to allocate. The second caveat concerns budget constraints: individuals who
misperceive relative prices will also misperceive their budget constraint. How individuals
nonetheless satisfy their budget constraint has important implications for welfare, which may
not be fully captured by empirical analysis based on field experiments. Both the phenomenon
of debiasing and of budget adjustment are in principle empirically examinable, and such
empirical work would substantially improve the debate over optimal taxation in the presence
of mis-perception.
This research does not fully solve the problem of how to conduct optimal analysis in
a behavioral economic world, but it takes a few steps in the right direction. While the
research does contain assumptions about welfare that may, at least in some contexts, be
subject to debate, it does so in a completely transparent fashion, which will allow future
research to consider alternative assumptions using similar tools. In the course of studying
this problem, I have become more optimistic about the possibility of building a consensus
on how economists can approach this problem without relying exclusively on paternalistic
judgements. Whereas the difficulty with optimal policy in behavioral economics is often cast
as a philosophical impasse, leading some to become outright nihilistic in their views about
welfare, this work shows that a combination of economic and econometric theory can make
the problem parsimonious, tractable, and even a little familiar.
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Chapter 1
Preference Identification Under Inconsistent Choice1
by Jacob Goldin (Stanford Law School) and Daniel Reck (University of Michigan)
Abstract
In many settings, seemingly arbitrary features of a decision can a ect what people choose. We develop an
empirical framework to recover ordinal preference information from choice data when preference-irrelevant
frames a ect behavior. Plausible restrictions of varying strength permit either partial- or point-identification
of preferences for the decision-makers who choose consistently across frames. Recovering population pref-
erences requires understanding the empirical relationship between decision-makers’ preferences and their
consistency. We develop tools for studying this relationship and illustrate them with data on automatic
enrollment into pension plans. The results suggest that 70 percent of default-sensitive employees prefer
enrollment but that a default of non-enrollment may be optimal for young, low-income employees.
1 Introduction
Sometimes choices do not reveal preferences. For example, an internet company seeking to
collect and use its customers’ personal data might adopt an opt-out policy, under which it
can collect a customer’s data unless the customer indicates otherwise. Empirical research
suggests that switching to an opt-in policy, under which customers must give permission be-
fore the company can collect their data, would substantially reduce the fraction of customers
who allow the company to do so (Johnson, Bellman and Lohse, 2002). Suppose 40 percent
of customers give permission when the policy is opt-in and 70 percent do so when the policy
1The authors wish to thank Jason Abaluck, Roland Benabou, John Beshears, Sebastien Bradley, Benjamin
Brooks, Charlie Brown, Raj Chetty, Henry Farber, Nikolaj Harmon, James Hines, Bo Honore, Louis Kaplow,
Miles Kimball, Alvin Klevorick, Henrik Kleven, Claus Kreiner, David Lee, Jay Lu, Charles Manski, Alex
Mas, Ted O’Donoghue, Søren Leth-Petersen, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Kareen Rozen, Joel Slemrod, Jesse
Shapiro, Sharon Tennyson, and seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen, Cornell, Harvard, the
London School of Economics, the University of Michigan, Oxford, and Princeton for helpful discussion and
comments. We are grateful to Brigitte Madrian and Aon Hewitt for providing us with data.
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is opt-out. Both policies let customers control the use of their data, but the choices made
under the two policies imply di erent conclusions about what customers prefer.
Situations such as this one pose an important challenge to behavioral economics. In
many settings – from privacy controls to retirement savings (Madrian and Shea, 2001) to
health insurance (Handel, 2013) to voting (Ho and Imai, 2008) – choices depend on seemingly
arbitrary features of the decision-making environment, such as which option is the default,
the order in which options are presented, or which features of the options are made salient.
Inconsistencies in choice invalidate the traditional revealed preference approach of equating
choices with preferences.2 This di culty contributes to widespread disagreement about when
and how to use behavioral economics to inform policy.
In this paper we develop an empirical framework for analyzing choice inconsistencies
and use it to derive conditions under which preference information may be recovered from
choice data. Our approach consists of two steps: first, identifying preference information for
the subgroup of decision-makers una ected by the source of the inconsistency, and second,
accounting for selection into this subgroup to recover population preferences. We develop
new tools for carrying out both steps of the analysis and illustrate them with data on a
policy that is well-known in the behavioral economics literature: automatic enrollment into
employer-sponsored pension plans.
Most prior work takes one of two approaches to the problem of preference identifica-
tion under inconsistent choice. First, researchers may utilize a positive model of behavior
that fully specifies the mapping from decision-makers’ preferences to their (potentially sub-
optimal) behavior (e.g. Rubinstein and Salant, 2012; Benkert and Netzer, 2014; Carroll et al.,
2009). Such approaches yield important insights but in many cases the resulting welfare con-
clusions are sensitive to the researcher’s choice between competing positive models that are
di cult to distinguish observationally (Bernheim, 2009; De Clippel and Rozen, 2014). An
alternative approach is to restrict preference inferences to the subset of observed choice sit-
uations in which a given decision-maker chooses consistently (Bernheim and Rangel, 2009).
However, in practice individual decision-makers are typically observed making only a single
choice, which makes it di cult to detect which choices are consistent. Worse, this approach
yield no information on the preferences of those decision-makers who exhibit systematic
choice reversals – the very group whose preferences are most relevant for making optimal
policy determinations regarding how choices should be designed (a claim we formalize in Ap-
2By preferences, we mean the relative consistency of the available options with a decision-maker’s objec-
tives, whatever those may be. Preferences are not defined according to a decision-maker’s observed choices;
doing so would assume away the question we address by ruling out the possibility of choice reversals (see,
e.g., Basu, 2003; Sen, 1973). Note that the preferences revealed under the opt-in and opt-out policies are not
inconsistent if customers’ preferences over their personal data happen to turn on this feature of the decision.
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pendix B). Further “refinements” can provide a path forward if the researcher can observe
choices in a setting in which all decision-makers are known to select their most-preferred
option (e.g., Chetty, Looney and Kroft, 2009), but in many applications, such as those in
which behavior is sensitive to defaults or ordering, there is little reason to believe that any
of the observed choice situations satisfy this condition.3
Our approach to this problem overcomes many of the limitations of prior work. We
develop techniques to recover preference information with limited datasets – those in which
each individual is observed making only one decision and observers lack ex ante knowledge
about which individuals are optimizing. We do not assume that the researcher knows the
exact underlying positive model that generates the choice inconsistencies, nor do we assume
that all decision-makers choose optimally in any one of the observed choice situations. We
provide general conditions – consistent with a broad class of behavioral models – under
which the preferences of the consistent decision-makers can be either partially- or point-
identified. We also develop techniques for learning about the preferences of those decision-
makers who exhibit choice inconsistencies. Together, these innovations provide a range of
practical tools for better understanding the distribution of preferences in populations that
exhibit inconsistent choice behavior.
We focus on binary choices in which the option chosen by some decision-makers varies
according to a preference-irrelevant feature of the choice environment, which we refer to as
a frame (Salant and Rubinstein, 2008). Examples of frames might include: (1) which option
is presented as the default; (2) the order in which options are displayed; (3) whether the
consequence of selecting an option is presented as a loss or a gain; (4) whether the menu of
options includes an irrelevant alternative; (5) the point in time at which a decision is made;
or (6) whether various consequences of the available options are made salient. Focusing on
binary choices and binary frames permits us to view identification through the lens of the
potential outcomes framework commonly used in the program evaluation literature (Angrist,
Imbens and Rubin, 1996),4 but the intuition we develop is useful outside of binary settings
as well.
Within this framework we make two key identifying assumptions. First, when decision-
3Another possibility is to turn from actual to hypothetical choice data designed to elicit preference param-
eters (Barsky et al., 1997), or more radically, away from preference-based measures of well-being altogether
(e.g., Benjamin et al., 2012; Kahneman, Wakker and Sarin, 1997). While useful, such approaches are subject
to criticisms of their own: for example, any survey-based method is potentially subject to numerous framing
e ects (e.g., Schwarz and Clore, 1987; Deaton, 2012) and approaches divorced from individual preferences
may fail to capture normatively important components of welfare (Loewenstein, 1999). A useful discussion
of these and other issues related to behavioral preference recovery is provided in Beshears et al. (2008).
4Unlike all other applications of the potential outcomes framework, our goal is not to identify the causal
e ects of one variable on another, but rather to remove variation in observed choices due to framing e ects,
isolating the variation due to preferences.
6
makers choose consistently across frames, we assume those choices reflect their preferences –
an assumption we label the consistency principle. This relaxation of the revealed preferences
approach permits us to recover preference information in a non-paternalistic manner (Bern-
heim and Rangel, 2009), without taking a stance on the exact positive model that generates
behavior. We also allow some decision-makers to choose inconsistently across frames, but
initially we limit our analysis to settings in which the frame pulls the choices of all decision-
makers in a uniform direction – an assumption we call frame monotonicity. Although frame
monotonicity represents additional structure relative to Bernheim and Rangel (2009), it per-
mits us to point-identify the distribution of preferences in datasets where decision-makers
are observed under only one frame each. These two reduced-form assumptions are consistent
with a wide array of positive models (see Appendix C).
Our first main result concerns the recovery of the preferences of consistent decision-
makers – those who would select the same option under each frame.5 To do so, we exploit
the fact that under our assumptions, a decision-maker who chooses “against the frame” – for
example someone who chooses the option that is not the default – is consistent and prefers
the option that she chooses. This insight, along with a statistical assumption concerning
the assignment of decision-makers to frames, allows us to recover preferences among the
consistent decision-makers. Without frame monotonicity, the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers are partially identified, and we derive the corresponding bounds.
We next develop techniques to shed light on population preferences using the prefer-
ences of consistent choosers. We begin by showing how our assumptions permit partial
identification of population preferences. Full identification of population preferences re-
quires understanding the empirical relationship between decision-makers’ preferences and
their consistency. Intuitively, the first step of our analysis yields preference information for
a subset of the population (the consistent decision-makers). By understanding the rela-
tionship between decision-makers’ likelihood of selecting into that sub-population and their
likelihood of having a particular preference, we can extrapolate from the preferences of the
consistent decision-makers to the full population. We develop two approaches for studying
the empirical relationship between decision-makers’ consistency and their preferences.
The first technique is to adjust for observable di erences, such as income or education,
between the consistent and inconsistent decision-makers, and then to extrapolate from the
former to the latter. If consistency and preferences are uncorrelated conditional on these
5An alternative interpretation of the empirical evidence concerning choice reversals is to conclude that
inconsistent decision-makers simply lack normatively relevant preferences in the first place. For someone who
takes that view as a starting point, the contribution of our paper is that it provides a method for isolating the
preferences of the consistent decision-makers (which are normatively relevant) from the aggregate observed
choice data.
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observable characteristics, one can recover population preferences by separately estimating
the preferences of each demographic group and then re-weighting those estimates based
on the distribution of observables among the inconsistent decision-makers. As in other
empirical contexts, the plausibility of this matching-on-observables approach depends on
what information about decision-makers can be observed.
The second technique exploits variation in the choice environment related to decision-
makers’ susceptibility to the frame. A decision quality instrument monotonically a ects
decision-makers’ propensity to choose consistently without otherwise a ecting choice. For
example, a decision quality instrument could take the form of the time pressure under which
a decision must be made: decision-makers faced with greater time pressure may be more
likely to choose according to the frame, but time pressure is unlikely to a ect which option
they actually prefer. Variation in a decision-quality instrument sheds light on the empirical
relationship between preferences and consistency by identifying the distribution of prefer-
ences for the set of decision-makers whose susceptibility to the frame is a ected by the
decision quality instrument. We then describe two extrapolation techniques for using this
information to estimate population preferences.
One way to understand our techniques for recovering population preferences is by analogy
to a canonical sample selection problem. For example, the matching on observables result is
closely related to the commonly used technique of re-weighting of samples based on observ-
able demographics to address sample selection. Additionally, the decision quality instrument
approach is closely related to the identification of Local Average Treatment E ects (Imbens
and Angrist, 1994). Although these parallels are helpful in understanding our results, there
is one key di erence: in our setting, whether a given individual is consistent—the analogue
to selecting into the sample in the parallel—is unobservable. The techniques we develop
modify existing tools to overcome this di culty.
We illustrate our methodology using data on participation in an employer-sponsored pen-
sion plan with varying default enrollment regimes, drawn from Madrian and Shea (2001).
Automatic enrollment in tax-deferred pension plans is a topic of immense policy interest,
but also, due to the di culty of policymakers’ understanding preferences that motivates our
paper, much controversy. Applying our approach to this setting uncovers a strong positive
relationship between employees’ consistency across default regimes (opt-in versus opt-out)
and their preferences for enrollment in the pension plan: employees whose enrollment deci-
sions are una ected by the default are more likely to prefer to enroll. Our results suggest
that although most of the inconsistent employees in the firm we study prefer enrollment, a
sizable minority (30 percent) do not. Preferences for non-enrollment are disproportionately
concentrated among younger and lower-income employees, suggesting there may be value to
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customizing default options based on employee characteristics.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 provides point-
and partial-identification conditions for the preferences of the consistent choosers. Section 4
addresses the problem of recovering preferences for the full population. Section 5 illustrates
our approach using data on defaults and enrollment into employer-provided pension plans.
The Appendix6 contains proofs of propositions (A); motivates our parameters of interest
with a simple model of optimal frame design (B); considers the relationship between our
framework and alternative structural models of default e ects (C); generalizes the framework
to settings with non-binary frames and non-binary menus (D); and derives standard errors
for finite-sample inference (E).
2 Setup
This section introduces the notation and assumptions employed throughout the paper. We
observe individual choice data from a population of density 1, with individuals denoted by
i. The observed decisions are binary, yi œ {0, 1}, and each decision-maker is observed under
exactly one of two possible frames, denoted d0 and d1.7 Let y1i and y0i denote what i would
choose under d1 and d0, respectively. Population moments are given by Y1 © E[y1i|di = d1]
and Y0 © E[y0i|di = d0]. Without loss of generality, assume Y1 Ø Y0. To illustrate the
notation using the privacy example from the introduction, y could indicate whether an
individual allows a company to use her data, so that d1 would indicate the opt-out regime,
and d0 would indicate the opt-in regime. We assume throughout that population moments
such as these are directly observable, setting aside issues of finite-sample statistical inference.
Decision-makers have ordinal, asymmetric preferences over the available options, denoted
by yúi œ {0, 1}. Implicit in this notation is the following assumption:
A1 (Frame Separability) For all individuals, yúi does not depend on d.
Frame separability limits which features of the decision-making environment are treated
as a frame. Features of a decision that a ect choice but that are relevant to decision-makers’
preferences over the available options are not frames.8 Importantly, frame separability does
6Available on the authors’ websites.
7Our definition of a frame is based on Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009),
and corresponds to what Thaler (2015) refers to as a Supposedly Irrelevant Factor. In settings where the
frame is multi-dimensional, such as variation in which option is the default and the order in which the
options are presented, we can apply this framework using the two most extreme frames – those that make
decision-makers most likely and least likely to choose y = 1, respectively – as d1 and d0. See Appendix D
for generalizations beyond the two-option, two-frame setting.
8For example, if a decision-maker chooses hot chocolate from {hot chocolate, ice cream} under one frame
and ice cream from {hot chocolate, ice cream} under the other frame, there would be no apparent deviation
from rationality if the frame indicated whether the season was winter or summer. This assumption is explicit
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not require decision-makers to be irrational; a decision-making feature that imposed a trans-
action cost for selecting one of the options would constitute a frame, as long as it did not
also a ect decision-makers’ preference for receiving one option or the other.9
Decision-makers may either choose consistently or choose in a way that is sensitive to the
frame. We denote consistency by ci © 1{y0i = y1i}. We assume throughout that the fraction
of consistent decision-makers is strictly positive, E[ci] > 0.
When a decision-maker chooses consistently, we assume that her choice reflects her pref-
erences:
A2 (The Consistency Principle) For all individuals, ci = 1 =∆ yi = yúi .
In the privacy settings example described above, the consistency principle implies that
a customer who would choose to keep his data private under both the opt-in and opt-out
frame does in fact prefer that his data be kept private. The consistency principle relaxes the
instrumental rationality assumption relied on by neoclassical revealed preference analysis,
in that the choices made by inconsistent decision-makers need not reveal their preferences.
It fails when decision-makers su er from biases that cause them to make the same mistake
under every frame in which they are observed.
Because each decision-maker is observed under only one frame, consistency is not directly
observable from the data. If consistency were directly observable, Assumptions A1 and
A2 alone would permit the identification of consistent decision-makers’ preferences, as in
Bernheim and Rangel (2009). The following two assumptions permit us to recover this
information under weaker data requirements.
A3 (Unconfoundedness) (y0i , y1i) ‹ di.
Unconfoundedness is a statistical assumption about the process by which decision-makers
are assigned to frames. It ensures that di erences in observed choices under di erent frames
is due to the e ect of the frames rather than to di erences in the decision-makers assigned
to each frame. Unconfoundedness is guaranteed when frames are randomly assigned.
A4 (Frame Monotonicity) For all individuals, y1i Ø y0i.
Frame monotonicity requires that when a frame a ects choice, it does so in the same
direction for each a ected decision-maker. In the privacy settings example described above,
frame monotonicity fails if some customers choose to allow access to their data if and only
if doing so is not the default. Much of our discussion assumes frame monotonicity, but we
in Salant and Rubinstein (2008) and implicit in Bernheim and Rangel (2009), who require it for determining
when two potentially conflicting choice situations di er in terms of the frame or in terms of the available
menu items. In this sense, frame separability is the property that distinguishes variation in frames from
variation in menu items.
9Put di erently, yúi indicates which option a rational individual would select in the absence of transaction
costs.
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also derive partial identification results for settings in which the assumption fails.
3 Identifying Consistent Preferences
We initially focus on consistent decision-makers, those whose behavior is not a ected by
the frame. Recovering the preferences of this group would be trivial if decision-makers were
observed under each frame; in that case an observer could identify which decision-makers
were consistent and, using the consistency principle, which options the consistent decision-
makers preferred. However, many real-world datasets do not have this property, and even
when they do the order in which decision-makers are exposed to frames may itself a ect
behavior (LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003). The following proposition provides conditions for the
identification of consistent decision-makers’ preferences when each decision-maker is observed
under a single frame:
Proposition 1 Let Yc © Y0Y0+1≠Y1 .
(1.1) Under A1 - A4, E[yúi |ci = 1] = Yc.
(1.2) Under A1 - A3,
(i) Yc > 12 =∆ E[yúi |ci = 1] Ø Yc
(ii) Yc < 12 =∆ E[yúi |ci = 1] Æ Yc
(iii) Yc = 12 =∆ E[yúi |ci = 1] = Yc
Proof By construction, (y0i, y1i) œ {(0, 0), (1, 1), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Frame monotonicity rules
out (y0i, y1i) = (1, 0). Therefore we know that y0i = 1 ≈∆ (y0i, y1i) = (1, 1), and by the
consistency principle, (y0i, y1i) = (1, 1) =∆ yúi = 1. Thus, E[y0i] = p(yúi = 1; ci = 1). By
the same logic, frame monotonicity and the consistency principle imply that E[1 ≠ y1i] =
p(yúi = 0; ci = 1). Then by definition, p(ci = 1) = E[y0i] + E[1≠ y1i], and by the definition
of conditional probability, E[yúi |ci = 1] = E[y0i]E[y0i]+E[1≠y1i] . By unconfoundedness, Y1 = E[y1i]
and Y0 = E[y0i]; substituting these into the previous expression yields 1.1.
The proofs of 1.2 and of all further results are contained in Appendix A. ⌅
Proposition 1.1 follows from the insight that, under frame monotonicity, only consistent
decision-makers choose against the frame (i.e., they choose y = 1 under d0 or choose y = 0
under d1). Unconfoundedness guarantees that the assignment of individuals to frames is un-
correlated with preferences or consistency, which means that we can treat the set of decision-
makers choosing against the frame as a representative sample of all consistent choosers. Fi-
nally, the consistency principle ensures that the observed choices of this group reveal the
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Table 1: Aggregate Choices by Frame
d1 d0
Fraction choosing y = 1 Y1 = 0.70 Y0 = 0.40
Fraction choosing y = 0 1≠ Y1 = 0.30 1≠ Y0 = 0.60
Fraction consistent, E[ci],
under A1-A4 Y0 + 1≠ Y1 = 0.4 + 0.3= 0.70
Consistent preferences,
E[yúi |ci = 1], under A1-A4
Y0
Y0+1≠Y1 =
0.4
0.7= 0.57
Bounds on E[yúi |ci = 1],
under A1-A3 [0.57 , 1]
preferences of the corresponding decision-makers. As a result, the denominator of Yc mea-
sures the fraction of decision-makers that are consistent and the numerator measures the
subset of that group with yúi = 1.
Proposition 1.2 provides a partial identification result that is robust to failures of frame
monotonicity. Borrowing terminology from Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1996), define frame-
defiers as the subset of inconsistent decision-makers who select yi = 1 if and only if d = d0.
Frame-defiers would be misclassified as consistent by Proposition 1.1. Intuitively, decision-
makers choosing against the frame under either frame may be either consistent choosers or
frame-defiers. Because frame-defiers are assigned to the frames in equal proportions (by
unconfoundedness), Proposition 1.1 will classify half of the frame-defiers as choosing yi = 1
consistently and half as choosing yi = 0 consistently. Misclassifying the frame-defiers as
consistent therefore biases Yc toward 12 .
Table 1 illustrates this result for hypothetical data on the online privacy controls example
described in the introduction. We suppose that 70 percent of individuals allow a company
to use their data (yi = 1) under an opt-out policy, but that under an opt-in policy, 40
percent do so. Under frame monotonicity, we can conclude that 70 percent of individuals
are consistent across default regimes and that 57 percent of those customers prefer allowing
the company to use their data. Without frame monotonicity, we may only conclude that at
least 57 percent of the consistent customers prefer allowing the company to use their data.
The preference information recovered by Proposition 1 is important for several reasons.
First, if one’s philosophical starting point is that inconsistent decision-makers lack norma-
tively relevant preferences (see the discussion of this issue in Fischho , 1991), Proposition
1 is the end-point of the analysis; our method isolates the normatively-relevant parameter
(the consistent decision-makers’ preferences) from the noise induced by the frames. Second,
when population preferences are known – what Bernheim and Rangel (2009) refer to as a
“refinement” – Proposition 1 can be used in conjunction with that information to recover the
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preferences of the inconsistent decision-makers.10 Such information is often valuable because
optimal policy may turn on the preferences of the inconsistent decision-makers (see Appendix
B), but observing aggregate population preferences under a refinement does not provide the
preferences for that subgroup. Finally, the preferences of the consistent decision-makers may
be used to recover the preferences of the remainder of the population by accounting for se-
lection into the consistent sub-population, which is the task we undertake in the remaining
sections.
4 Identifying Population Preferences
The remainder of the paper addresses how to use the preferences of the consistent decision-
makers to gain information about the preferences of the inconsistent decision-makers or of
the full population. The basic challenge to doing so is overcoming a potential selection
bias: when selection into the consistent sub-population is not random, characteristics of
the consistent decision-makers may be correlated with the preferences of that group. In
many ways, this challenge parallels the well-known problem of selection into treatment that
has been studied in the program evaluation literature. However, an important di erence is
that in the typical sample selection context, the researcher can identify which units have
been selected into the relevant sample.11 In contrast, whether a particular decision-maker is
consistent is unobservable when each decision-maker is observed under a single frame.
To clarify the selection issue, note that we can write
E[yúi ] = E[yúi |ci = 1]≠
cov(yúi , ci)
E[ci]
, (1)
where the equation follows from the identity cov(yúi , ci) = E[yúi ci]≠ E[yúi ]E[ci] and the fact
that E[yúi ci] = P (yúi = ci = 1) = E[yúi |ci = 1]E[ci]. Equation (1) highlights that recovering
population preferences from consistent sub-group preferences requires accounting for the
correlation between preferences and consistency (the other parameters in the equation are
identified under A1-A4). Moreover, the covariance is a su cient statistic for identifying
population preferences despite uncertainty about the underlying behavioral model; that is,
for the purposes of identifying E[yúi ], the behavioral model only matters to the extent that
it shapes cov(yúi , ci). Note that in the special case in which the covariance term is zero –
10Formally, when E[yúi ] is known, the law of iterated expectations allows us to recover E[yúi |ci = 0] =
E[yúi ]≠E[yúi |ci=1]E[ci]
1≠E[ci] .
11For example, assessing the e ect of a job training program on wages may be biased if the program
induces some individuals to become employed when they would not have been employed otherwise (e.g.,
Lee, 2009). In that context, the researcher can observe whether a given individual has wage data and hence
whether he or she has been selected into the sample of employed workers.
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a condition we refer to as decision quality independence – the preferences of the consistent
decision-makers will be representative of the full population.12
4.1 Partial Identification
Absent information on the relationship between preferences and consistency, the distribution
of preferences in the population may be partially identified in the spirit of Manski (1989),
as follows:
Proposition 2
(2.1) Under A1-A4, E[yúi ] œ [Y0, Y1].
(2.2) Under A1 -A3, max {Y0 ≠ (1≠ Y1), 0} Æ E[yú] Æ min {Y0 + Y1, 1} .
The partial identification result in Proposition 2.1 is quite intuitive: with frame monotonicity,
the fraction preferring an option lies between the fraction choosing that option under the
two frames. When the fraction of inconsistent decision-makers is large, the bounds will be
relatively uninformative.
Without frame monotonicity, we obtain weaker, one-directional bounds for population
preferences. The result follows from noting thatE[yúi ] depends on three parameters: E[yúi |ci =
0], E[yúi |ci = 1], and E[ci]. Although E[yúi |ci = 0] is unobservable, the other two parameters
can be inferred from the data given information on the prevalence of frame-defiers. Knowing
that E[yúi |ci = 1] œ [0, 1] constrains the prevalence of frame defiers, which then yields bounds
on the value of E[yúi ]. The further Y0 is from 1 ≠ Y1, the more informative the bounds will
be.13 Note that when frame monotonicity fails, it is possible that a majority of decision-
makers choose one option under both frames even though a majority of the population in
fact prefers the other option.
Using the hypothetical data from Table 1, we would conclude under frame monotonicity
that the fraction of the population preferring that their personal data be used is between 40
and 70 percent. Without monotonicity, we can only conclude that this fraction is greater
than 10 percent.
To summarize the results thus far, the degree to which E[yúi ] and E[yúi |ci = 1] can be
identified from the data depends on the strength of the researcher’s assumptions about the
12Decision quality independence is analogous to the familiar “missing at random” assumption in the sample
selection literature.
13When Y0 = 1≠ Y1 exactly, the bounds are entirely uninformative because the data do not constrain the
fraction of frame-defiers and, as a result, we cannot rule out E[ci] = 0. Consequently, when Y0 = 1≠Y1, any
E[yúi ] œ [0, 1] is feasible.
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behavioral model. When only A1-A3 are imposed, the data permit partial identification of
E[yúi ] and E[yúi |ci = 1], where the bounds on the former are wider than those on the lat-
ter. Adding frame monotonicity permits E[yúi |ci = 1] to be point identified and narrows the
bounds on E[yúi ]. Finally, imposing decision quality independence permits point identifica-
tion of E[yúi ] as well. The remaining two sections provide alternative identification conditions
for E[yúi ] that rely on frame monotonicity but not on decision quality independence.
4.2 Matching on Observables
In this section, we consider situations where the relationship between preferences and con-
sistency depends on characteristics of decision-makers that are observable to the researcher,
such as income, education, age, or prior experience with the decision at hand. For example,
it could be that more educated customers are less likely to prefer that companies use their
personal data and are more likely to choose consistently across default regimes, but that
conditional on education, preferences and consistency are independent.
Suppose that decision-makers exhibit observable characteristics wi œ W . The presence
of these observables permits us to relax the unconfoundedness assumption:
A3’ (Conditional Unconfoundedness). For all observable characteristics w, (y1i, y0i) ‹
di |wi = w.
Using the observable characteristics to extrapolate from the preferences of consistent
decision-makers requires the following assumption:
A5 (Conditional Decision Quality Independence) For all individuals and all observable
characteristics w, cov(yúi , ci|wi = w) = 0.
Conditional decision quality independence requires that consistent and inconsistent decision-
makers with the same observable characteristics have the same distribution of preferences.
As with any matching-on-observables approach, the plausibility of this assumption will de-
pend on the detail and quality of the observable characteristics as well as the underlying
positive model of behavior. We examine this question in more detail in Appendix C and
show that A5 is more likely to hold when variation in consistency is driven by heterogeneity
in the cost of optimizing or in the tendency to employ a psychological heuristic (C.1.2),
rather than intensity in preferences over the available options (C.2).
The identification strategy we propose in this section is: first, to estimate the preferences
of consistent decision-makers with given observable characteristics; second, to extrapolate
preferences from consistent to inconsistent decision-makers with the same observable char-
acteristics; and third, to use weighted combinations based on the distribution of observable
characteristics to recover preferences in the full population or the sub-population of incon-
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sistent decision-makers.
An important barrier to employing this familiar approach in our context is that we cannot
directly observe consistency. The following lemma shows that the distribution of character-
istics among the consistent and inconsistent decision-makers is nonetheless identified.14
Lemma 1 Let Yj(w) = E[yji|di = dj, wi = w] for j = 0, 1, qw = Y0(w)+1≠Y1(w)Ew[Y0(w)+1≠Y1(w)] , and
sw = Y1(w)≠Y0(w)Ew[Y1(w)≠Y0(w)] . Under A1, A3’, and A4:
(L1.1) For any w, p(wi = w| ci = 1) = qwp(wi = w)
(L1.2) For any w, p(wi = w| ci = 0) = swp(wi = w).
Apart from its role as a step in the construction of the matching estimator, Lemma 1 is
useful in its own right. Information on the observable correlates of consistency is important
for researchers investigating the mechanisms by which frames a ect decision-making and
for policymakers designing interventions aimed at particular sub-groups of the population.15
Exploiting Lemma 1 along with conditional decision quality independence, the following
proposition formalizes the matching-on-observables identification strategy described above:
Proposition 3 Let Yc(w) = Y0(w)Y0(w)+1≠Y1(w) . Under Assumptions A1, A2, A3’, A4, and A5 :
(3.1) E[yúi ] = Ew[Yc(w)]
(3.2) E[yúi |ci = 0] = Ew[sw Yc(w)]16
Table 2 illustrates the identification approach for our privacy controls example, reporting
hypothetical data conditioned upon whether individuals have at least a high school educa-
tion. The population moments in the third column match the moments in Table 1. The
14Lemma 1 is analogous to Abadie (2003), who shows how to identify the aggregate observable character-
istics of compliers with respect to an instrument when individual compliers cannot be identified. Continuing
with the analogy, Proposition 3 is related to Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2013), who exploit information on
the distribution of observables to extrapolate an estimated treatment e ect from one subset of a population
to another.
15For example, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) advocate designing frames in ways that o set other decision-
making biases. However, for this approach to be valid, it must be that the decision-makers subject to the
bias being targeted are also the ones that are sensitive to the frame being set. Lemma 1 helps address this
issue by allowing the researcher to determine which types of decision-makers are likely to be sensitive to
a given frame. Lemma 1 is also valuable for assessing which types of decision-makers are “more rational”
when the researcher is unable to observe repeated decisions by individual decision-makers, as required for
the approach developed in Choi et al. (2014).
16Replacing assumption A3 with A3’ in (1.1) and (1.2) implies that E[ci] = Ew[Y0(w) + 1 ≠ Y1(w)],
andE[yú|ci = 1] = Ew[qwYc(w)]. The results in Proposition 3 make use of this revised estimator for E[ci].
Even under random frame assignment, the revised estimator for E[ci] will be preferable for applications of
Proposition 3 in finite sample, due to possible spurious correlation between observables and frame assignment.
In particular, using the revised estimator ensures the weights implied by (3.1) will sum to one.
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Table 2: Average Choices by Frame and High School Education
HS = 1 HS = 0 Total
Fraction choosing y = 1 under d1, Y1(w) 0.66 0.76 0.70
Fraction choosing y = 1 under d0, Y0(w) 0.56 0.16 0.40
Fraction of population, p(w) 0.60 0.40 1.00
Fraction consistent, E[ci|w] 0.90 0.40 0.70
Fraction of consistent population, p(w|ci = 1) 0.77 0.23 1.00
Fraction of inconsistent population, p(w|ci = 0) 0.20 0.80 1.00
Consistent preferences, E[yúi|ci = 1] 0.62 0.40 0.57
Inconsistent preferences, E[yúi|ci = 0] 0.62 0.40 0.44
Population preferences, E[yúi ] 0.62 0.40 0.53
conditioning reveals that high-school-educated individuals are more likely to be consistent
and the consistent choosers among them are more likely to prefer that the company use
their personal data (yi = 1). Under conditional decision quality independence, we conclude
that 44 percent of inconsistent decision-makers, and 53 percent of the population prefer that
their personal data be used. Under unconditional decision quality independence, both these
fractions would be 57 percent and we would over-estimate the share preferring that their
personal data be used, because this approach ignores the relationship between preferenes
and consistency.
4.3 Decision Quality Instruments
Here we develop an approach for settings in which selection into the consistent subpopu-
lation is driven by characteristics that are unobservable to the researcher. Specifically, we
introduce the notion of a decision quality instrument, which exploits variation in the decision-
making environment that a ects decision-makers’ consistency but that is orthogonal to their
preferences. The key di erence between this approach and canonical instrumental variables
analysis (Imbens and Angrist, 1994) is that our analogue of the first-stage outcome variable,
consistency, is unobservable.
Let z denote a decision quality instrument with two values, z œ {zh, zl}. Individual
choices now depend on d and z; we denote them by by yijk, where j œ {0, 1} indexes the frame
and k œ {h, l} indexes the instrument. Consistency is defined at each value of the instrument
and denoted by cik = 1{yi1k = yi0k}. We denote the fraction of decision-makers observed
choosing y under a given (d, z) combination by Yjk © E[yijk|d = dj, z = zk]. The following
assumptions establish which variation constitutes a valid decision quality instrument:
A3” (Unconfoundedness of d and z) (yi1h, yi0h, yi1l, yi0l) ‹ (di, zi)
A6 (Decision quality exclusivity) For all individuals, yúi does not depend on z.
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A7 (Decision quality monotonicity) For all individuals, cih Ø cil with E[cih ≠ cil] > 0.
Assumption A3” modifies the unconfoundedness assumption, which now requires that
both d and z be uncorrelated with confounding factors. Assumption A6 requires that vari-
ation in the decision-making environment induced by z is irrelevant from the perspective of
decision-makers’ preferences; it ensures that z a ects behavior by altering consistency, not
by changing which option decision-makers prefer.17 Assumption A7 requires that the e ect
of z on consistency is weakly monotonic for all decision-makers and strictly monotonic for
some.
Variation in z might arise from natural experiments or be induced by researchers. For
example, suppose that some decision-makers were randomly assigned to a treatment group
aimed at manipulating their “cognitive load” – such as by memorizing a 10-digit number
– prior to making the decision being studied. Such experimental designs could plausibly
manipulate decision-makers’ susceptibility to a frame in ways that are unrelated to their
preferences. Other examples of decision quality instruments might include the time pressure
for making a decision, the cost of obtaining or processing information about the available
choices, the opportunity cost of cognitive resources at the time of decision-making, or the
intensity of the frame (e.g., the degree to which one alternative is more salient than another).
4.3.1 Identifying Sometimes-Consistent Preferences
This section develops a reduced-form approach to recover the preferences of those decision-
makers whose consistency is a ected by a decision quality instrument, which sheds light on
the empirical relationship between consistency and preferences.
Proposition 4. Assume that A1, A2, and A4 hold at each fixed value of z, and assume
A3”, A6, and A7. Then
E[yúi |cih > cil] =
Y0h ≠ Y0l
Y1l ≠ Y0l ≠ (Y1h ≠ Y0h)
Proposition 4 is best understood by analogy to the identification of a local average treat-
ment e ect (LATE, see Imbens and Angrist, 1994). The monotonicity assumption (A7) per-
mits us to divide the population into three groups of decision-makers: the always-consistent
(cih = cil = 1), the sometimes-consistent (cih = 1; cil = 0), and the never-consistent
(cih = cil = 0). The denominator of the expression in Proposition 4 measures the de-
crease in the size of the inconsistent sub-group as we move from zl to zh, which identifies
17Like A1, A6 does not rule out variation in z a ecting welfare by altering the transaction costs associated
with choosing against the frame. Indeed, exogenous variation in such costs is an excellent candidate for a
decision quality instrument. See Appendix C.
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the size of the sometimes-consistent group, who are the analog of the compliers in the LATE
framework. The expression in the numerator measures the change in the fraction choos-
ing y = 1 under d0 as z changes, which identifies the fraction of decision-makers who are
sometimes-consistent and prefer y = 1.
Several other parallels to the instrumental variables literature are apparent. First, one
can use Proposition 4 to motivate over-identification tests of decision quality indepen-
dence along the lines of Wu (1973) and Hausman (1978). However, such a test requires
E[yú|cih > cil] = E[yú], which may fail depending on the nature of selection into consis-
tency. We explore less restrictive alternatives below. Additionally, the types of variation
that will satisfy assumptions A6 and A7 depend on the underlying model of behavior that
generates framing e ects, reflecting a familiar interplay between structural reasoning and
instrumental variables. We discuss this issue further in Appendix C. Finally, Proposition 4
may be extended beyond binary decision quality instruments, by applying Proposition 4 to
each pair-wise combination of values of z or, when z is continuous, by adapting the methods
of Yitzhaki (1996) (see also Heckman and Vytlacil, 2007).18
Table 3 illustrates this identification approach for the hypothetical data on privacy con-
trols. We now suppose that the process for adjusting privacy settings may be either onerous
(customers are required to navigate through several web pages) or streamlined (customers
may adjust privacy settings with a single click). Aggregate choices under the onerous design
correspond to the population moments reported in Table 1. Customers are less susceptible
to default e ects when the process is streamlined. We can back out the fraction of consistent
choosers and the aggregate preferences of the consistent choosers when controls are onerous
(zl) or streamlined (zh) using Proposition 1, as before. Note that the fraction of consistent
customers who prefer that the company use their personal data is lower under streamlined
controls than onerous ones, because the variation in z a ects opt-out rates (Y1) more than
opt-in rates (Y0). Applying Proposition 4 in this example would imply that of the 20 percent
of the population of customers who are sometimes-consistent, only 25 percent prefer that
the company use their data, a share substantially below that of the consistent choosers at
either zh or zl.
An interesting special case of Proposition 4 occurs when, under zh, all decision-makers
are consistent, i.e., p(cih = 1) = 1. For example, default e ects may be eliminated by
18Another use for Proposition 4 is motivated by the optimal policy problem facing governments that must
choose which z value to implement, for example a regulator deciding how streamlined privacy controls should
be. Appendix B shows the solution to this problem trades o  the cost of selecting a z that induces greater
consistency against the welfare gain from doing so. The latter depends on the preferences of the decision-
makers who choose consistently at one candidate z but not in another, which Proposition 4 can be used to
estimate.
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Table 3: Average Choices by Frame and Di culty of Changing Privacy Settings
Onerous (zl) Streamlined (zh)
Fraction choosing y = 1 under d1 0.70 0.55
Fraction choosing y = 1 under d0 0.40 0.45
Fraction consistent, E[ci] 0.70 0.90
Consistent preferences,
E[yúi |cik = 1] 0.57 0.50
Sometimes consistent preferences,
E[yúi |cih > cil] 0.25
requiring all decision-makers to make an active choice (Carroll et al., 2009). In this case,
E[yúi |cih = 1] = E[yú], so choices under zh are a “refinement” in which the preferences of
the full population is identified, as in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009). Furthermore, when
cih = 1 for all individuals, E[yúi |cih > cil] = E[yúi |cil = 0]. Consequently, the statistic Ys
identifies the preferences of the inconsistent choosers at zl. One can directly recover the
preferences of the population and of the inconsistent decision-makers from choice data using
Proposition 4 in this case.
The next two sections develop identification conditions for population and inconsistent
decision-maker preferences that utilize variation in z. On its own, Proposition 4 does not
identify these parameters; rather, by shedding light on the covariance between preferences
and consistency, it allows us to extrapolate preference information from consistent decision-
makers to other groups in the population.
4.3.2 Structural Extrapolation with Decision Quality Instruments
This section develops a latent variable model of the relationship between decision-makers’
consistency and their preferences, assuming a bivariate normal distribution for the idiosyn-
cratic terms. With this additional structure, population preference parameters may be fully
characterized using a decision quality instrument.
Suppose that consistency for individual i is determined by
Pi = P + ◊zi + Ái (2)
ci = 1 ≈∆ Pi > 0, (3)
where Pi is a latent variable reflecting idiosyncratic variation Ái and the e ect of a binary
decision quality instrument zi œ {0, 1}. Note that consistency depends on i’s choice under
both frames, so Pi does not depend on the frame to which i is assigned. Note also that
decision quality monotonicity (A7) is satisfied provided ◊ ”= 0.
Next, suppose the distribution of preferences can also be described with a latent variable
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model:
Mi = M + ‹i (4)
yúi = 1 ≈∆ Mi > 0, (5)
where the latent variable Mi simply reflects idiosyncratic variation in preferences, ‹i. Frame
separability (A1) is satisfied becauseMi does not depend on d, and decision quality exclusiv-
ity (A6) is satisfied because Mi does not depend on zi. Unconfoundedness (A3”) is satisfied
provided that Ái and ‹i are independent of zi and di.
Assume that Ái and ‹i are characterized by a bivariate standard normal distribution:QaÁi
‹i
Rb ≥ N
QaQa0
0
Rb ,
Qa1 fl
fl 1
RbRb , (6)
where fl œ (≠1, 1) is the correlation between the error terms and where the normalization is
without loss of generality. Note that decision quality independence is satisfied if and only if
fl = 0.
We close the model with the consistency principle (A2) and frame monotonicity (A4).
Together, these assumptions allow us to evaluate the probability of observing a given choice
for a given (d, z):
’i,’k = 0, 1, yi0k = 1 ≈∆ Ái > ≠P ≠ ◊zk; ‹i > ≠M (7)
’i,’k = 0, 1, yi1k = 0 ≈∆ Ái > ≠P ≠ ◊zk; ‹i < ≠M. (8)
Equations (7) and (8) can be combined with (6) to identify the parameters of the model: P ,
M , ◊, and fl. We can then recover ordinal preferences by integrating the underlying distri-
bution: E[yú] =  (M¯), where  () is the standard normal cumulative density function, and
E[yúi |cik = 0] = 11≠E[cik]
´ P≠◊zk
≠Œ
´Œ
≠M „
BV SN(Á, ‹; fl)ˆ‹ˆÁ, where „BV SN(a, b; fl) is the bivariate
standard normal density with correlation coe cient fl evaluated at (a, b).
The structural model described above resembles the classic bivariate normal model of
selection (see e.g. Heckman, 1979). Variation in the decision quality instrument induces
variation in consistency without a ecting preferences; this guarantees the relationship be-
tween consistency and preferences is identified without relying on functional form alone
(Puhani, 2000).19
Applying the model to the data from Table 3 yields an estimated correlation coe cient
of fl = 0.54; the positive estimate suggests decision-makers with a high propensity to choose
consistently (so that they are consistent at zl) are more likely to prefer yi = 1 than those
with a low propensity to choose consistently. The estimated parameters imply E[yúi ] = 0.46.
19With a binary decision decision quality instrument, the model is just-identified. Additional values of z
permit maximum likelihood estimation of the model’s parameters.
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The population average is below both E[yúi |cil = 1] and E[yúi |cih = 1] because it incorporates
the preferences of the decision-makers with the very lowest propensity to choose consistently.
4.3.3 Semi-Parametric Extrapolation with Decision Quality Instruments
This section develops an extrapolation approach for recovering population preferences with-
out relying on distributional assumptions. In particular, we model the preferences of the
consistent decision-makers at a given value of the decision quality instrument as a flexible
polynomial in the fraction of decision-makers who are consistent at that value of the decision
quality instrument.20
Suppose the decision quality instrument is observed taking on N + 1 values, indexed
z0, z1, ..., zN , and drawn from a continuous ordered set of values, [z, z¯] µ R such that E[ciz] =
0 and E[ciz] = 1. In addition, suppose that decision quality monotonicity holds with respect
to any two values of z:
A7’ For all individuals and all z, zÕ œ [z, z¯] such that z > zÕ, ciz Ø cizÕ and E[ciz ≠ cizÕ ] > 0.
For each individual, let zúi < z¯ denote the value of z at which she begins to choose consistently,
i.e., z Ø zúi =∆ ciz = 1. Assumption A7’ implies that zúi is unique. Denoting the CDF of
zú by F (.) and the PDF by f(.), we have E[ciz] = F (z). In addition, note that the second
part of A7’ guarantees f(z) > 0 for all z œ [z, z¯], so that F (.) is strictly increasing with a
well-defined inverse function over E[ciz¯] œ [0, 1], which we denote F≠1(E[ciz]).
Finally, let g(z) = E[yúi |zúi = z] denote the preferences of the marginally consistent
decision-makers at a given z.21 To guarantee the validity of the Taylor Series approximation
that underpins the following result, it will be convenient to assume that both F (z) and g(z)
are infinitely di erentiable with respect to z.
Proposition 6 Under A1, A2, A6, and A7’, for any degree D œ N, there are constants
a0...aD such that
(6.1) For any z,22 E[yúi |zúi = z] ¥ a0 + a1E[ciz] + a2E[ciz]2...+ aDE[ciz]D
20This approach shares some similarity to the literature on non-parametric identification of marginal
treatment e ects from local average treatment e ects (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). An important di erence
is that the techniques in that literature utilize instrumental variables that drive the propensity to participate
in the treatment over a range from 0 to 1. However, recall that in our context, if we were able to observe
decisions made under a decision-quality state that induced everyone to choose consistently, we could simply
look at the preferences revealed in that state to recover the preferences for the population.
21Although by definition z œ R, the value of z itself may be unobservable to the researcher.
22The approximation disregards terms of order D and higher, i.e. those of the form E[ciz]k where k Ø D,
as do the approximations in (6.2) and (6.3).
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(6.2) For any z, E[yúi |ciz = 1] ¥ a0 + a12 E[ciz] + a23 E[ciz]2 + ... aDD+1E[ciz]D
(6.3) E[yúi ] ¥ a0 + a1 + ...+ aD
Proposition 6 implies that the preferences of the consistent decision-makers at a particular
value of the decision quality instrument can be approximated by a polynomial function in the
fraction of decision-makers who choose consistently at that value of the instrument. Because
A7’ guarantees a one-to-one mapping between z and E[ciz], we can write the preferences
of the marginally consistent decision-makers as a function of the fraction of decision-makers
choosing consistently, i.e. E[yúi |zi = z] = g(F≠1(E[ciz])). In addition, infinite di erentiability
of g and F ensure imply the composite function h © g ¶ F≠1 will have a well-defined Taylor
Series approximation of degree D. We then obtain 6.2 by integrating the marginal preference
function h(.) from E[ciz] = 0 to E[cizÕ ] and scaling by E[cizÕ ] for any arbitrary zÕ. Finally,
6.3 follows directly from setting E[ciz] = 1 in 6.2. Note that when N = D, we will have
D+ 1 equations in D+ 1 unknowns, so that a0, ..., aD are just-identified. When N > D, we
will have more equations than unknowns, and a best-fit technique such as least-squares can
be used to estimate a0, ..., aD.
Proposition 6 allows us to quantify the relationship between consistency and preferences,
which can be used to estimate population preferences, without the rigid functional form
assumption underpinning the bivariate normal model in the previous section. Figure 1
illustrates the approach with data from Table 3 under a linear functional form assumption:
E[yú|ci(z) = 1] = –+ —E[ci(z)]. With two values of z, – and — are just-identified: – ¥ 0.82
and — ¥ ≠0.35. Applying 6.2 yields E[yúi ] = 0.48. As in the bivariate normal model,
accounting for the relationship between consistency and preferences leads us to conclude
that the fraction of the population preferring yi = 1 is less than the fraction of the consistent
choosers preferring yi = 1 under either value of the decision-quality instrument.
5 Application to 401(k) Automatic Enrollment
In this section we illustrate our identification framework by analyzing data on enrollment
decisions into employer-provided 401(k) pension plans. Depending on how the plan is de-
signed, new employees may have to actively enroll in the plan in order to participate, or
their enrollment may be automatic unless they choose to opt out. An influential body of
research documents striking di erences in take-up and savings behavior between such opt-in
and opt-out regimes (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2006; Chetty et al., 2014). Most
policy discussion of automatic enrollment takes as its starting point that employees would
be better o  under 401(k) plan designs that cause them to save more than they otherwise
23
Figure 1: Extrapolation from Preferences of Consistent and Marginally Consistent Choosers
1
E[c]
E[yú]
0.90.7
0.35
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would. Our framework allows us to investigate employee preferences empirically, without
imposing paternalistic assumptions of this form. Moreover, although others have studied
the welfare e ects of defaults in this setting (Carroll et al., 2009; Bernheim, Fradkin and
Popov, 2015), an important advantage to our approach is that it does not require taking
a stance on the particular positive model that generates any decision-making bias.23 Only
models that violate the consistency principle are entirely ruled out. In addition, an advan-
tage of the reduced-form nature of our approach is that it makes transparent what role each
assumption plays in identification, such as how frame monotonicity and conditional decision
quality independence strengthen the conclusions that can be drawn from the data.
5.1 Data
To study the e ect of automatic enrollment on pension plan participation, we use data
from the large health care and insurance firm studied in Madrian and Shea (2001). This
firm switched from an opt-in to an opt-out enrollment design in April 1998,24 and Madrian
23Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015) consider a variety of positive models of default e ects and welfarist
assumptions, and derive welfare inferences that are robust to a range of alternative assumptions. Importing
each of these into our setting reveals that frame monotonicity and the consistency principle are satisfied for
each of the possibilities they consider (see Appendix C).
24Under automatic enrollment, employees who were automatically enrolled faced a default contribution
rate of 3 percent. Refer to Madrian and Shea (2001) for additional details regarding the data and the change
in enrollment policy. Data from other studies suggests that raising the default contribution rate would
increase the share opting out of enrollment under automatic enrollment (e.g. Choi et al., 2006; Bernheim,
Fradkin and Popov, 2015), as would be suggested by a model of costly opt-out. In our setting, this finding
implies that at a higher default contribution rate, the fraction of employees that prefer to be enrolled in a
24
Table 4: Employee Characteristics
Hired under
opt-in
Hired under
opt-out Full sample
Compensation
<$20K 10.5 12.7 11.8
$20K-$29K 37.7 45.6 42.2
$30K-$39K 18.6 16.5 17.4
$40K-$49K 15.2 11.2 12.9
>$50K 18.0 14.1 15.7
Age
<30 years 30.9 37.4 34.6
30-39 years 36.0 33.3 34.5
40-64 years 33.1 29.3 30.9
Race
White 72.4 69.5 70.8
Non-white 27.6 30.4 29.2
Gender
Male 23.1 21.0 21.8
Female 76.9 79.0 78.1
Observations 4,185 5,702 9,887
Source: Disaggregated data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided to the authors.
Notes: All reported tabulations are percentages of the total sample with a given
characteristic. Due to data sharing agreements, a small number of observations in the
original sample (1.8 percent of the original dataset) were dropped from our analysis,
causing our sample characteristics to di er slightly from those reported in the original
study.
and Shea (2001) find that the switch caused a large increase in the fraction of employees
choosing to participate in the firm’s pension plan. We use the choice data from this study
to investigate employee preferences for plan participation.
We observe whether an employee enrolls in the plan (indicated by yi) and whether the
default is opt-in (d0) or opt-out (d1) when he or she is hired. We also observe annual com-
pensation, age, sex, and race for each employee.25 Table 4 describes employee characteristics.
The distribution of characteristics is not substantially di erent across default regimes. The
income, age, and racial composition of its workforce are typical of a large employer in the
US, although this firm’s workforce is predominately female. Employee participation rates by
frame and demographic group are summarized in Table IV of Madrian and Shea (2001).
401(k) is lower than our estimates for the fraction preferring enrollment under a 3 percent default.
25To ensure individual employees could not be identified, we were provided compensation and age only
within a range of values. See Table 4.
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For our identification results to apply to the choices in this data, the conditions described
in Section 2 must be satisfied. Frame separability seems likely to hold: it is di cult to imag-
ine that an employee’s preferences over how much to save depend on how her employer
chooses to structure enrollment into its sponsored retirement plan. Unconfoundedness re-
quires that an employee’s hiring date be uncorrelated with whether she chooses to participate
under either plan design. This is the same assumption necessary to identify the causal e ect
of the change in enrollment from the change in plan design, and Madrian and Shea (2001)
provide evidence this assumption is satisfied. Frame monotonicity requires that no employee
chooses to enroll when enrollment is opt-in but chooses not to enroll when enrollment is
opt-out, which seems plausible in this setting.
Of our assumptions, the one that is perhaps least likely to hold in this setting is the
consistency principle, which requires that employees who would make the same participation
decision under both opt-in and opt-out enrollment actually prefer the option that they
choose. If some of the employees who choose not to participate under either plan design
are present-biased, they might be better o  participating in the plan – despite the fact
that doing so is the opposite of their (consistently) revealed preference. Importantly, not
all forms of present bias would cause the consistency principle to fail. For example, in the
model of default-sensitivity studied by Carroll et al. (2009), present-bias causes individuals
to procrastinate and stick with the default savings plan until they make an active choice,
but when they do make an active choice the amount they choose to save is optimal. Such
behavior satisfies the consistency principle because those individuals who choose consistently
have selected their welfare-maximizing option. Alternatively, a government may wish to
adopt the consistency principle for purposes of policy design even when it is suspect, if one
of its goals is to respect individuals’ choices and avoid paternalism (Bernheim and Rangel,
2009). Ultimately, the policy implications of our findings in this section depend on whether
one believes that employee enrollment decisions made consistently across frames reveals
normatively meaningful preference information. We return to this caveat in our discussion
of the results below.
5.2 Results
To begin, we focus on the preferences of the consistent decision-makers. Table 5 columns
1 and 2 report the aggregate enrollment rates under the two policy designs. The estimated
population participation rates are Yˆ1 = 0.859 under opt-out and Yˆ0 = 0.491. Columns 3 and
4 apply Proposition 1 to this data. Substituting the estimated population moments into the
definition of Yc in Proposition 1 yields Yc = 0.777, with a standard error of 0.006. Thus,
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under frame monotonicity, of the 63.2 percent of employees whose enrollment decisions are
sensitive to the enrollment design, we conclude that a large majority (77.7 percent) preferred
enrollment. Without assuming frame monotonicity, Proposition 1.2 implies the fraction of
consistent employees that prefer enrollment is at least 77.7 percent.
Turning to population preferences, the bounds provided by Proposition 2 are quite coarse
because of the large fraction of inconsistent decision-makers. With frame monotonicity, we
can conclude that the fraction of the population preferring enrollment lies somewhere between
0.491 and 0.859. Without frame monotonicity, we can only rule out values of E[yúi ] below
0.350. Additional structure is needed to draw more precise conclusions from the data.
We next investigate heterogeneity among employees in their preferences for enrollment
and their sensitivity to the enrollment regime. Although we cannot directly observe either
preferences or consistency for individual employees, the results from section 4.2 allow us
to investigate di erences based on employees’ observable characteristics. We estimate a
regression of the form
E[yi|d, w] = –0 + –11{d = d1}+ wÕi—0 + w
Õ
i—11{d = d1} (9)
where yi and d are defined as above and wi is a vector of employee characteristics. Applying
Proposition 1 (conditional on a given realization of employee characteristics) implies that:
E[ci|wi = w] = 1≠ –1 ≠ wÕ—1 (10)
E[yúi |ci = 1, wi = w] =
–0 + w
Õ
—0
1≠ –1 ≠ wÕ—1 (11)
The results of the analysis are reported in Table 6.26 The results suggest that both con-
sistency and the preferences of consistent choosers vary systematically and substantially by
employee characteristics. Variation in consistency is strongly related to variation in compen-
sation, with those in the highest compensation bin (annual income over $50K), estimated
to be 40 percent more likely to choose consistently than those in the lowest bin (annual
income less than $20K). The estimated di erences in consistency by income are statistically
significant (p < 0.001).27 When compensation is controlled for, di erences in consistency are
not significantly associated with heterogeneity in age, race, or gender.
Turning to preferences for enrollment among consistent employees, we document signif-
26To facilitate interpretation of the results, Column 2 of Table 6 reports the average e ect on E[yúi |ci =
1, wi = w] of a change in each component of w (relative to a “left-out” group), holding fixed the other
components of w.
27This finding adds to a growing literature that documents important di erences in susceptibility to
decision-making biases by income (e.g., Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013; Goldin and Homono , 2013; Choi
et al., 2014). Unlike Choi et al. (2014), our approach allows us to identify patterns in consistency without
observing individuals making multiple decisions.
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icant heterogeneity here as well. As with consistency, di erences by income are striking.
Employees in the highest compensation bin are 41 percent more likely to prefer enrollment
than those in the lowest compensation bin. Unlike consistency, preferences for enrollment
also vary by age, race, and gender, even after controlling for income.
The fact that both consistency and preferences for enrollment among the consistent
decision-makers are associated with income casts doubt on the plausibility of decision-quality
independence in this setting. To further assess the validity of the assumption, Figure 2
plots consistency and preferences for enrollment among the consistent employees in each
observable cross-section of the data. The scatter plot provides additional (non-parametric)
evidence against decision-quality independence: employee groups that contain a greater frac-
tion of consistent decision-makers are also more likely to have a greater fraction of consistent
decision-makers that prefer 401(k) enrollment.28 The estimated slope of the best-fit line
is 0.78, suggesting a strong positive relationship between employees’ consistency and their
preferences. Figure 2 also reveals that a majority of consistent employees in every group
with income less than $20,000 and age less than 30 prefer non-enrollment.29
Because of the apparent correlation between preferences for enrollment and consistency
in the population of employees, we apply the matching estimator described in Proposition 3
to estimate the distribuion of preferences for inconsistent employees and the full population.
To maximize the likelihood that the conditional decision quality independence assumption
is satisfied, we use a fully interacted econometric model: each combination of observables
defines a unique demographic group. Consequently, for the results to be invalid there must
be unobserved variation in consistency among employees of the same age, gender, race, and
income that is also correlated with preferences for enrollment.30
The last two columns of Table 5 present the results of the matching analysis. We estimate
that the fraction of inconsistent employees preferring enrollment is 70.8 percent – approxi-
mately 7 percentage points lower than the corresponding fraction of consistent employees.
The di erence in estimated preferences between the consistent and inconsistent employees is
statistically significant, allowing us to reject the hypothesis of decision quality independence
(p < 0.001). For the full population of employees, we estimate that 74.9 percent prefer
enrollment.
28Under conditional decision-quality independence, the fraction of the consistent preferring enrollment
within a cell equals the fraction of the population in that cell preferring enrollment.
29In fact, with one exception these were the only groups for which a majority prefer non-enrollment.
30For example, if cognitive ability is positively correlated with both consistency and preferences among
employees of the same age, gender, race, and income, our results would yield an upwardly-biased estimate
for the preferences of the inconsistent employees. The bias in the matching estimator is given by E[yúi ] ≠
Ew[Yc(w)] = Ew
Ë
cov(yúi ,ci|w)
E[ci|w]
È
. This expression follows from the law of conditional expectations and Equation
(1).
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Table 6: Consistency and Preference by Observable Characteristics
(1) (2)
Consistency
Preferences of
Consistent
Choosers
Compensation
$20K-$29K 0.123*** 0.197***
(0.028) (0.032)
$30K-$39K 0.218*** 0.319***
(0.033) (0.033)
$40K-$49K 0.267*** 0.368***
(0.035) (0.034)
>$50K 0.398*** 0.407***
(0.034) (0.033)
Age
30-39 years -0.033 0.008
(0.022) (0.017)
40-64 years 0.025 0.068***
(0.023) (0.017)
White -0.015 0.087***
(0.021) (0.016)
Male 0.003 -0.059***
(0.021) (0.017)
Observations 9,887 9,887
Source: Disaggregated data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided to the authors.
Notes: Estimates are based on equations (9)-(11). The left-out groups for each demographic
characteristic are 1) employees with compensation less than $20K, 2) employees with age
less than 30 years, 3) non-white employees, and 4) female employees. Column (1) reports
the change in the probability that an employee with a given characteristic is consistent
relative to the left-out group, controlling for other characteristics. Column (2) reports the
average increase in the probability, relative to the left-out group, of a consistent chooser
with the given characteristic preferring enrollment, holding other characteristics constant.
Standard errors calculated using the delta method are reported in parentheses.
*** indicates p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.1.
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Figure 2: Consistency versus Preference for Enrollment in a 401(k) Plan
Notes: Estimates are based on calculations on data from Madrian and Shea (2001) provided to
the authors. Each point on the bubble scatter plot consists of all workers with given values of
compensation, age, sex, and race. The fraction consistent and fraction of consistent
decision-makers preferring enrollment are calculated using the take-up rates before and after
automatic enrollment in each cell. The size of the cell is proportional to the area of the circle.
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5.3 Discussion
Our results suggest that a sizable majority of inconsistent employees, approximately 70
percent, prefer enrollment in this employer’s pension plan. This finding is consistent with the
more paternalistic view that leading these individuals to save more via automatic enrollment
would improve their welfare. Notably, however, we also find that a majority of the youngest
and lowest-income workers do not prefer enrollment in the plan.31 This could be, for example,
because employees in this group perceive retirement to be far o  and are therefore inattentive
to retirement savings, and also prefer to save less because they anticipate higher future
earnings or are currently paying o  student loan debt. To the extent an employer wishes to
implement a personalized default regime along the lines suggested in Sunstein (2015), our
results suggest a default of non-enrollment may be welfare-maximizing for young, low-income
employees.32
6 Conclusion
Recovering preferences from choice data is a fundamental challenge in behavioral economics.
Our results provide a practical framework for approaching the problem. We showed how
one can recover preference information for consistent decision-makers, as long as consistent
choices reveal preferences. In doing so, the problem of population preference identification
is transformed into one of accounting for potentially endogenous selection into the subpop-
ulation of consistent decision-makers. The transformed problem is both more familiar and
more tractable than the original: economists have developed a wide range of tools for dealing
with endogeneity challenges of this sort. The second part of the paper adapted a number of
these tools to this unfamiliar setting. These techniques account for the relationship between
consistency and preferences, allowing researchers to overcome the endogeneity issue under a
range of conditions. Using one of these techniques to analyze enrollment in pension plans
suggests that automatic enrollment benefits most workers, with the exception of younger
and lower-income employees.
Like Bernheim and Rangel (2009), our approach is most appealing in settings where
31This finding does not rely on frame monotonicity: since Yc(w) < 0.5 for these employees, Proposition 1.2
implies E[yúi |ci = 1] < Yc(w), and conditional decision quality independence then implies E[yúi |ci = 0] < 0.5
as well.
32An alternative possibility is that employees in this group are simply more present-biased, and this bias
leads many of them to consistently and sub-optimally opt out of the pension plan under automatic enrollment.
This possibility, alluded to above, would violate the consistency principle. Additional data on the timing of
decisions might help to resolve this ambiguity, but our present data cannot do so. Ultimately, our results
suggest that either young, low-income employees prefer non-enrollment or that the choices of decision-makers
in this group are so biased that they should be disregarded when selecting a pension enrollment regime.
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preference identification is important but the researcher is not confident in the precise model
of behavior that generates the inconsistency. Unlike Bernheim and Rangel (2009), many
of our results require assumptions beyond the requirement that consistent choices reveal
preferences. However, the payo  to this additional structure is substantial: it allows us to
apply our framework to weaker datasets (those in which decision-makers are observed only
once and the researcher lacks ex ante knowledge over which choices are optimal) and to sheds
light on the preferences of those decision-makers whose choices are sensitive to the frame.
Moreover, even when our behavioral assumptions are exactly the same as those required by
Bernheim and Rangel (2009), our framework provides new partial-identification results for
the preferences of the consistent choosers and for the full population.
Although focusing on binary menus and binary frames simplifies the analysis, our ap-
proach is useful outside of such settings. Appendix D develops several generalizations to more
complicated choice settings. Notably, a number of our results extend in a straightforward
way to ordered menus with two frames and multiple options. We also develop generalizations
to settings with multi-dimensional frames or multiple frames that vary in their intensity.
An important feature of our approach is its reduced-form nature. Within the wide range
of models consistent with frame-monotonicity and the consistency principle, the basic iden-
tification problem – i.e., understanding the empirical correlation between decision-makers’
preferences and their sensitivity to frames – is the same regardless of the details of the
structural model that generates behavior. On the other hand, our approach is not a replace-
ment for structural models of decision-making. As in other areas of empirical economics,
the interpretation of the parameters identified by reduced-form approaches depends on the
underlying structural model that generates behavior.33 Finally, the reduced-form nature of
our approach has the virtue of making transparent which assumptions are driving preference
identification within a particular application.
The framework studied here can be thought of as a special case of a more general approach
in which an observer first identifies the preferences of a reference group of decision-makers
whose choices are assumed to reveal their true preferences, and subsequently extrapolates
the reference group’s preferences to the rest of the population. In our approach, the reference
group consists of those decision-makers who choose consistently across frames. When using
consistent choosers as the reference group is not feasible or credible, one might replace them
with experts, experienced choosers, or those thought to be immune to the framing e ect in
question (e.g., Johnson and Rehavi, 2015; Bronnenberg et al., 2013; Handel and Kolstad,
33As described in Appendix C, understanding the underlying structural model provides guidance about
which types of control variables are needed for conditional decision quality independence to hold and about
which types of variation constitute valid decision quality instruments.
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2015). The identification techniques we have proposed may be utilized with these reference
groups as well; for example, one might adjust the recovered preferences of experts based on
observable characteristics before extrapolating their preferences to the rest of the population,
or utilize exogenous variation that causes some individuals to become experts.
Our results are subject to several limitations. First, in certain applications even con-
sistent choices may not reveal preferences. For example, decision-makers who consistently
choose one retirement plan over another, regardless of the default option, may still be choos-
ing sub-optimally based on, for example, present bias. Similarly, biases in judgment and
perception – such as over-optimism or a tendency to underweight low-risk events – may
manifest themselves consistently across frames. Many of these failures can be attributed
within our framework to the presence of “missing” frames, which a ect behavior but do
not vary in the data available to the researcher. Accurately identifying preferences in such
contexts requires additional data or assumptions that permit the analysis to move further
away from observed choice behavior.
Second, although we have attempted to develop identification strategies that may be
applied to data, the credibility of such strategies will turn on whether their assumptions are
met in the application at hand. Insofar as one is skeptical that the required assumptions
will be satisfied in any setting, our results highlight the di culty in conducting even weak-
ened forms of revealed reference analysis in the presence of framing e ects. Further work,
perhaps combining the current framework with data on subjective well-being, could attempt
to empirically assess the validity of the underlying assumptions about welfare made here.
A third limitation is that the preference information we recover will not be su cient to
determine optimal policy in all settings. For example, when choices subject to framing e ects
generate externalities – such as rules for organ donations (Abadie and Gay, 2006; Johnson
and Goldstein, 2003) or environmental incentives (Homono , 2014) – the distribution of
private preferences, while still important, is not the only relevant parameter for setting policy.
Similarly, when choosing against the frame causes decision-makers to incur utility costs,
Appendix B shows that the optimal choice of frame depends on the intensity of preferences,
not just their ordinal content, as well as the magnitude of the utility costs. As in non-
behavioral settings, identifying cardinal preference information from binary choices requires
additional data or richer structure than what we impose here. Developing methods to identify
additional preference information and incorporate it into optimal policy prescriptions is an
important task for future research.
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Chapter 2:
The Analysis of Survey Data with Framing Effects1
by Jacob Goldin (Stanford Law School) and Daniel Reck (University of Michigan)
Abstract
A well-known difficulty in survey research is that respondents’ answers to questions can depend on arbitrary
features of a survey’s design, such as the wording of questions or the ordering of answers. We develop an
empirical framework for analyzing survey data characterized by such framing effects. We show that the
conventional approach to analyzing data with framing effects – randomizing across frames and pooling the
data for estimation – does not generally identify a useful parameter. We consider a range of alternatives,
and describe the conditions under which each yields a parameter of interest. One approach attempts to
isolate the answers of respondents that are unaffected by framing. A second approach attempts to recover
information on the distribution of “true answers” in the population – when true answers exist – using a
technique analogous to post-survey reweighting for non-response bias.
1 Introduction
A well-known difficulty in survey research is that how survey-takers answer a question may
depend on seemingly arbitrary details about how the question is asked. For example, re-
spondents may answer differently depending on the order of questions (Moore, 2002; Deaton,
2012), the order in which answers are listed (Holbrook et al., 2007), the grouping of responses
1For valuable comments, we thank Angus Deaton, Edward Freeland, Michael Gideon, Allyson Holbrook,
Bo Honore, David Lee, Yair Listokin, Charles Manski, Alex Rees-Jones, Joel Slemrod, Justin Wolfers, and
participants in the Princeton Industrial Relations Lunch and the Michigan Summer Seminar. All errors are
our own.
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into categories (Schwarz, 1990), or any number of minor variations in the manner in which
questions or responses are worded (Schuman and Presser, 1981; Krosnick and Fabrigar, Forth-
coming; Chong and Druckman, 2007). Such framing effects arise in many contexts; large
literatures in psychology, political science, communications, and marketing are devoted to
documenting and explaining their presence.
Despite the attention paid to framing effects in recent decades, the range of practical
solutions available to survey researchers remains limited. The conventional wisdom is that
when framing effects are unavoidable, researchers should balance them by randomly assigning
an equal number of respondents to each version of the survey questionnaire and then analyze
the pooled data.2 Some researchers acknowledge problems with the conventional balancing
approach but note the lack of better alternatives.3
In this paper we develop a simple theoretical framework for the analysis of survey data
characterized by framing effects.4 The framework highlights important shortcomings with the
conventional balancing approach. In its place, we develop a range of practical alternatives,
which we argue are more likely to shed light on substantive questions of interest.
Our formal analysis focuses on binary-response questions in which an arbitrary feature
of the survey – the frame – affects the responses of a subset of survey-takers. We assume
that each individual respondent is observed answering a given survey question only once,
under one of two possible frames. We label respondents as consistent if they would select
the same answer under both frames and inconsistent if their answer would vary depending
on the frame to which they are assigned.5 The primitive parameters of interest for discrete
2The following statements are typical of the literature: “Randomization ... does not reduce the impact
of context at the level of individual respondents. It simply ensures that these influences result in random
noise rather than systematic bias in the sample as a whole.” (Sudman, Bradburn and Schwarz, 1995). “Our
findings suggest that survey organizations should routinely rotate the order of response choices to guard
against creating bias in results.” (Holbrook et al., 2007). “Acquiescence bias can be reduced by balancing
scales so that the affirming response half the time is in the direction of the construct and half the time is in
the opposite direction (e.g. six agree/disagree items on national pride, with the patriotic response matching
three agree and three disagree responses).” (Presser et al., 2004).
3For example, Schwarz and Oyserman (2001) write, “[R]esearchers ... may reverse the order in which
the items are listed for half of the respondents. Although this ensures that the researcher becomes aware
of possible response order effects, it remains unclear what to do with the results aside from the less than
satisfying solution of averaging over both sets of answers.”
4In other work, we apply a similar framework to study the identification of decision-makers’ preferences in
settings characterized by inconsistent choice data (Goldin and Reck, 2015). The goal of the current project
is to apply this framework to framing effects in survey research.
5Our approach utilizes a potential outcomes framework of the type that has been widely applied in causal
inference analysis (e.g., Holland, 1986; Imbens and Angrist, 1994). In those studies, researchers utilize
experimental or non-experimental data to estimate the causal effect of some treatment on an observed
outcome variable. To our knowledge, we are the first to apply this approach to a setting in which the goal is
not to estimate the effect of the treatment (i.e., the frame) on a variable but rather to recover the distribution
of a variable after removing the treatment’s effect.
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choice survey questions are typically response shares, the fraction of respondents selecting a
particular answer, perhaps within a given subgroup of respondents.
Using this model, we show that balancing respondents evenly across frames does not
eliminate the bias induced by framing effects. Rather, the balancing approach yields a re-
sponse share that is a weighted sum of (1) the response share of the consistent respondents,
and (2) the fraction of respondents assigned to each frame, typically 0.5. The weights in
this weighted sum correspond to the fraction of respondents who are consistent. To under-
stand why, consider two extreme cases. First, suppose that all respondents are completely
immune to framing effects, so that each answers consistently across frames. In this case,
the pooled response share yields the share of respondents (consistently) selecting each an-
swer. Second, suppose instead that all respondents are influenced by framing effects, so
that each respondent’s answer is determined by the frame to which he or she is assigned. In
this case, randomly assigning respondents evenly across frames and pooling the responses
yields a pooled response share equal to 0.5. Finally, when some, but not all, respondents
are influenced by the frame, the pooled response share is a weighted sum of the response
share for the consistent respondents and 0.5 for the inconsistent respondents. Outside of
a narrow set of applications, this weighted sum is unlikely to be the parameter of interest
to the researcher. In its place, we propose several alternatives and describe the conditions
under which they are valid.
First, we consider identification of the consistent responses – the responses of the subset
of respondents who are unaffected by the frame. Consistent responses are most likely to
of primary interest to the researcher in settings where frame-varying responses indicate
incoherent or unformed opinions or beliefs.6 Under the assumption that the frame affects
respondents in a uniform direction, an assumption we label frame monotonicity, we show
that the consistent responses are point-identified. Intuitively, only consistent respondents
ever select an answer that is “against the frame,” for example choosing the second option
when the answer order favors the first option. As such, examining the fraction of respondents
who answer against the frame sheds light on the fraction of consistent respondents selecting
each response.
Whether the assumption of frame monotonicity is plausible in a particular context is
frequently debatable. In settings where researchers are unwilling to assume frame mono-
tonicity, we show that the consistent preferences are only partially identified. Importantly,
6For example, suppose a survey asks, “In forming its laws, should a society prioritize democracy or
economic growth?” and some people choose a different answer depending on the order that the answer
choices are listed. A researcher might conclude that the inconsistent respondents simply lack a meaningful
answer to the question being asked, and instead focus on recovering the responses of those whose answers
do not depend on the question order.
41
however, we also show that when frame monotonicity is assumed erroneously, the technique
we propose for recovering the consistent responses will be biased, but it will be less biased
than the conventional balancing approach.
In other applications, even the respondents who answer inconsistently will have well-
defined answers to the question being asked that the researcher hopes to recover. That is,
although inconsistent respondents do not directly reveal an answer to the survey question
through their responses, a well-defined answer nonetheless exists for each respondent being
asked. Plainly, in some cases, such as questions about past behavior (Schwarz, 1990), true
answers do exist for even respondents whose answers depend on the frame.7
We take no stance on when researchers should assume that a true answer exists, but
we provide a set of additional results for applications in which researchers do wish to make
that assumption – i.e., where their goal is to recover the distribution of true answers among
the entire population of respondents. In particular, we derive a new re-weighting technique
that exploits respondents’ observable characteristics to recover population responses. One
can understand this technique by analogy to the use of post-survey weights to adjust for
survey non-response bias. In the analogy, the true answers of inconsistent respondents are
viewed as missing data, which must be imputed using the responses of consistent respondents
with similar characteristics. An important difference from existing methods of post-survey
re-weighting is that in our framework the researcher cannot directly observe the identity of –
and hence the characteristics associated with – the inconsistent respondents. We overcome
this difficulty by providing techniques to recover the distribution of characteristics among
the consistent and inconsistent respondents, despite the fact that members of these groups
cannot be individually identified.8 In addition to the weighting estimator, we derive worst-
case bounds for the distribution of true answers in the population. We also discuss the
interpretation of other intuitive modes of analysis, such as simply reporting response shares
separately under various frames.
As we describe the various techniques for analyzing survey data and characterize their
7For example, suppose a survey asks respondents how much television they watch per week, and the
wording of the answer choices affects the amount of television respondents report watching (Schwarz, 1990).
If the goal of the study is to learn about the television habits of the population, the researcher will be
interested in the behavior of both consistent and inconsistent respondents.
8Researchers may wish to understand the characteristics associated with consistent and inconsistent
respondents as end in itself. For example, suppose an advocacy organization surveys people about their
support for a policy and the organization discovers that the framing of the question affects the fraction
of respondents expressing support for the policy. The campaign may wish to understand which types of
people are most sensitive to the framing effects, which may indicate that the respondent does not yet have a
fully-formed opinion of the options. Our results allow researchers to estimate the distribution of observable
characteristics for the consistent and inconsistent respondents, which can then be used to predict whether
or not a particular respondent is likely to be sensitive to a frame.
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interpretation, we illustrate our proposed techniques with data from a mix of classic and
recent studies characterized by survey framing effects. Doing so highlights that our proposed
techniques can provide novel insights, using only the type of data that is routinely collected.
2 Model and Notation
We presume to have data on a sample of individuals, denoted by i. Each individual answers a
binary question, with their response denoted by yi ∈ {0, 1}. Many survey questions have this
binary form. For example, yi might capture whether an individual agrees with a particular
statement or supports a particular candidate for public office.
Each individual answers the question once, under one of the two possible frames. As
described in the introduction, the frame denotes the manner in which the question is asked,
such as whether it is worded positively or negatively, or the order in which the answer choices
are listed. Let di denote the frame to which individual i is assigned, di ∈ {d0, d1}. Let Y0
denote the mean response among individuals observed under frame d0, Y0 = E[yi|di = d0],
and let Y1 = E[yi|di = d1]. We assume these response shares are directly observable to
the researcher, setting aside issues of finite sample size. We assume that framing effects are
observed, so Y0 Ó= Y1, and without loss of generality, we assume Y1 > Y0.
Let yi(d) denote how i would answer if asked the survey question under frame d. That is,
yi(d) = yi when di = d. Of particular interest for our analysis will be respondents who are and
are not affected by survey framing. Let ci ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether an individual’s response
would be consistent across frames: ci ≡ 1{yi(d0) = yi(d1)}. The fraction of respondents
affected by the frame is given by p(ci = 0) = 1 − E[ci]. We will at times refer to the
consistent response share, i.e., the response share among those individuals who are unaffected
by the frame: ρc = E[yi|ci = 1]. Note that by the definition of ci, ρc does not depend the
frame assigned to any individual. Also note that if individual respondents were observed
under multiple frames, the researcher could directly observe ci for each individual and easily
compute ρc.
Finally, we will assume throughout this paper that the frame under which an individual
answers the question is unrelated to how the individual would respond under either frame.
Assumption 1: Unconfoundedness. Frame assignment di is independent of the
vector (yi(d0), yi(d1)).
This assumption is satisfied, for example, if respondents are randomly assigned across
frames.
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Examples
The above framework accommodates a number of types of survey questions and framing
effects. We list several here, and briefly discuss their differences. Some of these differences
become material for the proposed methods for analyzing survey data described below.
• Answer order. A large literature suggests that polls about candidate preferences can
be influenced by the order in which candidates are listed. The data in this example
come from a Gallup telephone survey conducted on October 15 and October 16, 2012,
and relate to the 2012 presidential election (Gallup Organization, 2012). For example,
a survey from October 15-16, 2012 on the Presidential election asked respondents:9
Suppose that the presidential election were being held today, and it included
Barack Obama and Joe Biden as the Democratic candidates and Mitt Romney
and Paul Ryan as the Republican candidates. Would you vote for Mitt Romney
and Paul Ryan, the Republicans [Barack Obama. and Joe Biden, the
Democrats] or Barack Obama and Joe Biden [Mitt Romney and Paul Ryan, the
Republicans]?
When the Republican candidates were listed second, the average level of
support for Romney was 55%. When the Democrats were listed second,
Romney’s support fell to 48%.10
• Question wording (acquiescence bias). Schuman and Presser (1981) document the
presence of numerous survey framing effects, including one that they refer to as “ac-
quiescence bias” – the tendency of respondents to agree with the question being asked,
regardless of the content. For example, in one study individuals were randomly as-
signed one of two versions of the same question. The fraction agreeing with the stated
proposition, the estimates of Y0 and Y1 in our notation, is provided in brackets.
Individuals are more to blame than social conditions for crime and lawlessness
in this country [60%]
Social conditions are more to blame than individuals for crime and lawlessness
in this country [57%]
9Individuals who indicated they were unsure were asked “As of today, do you lean more toward...”, followed
by the candidates, presented in the same order as in the first question. Respondents indicating a preference
in the follow-up question are coded according to their stated preference in this question. The numbers we
report discard observations where the individual indicated a preference for a third candidate, or did not
know or refused the follow-up question.
10The data thus indicate a strong recency effect. Recency effects are commonly observed on oral surveys,
see Holbrook et al. (2007).
44
• Question wording (gain/loss framing). Tversky and Kahneman (1981) asked experi-
mental participants about their willingness to accept risky policies that have the poten-
tial to save large numbers of lives. Respondents were asked two versions of a question
after being randomly divided into the gain frame and the loss frame:
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease,
which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the
disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted,
there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved, and 2/3 probability that
no people will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor? [Program
A: 72%, Program B: 28%]
If Program C is adopted 400 people will die. If Program D is adopted there is
1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 people will
die.Which of the two programs would you favor? [Program C: 22%, Program D:
78%]
Note that Programs A and C are identical, as are Programs B and D.
• Question order. Moore (2002) documents question-order effects in a 1997 Gallup sur-
vey. Respondents were asked the following:
Do you generally think [Bill Clinton / Al Gore] is honest and trustworthy?”
Respondents’ answers varied depending on which politician they were asked
about first. When the Clinton question was asked first, 50% of respondents
reported thinking that Clinton was trustworthy, whereas 57% reported thinking
so when they were first asked about Al Gore. Conversely, 68% reported believing
Al Gore to be trustworthy when the Gore question was first, but only 60% did
so when the Gore question was second.
These examples illustrate that the potential for framing effects is largely unavoidable. The
logical content of the question is the same under different frames.11 Questions and answers
11The acquiescence bias example could be an exception to this, as individuals believe that the two causes
are equally to blame for crime and lawlessness might respond in the negative to both versions of the question.
However, this would affect answers in the opposite direction from acquiesence bias. Similarly, in the Tversky
and Kahneman (1981) gain/loss question, perhaps listing both the number of deaths and the number of lives
saved in the same question would elicit information not subject to framing effects. Even then, though, one
would need to decide which number to list first, lives saved or deaths.
45
must be provided to respondents in some order, and they must be worded in some way. Thus,
while using questions that elicit useful information while being unaffected by framing may
be the ideal scenario for survey researchers, determining a method of dealing with framing
effects will oftentimes be inescapable.
3 The Conventional Pooling Approach
As described in the introduction, the conventional approach to analyzing survey data that
exhibit framing effects is to randomize respondents across frames and then to proceed us-
ing the pooled data. For example, political polling surveys, recognizing the potential for
response-order effects, typically rotate which major candidate is listed first and which is
listed second; however, after this initial randomization, candidate order plays no further role
in the analysis. This section shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, simply ran-
domizing respondents across frames does not eliminate the difficulty associated with framing
effects.
Suppose that respondents are randomly assigned to each frame, with equal probability of
being selected for each. This is the conventional approach, and we refer to it as the pooled
mean because it entails pooling the data collected under each frame. The pooled response
share, Yp, is defined as:12
Yp ≡ Y1 + Y02
The following proposition characterizes the pooled response share.
Proposition 1: The Pooled Response Share.
The pooled response share identifies the following weighted sum: Yp = E[ci]ρc + (1 −
E[ci])
(
1
2
)
.
Proof By the law of iterated expectations,
Y0 = E[yi(d0)|ci = 1, d = d0] p(ci = 1|d = d0) + E[yi(d0)|ci = 0, d = d0] p(ci = 0|d = d0).
12It is straightforward to relax the assumption of equal probabilities of assignment to each frame, instead
allowing some generic fraction of respondents to be assigned to each frame, i.e. Yp = ωY0 + (1 − ω)Y1. We
know of no survey implementing unequal randomization in practice, so we shall proceed with the simpler
case here, setting ω = 0.5.
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Applying Unconfoundedness yields
Y0 = E[yi(d0)|ci = 1] p(ci = 1) + E[yi(d0)|ci = 0] p(ci = 0).
Because yi(d0) = yi(d1) when ci = 1, we use the definition of ρc to write
Y0 = ρc p(ci = 1) + E[yi(d0)|ci = 0] p(ci = 0). (1)
Similarly, one can show that
Y1 = ρc p(ci = 1) + E[yi(d1)|ci = 0] p(ci = 0). (2)
Finally, note that when ci = 0, (yi(d0), yi(d1)) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, and thus yi(d0) + yi(d1) = 1.
Therefore
E[yi(d0)|ci = 0] + E[yi(d1)|ci = 0] = 1. (3)
Substituting (1) and (2) into the definition of Yp and applying (3) yields the desired result.
Discussion When survey respondents are evenly divided between the two frames,
Proposition 1 shows that the pooled response share is a weighted average of the consis-
tent response share and 0.5. To understand why intuitively, consider two extreme exam-
ples. First suppose that all respondents are consistent, so E[ci] = 1. Then the pooled
response share would estimate the share of the population that (consistently) selects yi = 1,
Yp = E[yi|ci = 1] = E[yi]. Next, consider the opposite extreme, where all respondents are
sensitive to the frame, so E[ci] = 0. In this case, assigning half of the respondents to d0
and half to d1 would result in half of the respondents selecting each answer, so we would
obtain Yp = 0.5. Finally, when there are both consistent and inconsistent respondents in
the population, the pooled response share will simply be the weighted average of these two
extremes, where the weights depend on the fraction of respondents who are consistent.
We can think of few practical settings in which a researcher would want to identify
the weighted average associated with the pooled response share. In particular, the pooled
response share will depend on factors related to the design of the survey, in particular the
fraction of respondents assigned to each frame and the size of the framing effect. For example,
a pooled response share close to 0.5 could indicate either that many of the respondents are
influenced by the frame or that an equal number of respondents would consistently select each
of the two available answers.13 In the next sections, we propose an alternative approach for
13One narow set of cases in which the pooled response share does identify a useful parameter is when
the goal of a survey is to predict a future choice that is characterized by the same framing effect as the
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dealing with framing effects in survey analysis that attempts to shed light on the consistent
response share, ρc.
4 Identifying Consistent Responses
This section considers how researchers might attempt to recover information about the con-
sistent response share, ρc. In many cases, ρc is likely to capture information of interest to the
researcher. In particular, for subjective survey questions designed to measure the respon-
dent’s attitudes or beliefs, inconsistent respondents may lack a well-formed opinion on the
question being asked. In such cases, researchers may wish to isolate the consistent response
share from those whose responses depend on the frame. Another advantage of ρc is that it
provides information about the quantity the survey was designed to measure in a way that
is not mechanically related to the frame in which respondents are observed. For example,
when a survey of likely voters yields different response shares depending on which candidate
is listed first, the consistent response share is equal to the fraction planning to vote for each
candidate from the sub-population of respondents who select the same candidate regardless
of the order in which the options are listed.
Identifying ρc would be trivial if the researcher could observe individual respondents
under both frames; the inconsistent respondents could be individually identified and their
responses discarded.14 In contrast, when each respondent is only observed under one frame,
the degree to which ρc can be identified depends on whether the frame in question affects
all respondents in a uniform direction. In particular, consider the following assumption:
Assumption 2: Frame monotonicity. For every individual i, yi(d1) ≥ yi(d0).
For example, if one observes that a higher fraction of respondents answers “Yes” in
response to version A of a question as opposed to version B, frame-monotonicity implies
that there are no respondents who answer “No” to version A but “Yes” to version B. Clearly
this assumption will be more plausible in some settings, such as default effects (where it is
difficult to imagine that a non-trivial number of respondents always select whichever response
is not marked as the default), and less likely to hold in other settings, such as response-order
effects (where one might imagine that some respondents always select the first option while
survey itself. For example, suppose one finds that election polling data exhibits candidate order effects.
If actual voting behavior will exhibit the same candidate order effects as the survey, and if the order of
candidate names on the actual ballot will itself be randomized, then the pooled response share will estimate
the weighted average associated with the actual election results.
14Even if obtaining this information were possible, in many contexts it may be that surveying a respondent
under one frame would bias their subsequent answers under alternate frames (LeBoeuf and Shafir, 2003).
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others always select the most recent option). The following proposition describes the role of
frame monotonicity in identifying ρc.
Proposition 2: The Consistent Response Share
Let Yc = Y0Y0+1−Y1 and let ρc = E[yi|ci = 1].
2.1 Under frame monotonicity, E[ci] = Y0 + 1− Y1 and Yc = ρc.
2.2 Without frame monotonicity, |1− Y1 − Y0| ≤ E[ci] ≤ Y0+1−Y1, and Yc ≥ 12 =⇒ ρc ∈
[Yc, 1] while Yc ≤ 12 =⇒ ρc ∈ [0, Yc].
Proof of 2.1 For all individuals, (yi(d0), yi(d1)) ∈ {(1, 1), (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)}. Frame
monotonicity rules out the last possibility, that (yi(d0), yi(d1)) = (1, 0). Thus when yi(d0) =
1, we know that (yi(d0), yi(d1)) = (1, 1) and when yi(d1) = 0, (yi(d0), yi(d1)) = (0, 0). Thus
a respondent choosing against the frame will be choosing consistently, and the share of
respondents choosing the against-the-frame answer will be the fraction of respondents who
are consistent and select that answer. It follows that E[ci] = Y1 + 1 − Y0, and, using the
definition of conditional probability, that Yc = ρc. 
Proof of 2.2 Let α = p[(yi(d0), yi(d1)) = (1, 0)]. Frame monotonicity imposes α = 0,
which leads to the result in the previous proof. Otherwise, it follows from the four possibilities
for (yi(d0), yi(d1)) that
Y0 = ρcE[ci] + α (4)
and also that
1− Y1 = (1− ρc)E[ci] + α. (5)
To obtain bounds for E[ci], note that by (4) and (5),
Y0 + 1− Y1 = E[ci] + 2α (6)
The uppwer bound for E[ci] is immediately implied by (6) and the fact that α ≥ 0. The
lower bounds for E[ci] are implied by the fact that α ≤ Y0, and α ≤ 1−Y1 from (4) and (5).
Combining these with (6) we obtain E[ci] ≥ 1−Y1−Y0 and E[ci] ≥ Y0+Y1− 1. Combining
these yields desired the given lower bound.15
15Note that which of these two constraints binds depends on whether Y0 ≷ 1−Y1, i.e. whether Yc ≷ 12 , so
the two cases match the two cases of the second part of the result.
49
To obtain bounds for ρc, we combine 4 and 5 in the definition of Yc:
Yc =
ρcE[ci] + α
E[ci] + 2α
. (7)
Subtract 12 from both sides of equation (7) and simplify to obtain
Yc − 12 =
(
ρc − 12
)
E[ci]
E[ci] + 2α
. (8)
Noting that E[ci]
E[ci]+2α ∈ [0, 1], equation 8 implies the desired bounds for ρc. 
Proposition 2.1 establishes that the consistent response share is point identified under
frame monotonicity. Intuitively, frame monotonicity implies that only consistent individuals
choose against the frame so that the only respondents selecting yi = 1 under d0 are those
who would also select yi = 1 under d1. Consequently, we know that Y0 respondents were
consistent and chose option 1. Similar logic implies that 1−Y1 of respondents were consistent
and chose option 0. Scaling the former by the share of respondents that are consistent yields
the share of consistent respondents who select yi = 1, i.e., ρc.
Proposition 2.2 establishes that without frame monotonicity, the consistent response
share is partially identified. Borrowing terminology from Imbens and Angrist (1994), we
can divide the set of inconsistent respondents into two groups, those who are effected by the
frame in the same direction as the majority of inconsistent respondents (the frame-compliers)
and those who are affected by the frame in the opposite direction (the frame-defiers). That
is, a frame-defier selects yi = 1 if and only if the frame is d0. Intuitively, the presence
of frame-defiers means that some respondents who are inconsistent will be misclassified as
consistent in the computation of Yc; the misclassified group will contain the frame-defiers,
plus an offsetting number of frame-compliers. The frame-defiers will respond with yi = 1 if
and only if they are assigned to d0; the frame-compliers if and only if they are assigned to
d1. Since there are an equal number of frame-defiers and frame-compliers in the group of
misclassified respondents, the group, on average, answers yi = 1 half of the time under both
frames. Because the misclassified group’s behavior – in the aggregate – is the same under
each frame, the group as a whole appears to be consistent (even though, in reality, each
individual member of the group is actually inconsistent). And because the behavior of this
group is attributed to the consistent respondents, the misclassification will bias Yc upwards
from ρc when ρc is in fact below 0.5 and downwards when the opposite is true. Thus the
failure of frame-monotonicity implies that Yc is biased away from ρc towards 0.5.
The following corollary highlights an important practical implication of this result for
survey researchers. Recall that Yp denotes the pooled response share obtained from randomly
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assigning half of the respondents to each frame, Yp = 12 (Y0 + Y1).
Corollary to Proposition 2.2: Bias in Yc versus Yp
Without frame monotonicity, either 1) Yp < Yc ≤ ρc, 2) Yp > Yc ≥ ρc, or 3) Yp = Yc = ρc = 12 ..
Proof Using the expression for Yc in (7) and the expression for Yp in Proposition 1, it
follows that
Yc − Yp = (ρc −
1
2)p(ci = 1)[1− p(ci = 1)− 2α]
p(ci = 1) + 2α
(9)
One can derive that α < 12(1 − E[ci]) from the definitions of Y0 and Y1,16 so 1 − p(ci =
1) − 2α > 0. When Yc ≥ 12 , we know that ρc ≥ Yc from 2.2 and Yc ≥ Yp from equation (9).
Once we know that ρc ≥ Yc ≥ Yp, the desired result is established for this case. A similar
line of reasoning establishes the result for the case when Yc ≤ 12 . In the knife-edge case where
Yc = 12 , we know from 2.2 that ρc =
1
2 , and then Proposition 1 implies that Yp =
1
2 . 
Although neither Yc nor Yp will generally be equal to the consistent response share (ρc)
in the absence of frame monotonicity, the corollary states that the bias in the former will be
smaller than the bias in the latter. Intuitively, the misclassified group causing the bias in
Yc is necessarily smaller than the group of inconsistent respondents causing the bias in Yp.
Consequently, a researcher who finds Yc < Yp may conclude ρc ≤ Yc < Yp; or similarly, if
Yp < Yc, the researcher may conclude Yp < Yc ≤ ρc. Finally, note that when individuals are
observed under both frames, ρc is easily identified and the bias from using Yc as an estimator
for ρc, which generally depends on the nuisance parameter α, can be directly identified.
5 Which Respondents are Consistent?
Thus far our focus has been on eliminating the bias caused by frame-sensitive respondents
in order to learn about the distribution of the survey variable. In some applications, the
consistency (or lack thereof) of the respondents will itself be an issue of primary interest
to the researcher. For example, a political pollster working for an electoral campaign may
be quite interested in likely voters whose stated preferences between two candidates depend
on the order in which the candidates are listed, or upon which features of the candidates
16Specifically, we assumed Y1 > Y0. Plugging the formulas for Y1 and Y0 in the proof of 2.1 into this
inequality gives the result. An interesting special case occurs in the limiting case where α = 12 (1 − E[ci]),
which also implies Y0 = Y1. In this case there are just as many frame defiers as frame compliers, and the
two cancel each other out in the observations of Y1 and Y0. Then, although Y1 = Y0 and the aggregtae data
show no inconsistency, ρc and E[ci] can take any value from zero to one. We rule this out when we assume
that framing effects are observed, i.e. Y1 Ó= Y0, but it is important to note the implication of this reasoning:
framing effects can be present even when they are unobserved.
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are made salient in the survey. Understanding who such voters are could be quite useful
for better targeting political messages. Similarly, both advertisers and advocacy groups
may wish to know which types of consumers are most responsive to particular types of
messaging. Understanding which respondents are consistent is also the first step in the
method for recovering the distribution of true answers we describe in the next section.
Without exposing a single respondent to multiple frames, it is impossible to identify
precisely which individuals are consistent and which are not. Under the assumption of frame
monotonicity, however, researchers may estimate the aggregate distribution of characteristics
of the consistent and inconsistent decision-makers.17 Formally, we suppose that individuals
are endowed with observable characteristics g ∈ G; these characteristics could be discrete,
continuous, or even some vector of discrete and continuous characteristics. Let f(g) denote
the probability distribution function over G; this distribution is directly identified up to
finite sample concerns, which we ignore. We will denote the response shares under the
two frames, conditional on observable characteristics, by Y0(g) ≡ E[yi|di = d0; gi = g] and
Y1(g) ≡ E[yi|di = d1; gi = g].
Proposition 3: Relating Consistency and Observable Characteristics18 Under
frame monotonicity,
3.1 The distribution of g among the consistent respondents is given by p(gi = g | ci = 1) =
Y0(g)+1−Y1(g)
Y0+1−Y1 f(g).
3.2 The distribution of g among the inconsistent respondents is given by p(gi = g | ci = 1) =
Y1(g)−Y0(g)
Y1−Y0 f(g).
Proof First note that by the same logic as in Proposition 2.1, unconfoundedness and
frame monotonicity imply that
p(ci = 1|gi = g) = Y0(g) + 1− Y1(g). (10)
Bayes rule implies that
p(gi = g|ci = 1) = p(ci = 1|gi = g)f(g)
p(ci = 1)
. (11)
17The result in this section is analogous to that of Abadie (2003), who, in the context of instrumental
variable estimation, shows how to identify the aggregate characteristics of the “compliers,” despite the fact
that individual members of that population cannot be identified.
18Throughout the paper we have been assuming unconfoundedness, that di ⊥ (yi(d0), yi(d1)). Technically,
Propositions 4 and 5 can be proven under the weaker assumption of conditional unconfoundedness, only
requiring that for any g, di ⊥ (yi(d0), yi(d1))|gi = g. However, we do not emphasize this fact, as our focus is
on settings where respondents are randomized across frames by design, so unconfoundedness is guaranteed.
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Substituting (10) and the expression for p(ci = 1) obtained in Proposition 2.1 yields 3.1.
The proof of 3.2 is analogous. 
Intuitively, the distribution of g in the consistent population will be the distribution of g
in the population adjusted for the relative propensity of individuals with characteristic g to
be consistent relative to the rest of the population (see equation 11). Under monotonicity,
researchers can recover the fraction of individuals with a given characteristic that are consis-
tent, and the fraction of the population that are consistent using Proposition 2. As a result,
we can directly recover the distribution of g in the consistent, and inconsistent populations.
6 The Distribution of True Answers
In some cases, researchers will be interested in the distribution of true answers in the full
population. For example, framing effects have been documented in surveys that solicit self-
reported behavioral frequency data, such as the frequency with which respondents watch
television or engage in risky health behaviors (see Schwarz and Oyserman (2001) for a number
of examples). Another example is exit polling data for an election, where answer order may
bias which candidate a voter recalls voting for (especially in more obscure contests such as
judicial elections), but pollsters nevertheless want to know how the population voted. In
such cases, there exists a well-defined “true” answer to the survey variable even for those
respondents whose reported answers vary by frame; their susceptibility to framing effects
simply prevents that true value from being revealed to the researcher.19 More generally,
questions involving past behavior will typically have true answers, so long as they are logically
unambiguous. In other settings, such as quesitons about personal opinions, future behavior,
or hypothetical decisions, whether a true answer exists for a survey question is debatable.
We take no stand on whether researchers should assume that true answers exist in such
situations. Often, in the authors’ experience, economists are willing to assume that true
answers exist, while other social scientists, especially psychologists, are not.20 We leave to
applied researchers the question of whether they should assume that true answers exist in
19Understood this way, the problem parallels the one addressed in the “Contaminated Outcomes” litera-
ture, in that the goal is to learn about a parameter of interest in settings where the observed data contain
some fraction of erroneous observations (Joel L. Horowitz and Charles F. Manski, n.d.) (here, the erroneous
observation occurs when a survey-taker responds according to the frame).
20For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Fischhoff (1991).
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any particular context, and consider, in this section, what researchers who do make the
assumption can learn about the distribution of true answers.
Assumption 3: Existence of True Answers. For every individual i, there exists a
true answer, y∗i .
Researchers wishing to identify the distribution of true answers will need to make an as-
sumption about how respondents choices relate to their true answers. We will focus primarily
on the case where consistent answers reveal true responses:
Assumption 4: Consistent Answers Are True Answers For every individual i,
ci = 1 implies yi = y∗i .
In words, Assumption 4 requires that those individuals providing the same answer across
frames are reporting their true answers. The assumption represents a weakening of the
typical baseline assumption made in survey research, that survey-takers responses represent
the true answer to the question being asked. 21
We begin by deriving worst-case bounds for the distribution of true answers (as in Manski,
1989).
Proposition 4: Partially Identifying the Distribution of True Answers Under
Assumptions 1, 3, and 4,
4.1 Frame monotonicity implies Y0 ≤ E[y∗i ] ≤ Y1.
4.2 Without frame monotonicity, Yc ≥ 12 =⇒ E[y∗i ] ∈ [Y0 − (1 − Y1), 1] and Yc ≤ 12 =⇒
E[y∗i ] ∈ [0, Y0 + Y1].
Proof of 4.1 The law of iterated expectations implies
E[y∗i ] = E[y∗i |ci = 1]p(ci = 1) + E[y∗i |ci = 0]p(ci = 0) (12)
21This assumption is easily relaxed to accomodate multiple framing effects for a single question, such
as those in which both answer order and question wording cause framing effects. It will fail when there
are unobserved framing effects; intuitively, when unobserved factors are biasing respondents’ answers away
from their true answers, recovering the distribution of true answers will be difficult. Relatedly, we will
primarily focus on situations where researchers assume that consistent respondents report true answers, but
one can imagine some alternatives. One alternative would be to suppose that under some ideal frame d∗, all
respondents provide true answers, i.e. yi = y∗i when di = d∗. Identifying the distribution of true answers in
this case requires simply observing a representative sample under the frame d∗. Another alternative would
be to relax assumption 4 and assume that framing effects unavoidably cause deviations in reported answers
from true answers, but that the deviation occurs in a known direction, e.g. for some frame d, di = d implies
y∗i ≤ yi, or that conssitent answers are subject to an unobserved bias so ci = 1 implies y∗i ≤ yi. One can
naturally imagine a partial identification strategy for the learning about the distribution of true answers in
such settings.
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Under Assumption 4, ρc = E[y∗i |ci = 1]. Applying what we know about ρc and p(ci = 1)
from Proposition 2.1 and simplifying yields E[y∗i ] = Y0 +E[y∗i |ci = 0](Y1 − Y0). The bounds
then follow from the fact that 0 ≤ E[y∗i |ci = 0] ≤ 1. 
Proof of 4.2 We first consider the lower bound. Because E[y∗i |ci = 0] ≥ 0, equation
(12) implies thatE[y∗i ] ≥ ρcp(ci = 1). This is equivalent to E[y∗i ] ≥ Y0 − α by equation (4).
Finding a suitable maximum value for α will yield a lower bound. Re-arranging equation (5)
yields 1−ρc = 1−Y1−αEc , and 1−ρc ≤ 1, so α ≤ 1−Y1. Substituting our maximum value for α
gives the desired lower bound. Note that this lower bound is non-trivial only when Yc ≥ 12 ;
otherwise Y0 − (1− Y1) ≤ 0.
We next derive an upper bound using similar reasoning. Because E[y∗i |ci = 0] ≤ 1,
equation (12) implies thatE[y∗i ] ≤ ρcp(ci = 1) + 1− p(ci = 1). This is equivalent to E[y∗i ] ≤
Y1 + α by equation(5). Once again we require a suitable maximum value for α. In this case
the non-trivial bound comes from equation (4), which implies ρc = Y0−αE[ci] ≥ 0, so α ≤ Y0.
Note that this upper bound is non-trivial only when Yc ≤ 12 ; otherwise Y0 + Y1 ≥ 1. 
Proposition 4 reveals an interesting fact about the recovery of population preferences
from survey data. A conservative researcher wishing to analyze data in a robust fashion
despite framing effects might simply report the distribution of answers under alternative
frames. In our notation, this means reporting Y0 and Y1 separately. It might be tempting
to claim that the distribution of true answers, E[y∗i ], lies somewhere between Y0 and Y1.
Proposition 4 reveals, perhaps surprisingly, that such an interpretation, conservative as it
might seem, is only valid when the researcher assumes not only that consistent answers
are true answers, but also assumes frame monotonicity. Intuitively, when there are a large
number of individuals choosing against the frame, the framing effect can appear much smaller
than the true size of the survey response inconsistency. All hope is not lost, however, even
in such cases. Proposition 4.2 shows that without frame monotonicity, the distribution of
answers under the two frames still provides some information about the true distribution.
These one-directional bounds will be more informative when Y0 and 1−Y1 are very different,
which tends to occur when the observed framing effect (Y1 − Y0) is small.
Some researchers may wish to go further, making additional assumptions to point-identify
the distribution of true answers in the population. Under the assumption that consistent
answers are true answers, Proposition 2.1 point identifies the distribution of true answers
among consistent choosers. The problem of recovering the full population distribution then
parallels the well-studied question of inference under sample selection.22
22See Manski (2003). An important difference from the standard setting is that researchers can typically
observe whether individual respondents are included in the sample or not (e.g., whether they respond to the
survey); in contrast, the researcher cannot directly observe whether an individual respondent is consistent.
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We will develop an approach to this problem using techniques analogous to the strat-
ification weights commonly used in survey analysis in the presence of missing data. The
key assumption is that conditional on observable characteristics, respondents whose answers
are sensitive to framing and those reporting their true answers across frames have the same
distribution of true answers:23
Assumption 5: Conditional Consistency Independence
∀g ∈ G, cov(ci, y∗i |gi = g) = 0
where g are observable characteristics as in the previous section.
Proposition 5: The Distribution of True Answers Under Conditional Consis-
tency Independence Let Yc(g) = Y0(g)Y0(g)+1−Y1(g) . Under Assumptions 1-4 and Conditional
Consistency Independence, E[y∗i ] = Eg[Yc(g)].
Proof By the law of iterated expectations, E[y∗i ] = Eg[E[y∗i |gi = g]]. Proposition 2.1
implies that for any g, Yc(g) = E[y∗i |gi = g, ci = 1]. Conditional consistency independence
then implies that Yc(g) = E[y∗i |gi = g].24 Substituting this into the first expression yields
the result. 
To implement the approach suggested by Proposition 5 in practice, one would first cal-
culate Yc(g) for each observable characteristic (or as a continuous function of observable
characteristics), and then take a weighted sum of Yc(g), using weights equal to the distri-
bution of g in the full population (denoted f(g) in the previous section). The technique
is analogous to post-stratification weights frequently employed in survey analysis (Holt and
Smith, 1979), which correct for the fact that some respondents are more likely to select into
the sample than others. In our setting, consistency weights correct for the fact that some
respondents are more likely to select into the consistent subgroup of the population – the
subgroup whose true responses to the survey can be inferred.
Carrying the analogy further, for conventional post-survey non-response weights to elim-
inate selection bias, it must be the case that respondents’ propensity to participate in the
survey is uncorrelated with unobservable correlates of the variable being investigated. Our
As described below, this difference complicates the task of adapting the standard sample selection techniques
to this setting.
23An alternative approach, analogous to instrumental variable methods, for when this assumption is not
credible is described in Goldin and Reck (2015).
24Recall that two-valued variables are independent if they have zero covariance. One can also show formally
that E[y∗i ] = Yc− cov(ci,y
∗
i )
p(ci=1) . Conditioning this on g and taking its expectation also leads to the desired result.
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conditional consistency independence assumption guarantees exactly this; it will fail when
respondents’ consistency is related to the distribution of y in unobservable ways. As such,
the more individual characteristics the researcher can observe that are potentially corre-
lated with a respondent’s consistency, the more confident the researcher can be that using
consistency weights will recover the full population average.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a straightforward framework to study a ubiquitous problem
in survey research: the sensitivity of responses to seemingly-arbitrary features of the survey’s
design. We showed how the conventional approach to dealing with this problem does not
actually solve it, and proposed several practical alternatives. Many of these techniques focus
on the distribution of answers of consistent respondents and the characteristics of consistent
respondents; others attempt to go further and recover the distribution of “true answers” in
the population.
Once one adopts the formal framework we propose for analyzing survey response incon-
sistencies, several parallels emerge to classic ideas about identification and inference. As
ever, the degree to which interesting parameters can be identified from the data depend
on the assumptions the researcher is willing to impose. With very little structure, one
can recover information on the responses of consistent respondents – those unaffected by
framing – and the characteristics of consistent individuals. Recovering true answers in the
population requires assuming that true answers exist in the first place, and assuming away
unobserved framing effects. In both of these cases, the sharpness of the identification depends
on whether framing effects are assumed to be monotonic. Finally, assuming that consistency
across frames and true answers are conditionally independent permits point identification of
the distribution of true answers in the full population.
Two limitations of our work deserve consideration in future research and applications.
First, we have focused on the relatively simple setting of binary survey variables with two
frames; applying the approaches in settings with additional frames or answer choices requires
further assumptions. It is difficult to imagine that the difficulty with randomizing across
frames and pooling the data will be eliminated in a more complicated setting, but credible
alternatives may be somewhat more difficult to obtain. Second, our approach is aimed at
eliminating the bias induced by framing effects, but other sources of bias could still be
a problem. Generalizing the approach proposed here to non-binary survey questions and
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to settings characterized by other types of bias – such as random choice, forgetfulness, or
selection effects – are important directions for future research.
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Chapter 3:
Taxes and Mistakes: What’s in a Sufficient Statistic? 1
by Daniel Reck (University of Michigan)
Abstract
What determines the efficiency cost of taxation in the presence of optimization errors? Employing recent results
quantifying efficiency cost when consumers are subject to biases, this paper shows how budget adjustment rules,
debiasing, and the nature of tax perception affect efficiency cost. Budget adjustment rules govern how taxpayers meet
their budget constraint in spite of misperceptions. Complete consideration of budget adjustment rules shows why
simply detecting misperception of taxes is insufficient for welfare. Furthermore, if consumers “debias” at sufficiently
high stakes, policymakers’ attempts to exploit biases to reduce inefficiency—like switching from high- to low-salience
taxes—can actually increase inefficiency. Any cognitive costs of debiasing exacerbate this “curse of debiasing." I
demonstrate that the model can be applied to even complicated misperceptions using the example of "ironing," which
leads to a clarification of prior welfare analysis of ironing.
1 Introduction
A vitally important idea from the normative theory of taxation is that taxes distort relative prices, causing inefficiency
(Harberger, 1964). Yet recent evidence suggests that individuals make mistakes by ignoring or failing to understand
tax incentives. For example, some individuals ignore less salient taxes,2 react differently to taxes that are framed
1The author thanks David Albouy, Johannes Becker, Sebastien Bradley, Michael Gideon, Jacob Goldin, Morris
Hamilton, James Hines, Miles Kimball, Yusufcan Masatlioglu, Nathan Seegert, Joel Slemrod, Justin Wolfers, seminar
participants at the Michigan Public Finance Lunch Seminar, the International Institute of Public Finance Annual
Conference, and the National Tax Association Annual Conference for helpful discussion and comments. Any errors
are my own.
2Here, salience refers to the visibility of a tax at the time when a taxpayer makes a decision. For evidence of
salience effects, see Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009); Finkelstein (2009); Cabral and Hoxby (2012); Feldman and
Ruffle (2015); Goldin and Homonoff (2013). Chetty et al. (2014) provide evidence of inattention to savings incentives.
Many more recent studies finding surprisingly small responses to plausibly misperceived policies offer salience as an
explanation, see for example Saez (2010).
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differently,3 confuse average and marginal tax rates,4 or fail to understand the rules for tax avoidance and evasion.5
Understanding the normative implications of mis-perception and mistakes has proven difficult, because the traditional
approach to welfare analysis in economics relies on the principle that preferences are revealed by choices. When
people make mistakes, some choices do not reveal preferences. So how can we understand welfare?
A promising answer to that question has been proposed by Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) (henceforth CLK).6
These authors use a sufficient-statistics approach to tax salience to understand how mistakes can affect the excess
burden of taxation. The critical assumption is that individuals always respond optimally to price changes in absence
of taxation, but that the change in demand from a tax rate change may be suboptimal. Two sufficient statistics emerge:
responses to price changes summarize preferences, while responses to tax changes summarize behavior. Goldin (2012)
explores how these statistics may be used to decide how much tax the government should raise via low-salience taxes.
A central issue in this work is the finding that low salience taxes can cause less inefficiency than salient ones. This
finding has led to serious contemplation of the policy implications of the salience bias (Schenk, 2011; Galle, 2009;
Gamage and Shanske, 2011).
This paper explores several under-studied questions on the relationship between behavioral bias and efficiency
cost, questions which naturally arise when we consider applying the existing work to the real world. First, how does
the individual’s needs to meet the budget constraint, even under misperception of prices, matter for inefficiency?
Second, what happens if individuals correct their mistakes when policy makes those mistakes more costly? Third,
how do we apply the theory to biases other than the salience bias?
To answer these questions, I show how different assumptions about budget adjustment rules, debiasing, cognitive
costs, and the nature of mis-perceptions influence behavior and the efficiency cost of taxation, and by implication the
optimal tax policy.7 Primary results of interest are 1) a complete description of how budget adjustment rules affect
efficiency cost, 2) expressions for the efficiency cost of taxation that directly examine for any type of mis-perception,
and 3) the finding that attempting to exploit optimization errors to reduce inefficiency can give rise to a "curse of
debiasing," which actually increases inefficiency.
2 Informal Discussion
In this paper, I develop a static, two-good model of tax mistakes, generalizing Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007)
and Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004), and deriving the statistics of interest for welfare analysis using the CLK (2009)
framework. Three components are added to the standard model: misperception, budget adjustment, and debiasing.
First, individuals mis-perceive the tax rate, and try to choose optimally given their perception. For example, individuals
may ignore a sales tax not posted in the price of a good, they may have false beliefs about the value of a tax rate, or
they may believe their average tax rate is their marginal tax rate, known as "ironing" (Liebman and Zeckhauser, 2004).
3Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011); Sahm, Shapiro and Slemrod (2010); McCaffery and Baron (2006); Homonoff
(2015).
4Sheffrin (1994); de Bartolome (1995); Fujii and Hawley (1988); de Bartolome (1995). For other work on apparent
misperception of marginal tax rates, see Feldman, Katušcˇák and Kawano (2016).
5Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998). Another example is individuals’ apparent belief that estate tax rates are
significantly higher than they truly are (Slemrod, 2006).
6See also Chetty (2009).
7Optimal tax implications only obtain insofar as the objective of the optimal tax program is to minimize inefficiency
(Ramsey, 1927). The relevant distributional effects of misperceptions are not discussed here; for some exploration of
them see Goldin and Homonoff (2013) and Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2016). Neither do I address administrative and
compliance issues.
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When an individual does not choose based on the true marginal price, she will tend not to satisfy her budget constraint.
The second addition to the model is the budget adjustment rule, which I parameterize as the share of the necessary
reduction in expenditure that falls on the taxed good. For example, an individual may simply reduce her consumption
of an untaxed good to meet her budget constraint, in which case none of the reduction in expenditure falls on the taxed
good.8
2.1 Budget Adjustment Rules
Given these two additions to the standard model, I derive expressions for how budget adjustment rules affect the ef-
ficiency cost of taxation. Recall that the efficiency cost of taxation can be defined as the loss in utility relative to
a revenue-equivalent lump sum tax. I derive the lump-sum-equivalent budget adjustment rule, where the change in
demand due to budget adjustment exactly equals the effect of a lump-sum tax in the amount of the budget shortfall.
Intuitively, the individual’s choice under this budget adjustment rule fully accounts for the effect of taxes on income,
despite misperceiving marginal prices. With this budget adjustment rule, a tax that individuals ignore becomes iden-
tical to a lump-sum tax. The excess burden of a tax individuals ignore then increases quadratically as the share of
budget adjustment borne by the taxed good moves away, hypothetically, from its lump-sum-equivalent value. When
budget adjustment causes a sufficient decline in expenditure on the taxed good, low-salience taxes will not be socially
desirable.
2.2 Debiasing
The third addition to the standard model reflects the idea of bounded rationality:9 the individual will make an optimal
choice when the gain to doing so is sufficiently high. For example, a consumer may pay attention to a six percent sales
tax on a car but not on a cup of coffee. I call the switch to full optimization "debiasing," following the literature in
psychology and behavioral economics (Fischoff, 1981; Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982).
There are two ways of introducing this intuitive idea into the model. The first is to assume, axiomatically, that
at a sufficiently high tax rate, individuals always optimize. When we consider a shift from perfectly salient taxes to
low-salience taxes under this assumption, we find that any reductions in the efficiency cost of taxation arising from
mis-perception will be erased at some high level of reliance on low-salience taxes. On the margin, this erasure of
the social benefits of mis-perception leads low-salience taxes to cause more excess burden than salient taxes.10 This
8In a model with more than two goods, the budget adjustment rule would be a vector of such shares, where the
sum of the components is unity. Each component of the vector would specify one good’s share of the reduction in
expenditure to meet the budget constraint.
9The literature defines bounded rationality differently depending on the context. Here I define bounded rationality
as a tendency to correct behavioral biases when they are sufficiently costly, but otherwise tolerate them due to the lim-
ited nature of cognitive resources. A second strand of the literature defines bounded rationality according to partitions
of the information set, where the individual can only know whether the state of the world is in a particular subset of
the information set. In the latter, individuals are typically assumed to be expected utility maximizers who "know what
they don’t know." This evidence is difficult to square with evidence on tax perceptions, where individuals "don’t know
what they don’t know." As such, I assume individuals act as though they have full information but their perceptions
are biased. If individuals are boundedly rational according to the definition I use here, they should correct this bias
when they stand to gain sufficient utility from so doing.
10One natural way governments might try to avoid the consequences of debiasing is to implement many distinct,
small, non-salient taxes. I will not examine such a policy in detail. Whether it really would avoid the curse of debiasing
is ambiguous: do consumers debias for all tax at once or for individual taxes? Does the pressure to debias as mistakes
become more costly build across goods and types of taxes or does it build independently for particular goods and
62
result is the tax parallel of what Gabaix and Laibson (2006) call the "curse of debiasing," wherein debiased consumers
exploit policies which attempt to exploit biased consumers.11
I also consider a fully specified positive model of bounded rationality to further understand how debiasing drives
the result, and to examine cognitive costs. To do this I assume, as in Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007), that the
individual makes the same mistakes until she debiases, and a parameter governs how much must be at stake to induce
complete debiasing. One can view this parameter as a cognitive cost of debiasing, perhaps related to the opportunity
cost of attention or the mental anguish (or joy) of thinking about taxes, or one can assume that there are no cognitive
costs and the decision to debias only affects utility through the change in consumption.
When there are no cognitive costs, the curse of debiasing bites when sufficiently many individuals choose to
debias in response to a marginal increase in the tax rate. The curse of debiasing only affects marginal excess burden
with no cognitive costs. Total excess burden will, in this model, always be weakly lower for the low-salience tax than
for a rate-equivalent high-salience tax. Real cognitive costs of debiasing, however, exacerbate the curse of debiasing
for marginal excess burden, and reverse the direction of the total excess burden comparison when sufficient debiasing
occurs.
To understand the policy relevance of the curse of debiasing, consider a simple example. Suppose the government
introduces a small sales tax, which is typically excluded from the posted price of a good. Upon finding that inattention
makes the tax less inefficient than other tax instruments on the margin,12 the government increases the price-exclusive
tax rate. Then consumers debias, because ignoring the tax becomes too costly. Once everyone has debiased, the excess
burden of this sales tax will be the excess burden of an equivalent price-inclusive tax, plus the cost of individuals’
having to think hard about the exclusive tax. Previously desirable, non-salient taxes become undesirable if individuals
are boundedly rational and the government relies too heavily on them.13
It is worth noting that the curse of debiasing result is not generic: the tax rate at which enough debiasing occurs to
make low-salience taxes undesirable might be very high, so high that governments can raise all the revenue they need
without encountering this problem. What the theory really demonstrates formally is the importance of assumptions
about debiasing and cognitive costs for the argument that the government ought to exploit biases for social gain.
2.3 Ironing
We can apply this same general model outside the context of tax salience by specifying how misperceptions work in
alternative situations. I demonstrate this using the example of what Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) call "ironing."
Ironing occurs when individuals act as if their average tax rate (ATR) is their marginal tax rate (MTR). In this case, the
excess burden of taxation depends on the ratio of average and marginal tax rates. Applying the CLK result for excess
burden points yields two equivalent formulas for excess burden under ironing, using two different (compensated)
elasticities. One formula uses the observed elasticity of demand with respect to one minus the MTR—the conventional
behavioral elasticity of taxable income—and the other uses the elasticity of demand with respect to one minus the
ATR—what I will call the preferences elasticity. Liebman and Zeckhauser use the preference elasticity formula in
taxes? These important questions have not yet been addressed in the literature.
11Gabaix and Laibson (2006) examined the curse of debiasing in the context of competing firms attempting to
exploit consumers’ biases with hidden add-on prices.
12Figuring this out would require careful consideration of budget adjustment rules or robust estimation of the suffi-
cient statistics of the CLK model, but for the example, assume that policymakers properly considered this question.
13This kind of thinking suggests that cognitive burden could be considered to be part of the marginal efficiency cost
of funds (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002) Future work could integrate the cognitive burden in taxation into the optimal tax
systems framework, by adding cognitive burden to traditional concepts like compliance costs, avoidance, and evasion.
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their calculations of the welfare impact of ironing, but these authors evaluate the expression using an estimated value
of the behavioral elasticity. Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) note that it may be improper to use this elasticity because
it may not reveal preferences; the analysis here formalizes that concern and provides a simple means of making the
desired correction. The analysis also demonstrates that examining welfare effects requires careful consideration of
how preferences are revealed when individuals make mistakes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 3 sets up the two-good model, Section 4 examines budget
adjustment rules and their welfare implications, Section 5 adds debiasing to the model and proves the curse of debiasing
results, and Section 6 examines the example of ironing. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of optimal policy
arguments involving tax misperceptions, and describes empirical questions raised by the analysis, answers to which
questions should improve our ability to design optimal policies.
3 Model
Assume that a consumer spends a fixed endowment, Z, on two goods, x and y.14 The individual has additively
separable utility U(x, y) = u(x) + v(y). Assume that utility is increasing at a decreasing rate in x and y: u′(x) >
0, u′′(x) ≤ 0, v′(y) > 0, and v′′(y) ≤ 0.15 The pre-tax price of x is p and the price of y is normalized to 1. The
government taxes x at (per unit) rate t and y is not taxed. When multiple types of tax are in play we divide the tax
into different types of tax indexed by j, writing t =
∑
j tj . For example, we could have t = tI + tE where tE is the
price-exclusive tax rate and tI is the tax included in the posted price. For simplicity, assume there are constant returns
to scale on the production side of the economy, so that the producer price p is exogenous.16 The individual’s choices
must satisfy the budget constraint (p + t)x + y = Z. Note that if we normalize the price to 1, our per-unit tax will
be the same as an ad valorem tax. When I use such a normalization so I will denote the tax rate by τ for clarity. This
notation is more conventional for the income tax applications considered in Section 6.17
To introduce mis-perception, assume that the individual perceives the tax to be tˆ(t1, ..., tJ) when it is in fact t.
For inattention to taxes not included in the posted price of the good, for example, we would have tˆ = tI : the consumer
only notices the price-inclusive tax. Assume that the consumer will try to maximize utility based on the perceived
marginal tax rate tˆ. Define the planned consumption bundle (xˆ, yˆ) as the solution to the perceived decision problem:18
u′(xˆ) = (p+ tˆ)v′(yˆ) (1)
(p+ tˆ)xˆ+ yˆ = Z. (2)
Whenever tˆ 6= t, the bundle (xˆ, yˆ) does not satisfy the budget constraint. We specify the budget adjustment rule,
ρ as x’s share of the change in consumption necessary to meet the budget constraint. Actual consumption of x and y
14The traditional interpretation of a two-good model would be that y is either that it is a "numeraire", or "back-
ground" good, or it is leisure, which is not taxable. In section 4, I discuss how the model, especially as far as budget
adjustment rules are concerned, might change depending how one interprets good y.
15Note also that Uxy = 0 due to additive separability.
16This assumption may be relaxed without affecting any important conclusions. My focus is on consumer behavior
and optimization errors, so I make simplifying assumptions about the production side of the economy. See Chetty
(2009) for work on endogenous producer prices in this context.
17None of the important conclusions of the model depend on whether one assumes ad valorem or per-unit taxes.
Using one or the other is a matter of convenience and convention.
18The budget constraint will be satisfied with equality due to the assumption of monotonicity.
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is given by the following:
(p+ t)x = (p+ t)xˆ− ρ(t− tˆ)xˆ (3)
y = yˆ − (1− ρ)(t− tˆ)xˆ (4)
which identifies a unique point on the true budget line.19
4 The Budget Adjustment Rule
This section expands the model to incorporate misperception and budget adjustment rules (BARs), and derives ex-
pressions for excess burden that can be used for any misperception of marginal prices and any BAR. I derive an
approximation for the lump-sum-equivalent BAR, compute efficiency cost as a function of the BAR, and show how
the desirability of low-salience taxes depends on the BAR. Together, these results imply that budget adjustment rules
have important welfare implications in the presence of mis-perceived marginal prices. While it is true that the suffi-
cient statistics of the CLK model incorporate the budget adjustment rule, estimating these statistics requires observing
behavior in a setting where the individuals use the same BAR that they would given a permanent, real-world change
in a government’s reliance on misperceived taxes.
4.1 Discussion and Examples
The budget adjustment rule could be the result of a conscious process, the order of decision-making, or other aspects
of the setting in which a choice is made. Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007) propose three intuitive budget adjustment
rules, each corresponding to a value of ρ.
If the individual chooses x based on the perceived marginal price and budget constraint, and adjusts y to meet
the true budget constraint, then ρ1 = 0. We can think of this as choice rule in which x is chosen "actively," based on
conscious thought and perception of prices, and y is purchased with whatever income is left over. If the individual
instead chose y actively and purchases x with the left over resources, then ρ2 = 1 : all of the change in consumption
necessary to meet the budget constraint will fall on good x.
A third possibility is that the individual will choose x and y jointly based on the perceived MRS condition in
equation (1), but with her income implicitly reduced20 (or increased) by the excess tax she owes (or does not owe) due
to misperception. In this case we will have:
ρ3 ' (p+ t) ∂x
∂Z
∣∣∣∣
t=tˆ
x
xˆ
= ωx|t=t ηx,z|t=tˆ (5)
19One possibility not pursued here is that the budget adjustment process works differently for different tax misper-
ceptions. In this case ρ would need to depend on the type of tax j. None of the results in this paper compare two
different misperceived taxes, so this possibility is not material for the results.
20Behavior with this budget rule can be characterized according to the MRS condition under mis-perception
u′(x) = (p+ tˆ)v′(y)
and the true budget constraint
(p+ t)x+ y = Z
⇔ (p+ tˆ)x+ y = Z − (t− tˆ)x.
Re-writing the equation the second way highlights that income is "implicitly reduced" by (t− tˆ)x.
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Figure 3: Budget Adjustment Rules
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Notes: Each panel depicts the change in the choice bundle as the individual moves from the preferred choice under
mis-perception (xˆ, yˆ) to the adjusted bundle that satisfies the budget constraint (x, y). The first two panels correspond
to ρ = 0 and ρ = 1.The third panel corresponds ρ = ωxηx,Z ; the dotted line in this panel is the budget constraint if
income were reduced by L = (t− tˆ)x. It should be apparent that change in behavior from the third budget adjustment
rule is exactly the same as the change in behavior from introducing a lump-sum tax of L. When tˆ 6= 0, this means
adding a lump sum tax onto an existing per unit tax of tˆ.
where ηx,Z is the income elasticity of demand for x, ηx,z = ∂x∂Z
Z
x , evaluated at the perceived tax rate, and ωx =
(p+t)x
Z
is x’s share of the budget evaluated at the true tax rate. The derivation of this expression is in Appendix A.
Intuitively, the individual acts like her income is reduced in lump-sum fashion during budget adjustment. When
the income elasticity of demand for x is higher, or when x constitutes a larger share of the budget, x then bears a
larger portion of the change in expenditure from budget adjustment. Useful for welfare calculations will be the fact
that when the tax is completely perceived by the consumer at first—so tˆ = t and xˆ = x—we evaluate both ωx and
ηx,z at the true tax rate and we have simply ρ3 = ωxηx,z .
These three budget adjustment rules are depicted in Figure 3. For different values of ρ, the bundle (x, y) ends up
at very different locations on the true budget line. This foreshadows the finding that different budget adjustment rules
have substantially different welfare implications for the efficiency cost of taxation.
If we wish to understand the consequences of a particular kind of mistake, all we need to do is specify tˆ and ρ.
For example, suppose an individual ignores the sales tax on a cup of coffee whenever that tax is not included in the
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posted price, because of a salience bias, and there are no other taxes on coffee. Suppose x is the amount of coffee
consumed, and y is cash on hand. Because our individual totally ignores the sales tax, we will have tˆ = 0. In this
setting, it is intuitive to assume that the individual has quasilinear preferences and she simply reduces her consumption
of a numeraire good y to meet the budget constraint. So we would have ρ = 0. A second example is ironing (Liebman
and Zeckhauser, 2004). After slightly modifying the model to consider an income tax application, we should assume
τˆ is the individual’s average tax rate, τˆ =
∫ x
0
τ(s)ds/x, where τ(s) is the marginal tax rate when x = s. In their
paper, Liebman and Zeckhauser assume behavior is equivalent to that under budget adjustment rule ρ3.21 For these
specifications of ρ and τˆ , this model becomes exactly like the ironing model in their paper. I consider this example
more thoroughly in Section 6.
4.2 Excess Burden
Propositions from CLK and Chetty (2009) allow us to characterize excess burden in this setting by calculating two
demand elasticities. Note that we have not yet introduced debaising, which is discussed in Section 5.
The results in CLK and Chetty (2009) we use relies on two assumptions. Let x(p, t, Z) = x(p, t1, ..., tj , Z) be
demand for x and let y(p, t, Z) be demand for y:
A1. Taxes affect utility only through their effect on observable choices. Thus, indirect utility given some tax rate
t is
V (p, t, Z) = u(x(p, t, Z)) + v(y(p, t, Z))
A2. In the absence of taxation, the individual behaves fully optimally:
∀p, x(p,0, Z) = arg max
x
u(x) + v(Z − px)
where x(p,0, Z) is demand for x in the no-tax equilibrium. Intuitively, assumption A1 rules out any unobservable
cognitive costs caused by optimization errors. Assumption A2 requires that taxes alone are the cause of sub-optimal
decision-making.22 Both axioms hold in the model used here, until we add cognitive costs in section 5.2.
Before arriving at the results, we need to introduce some notation. Define the following two terms:
∂xc
∂p
≡ ∂x
∂p
+ x
∂x
∂Z
21This choice is motivated by the assumption that the individual believes that she faces a linear tax equal to her
average tax rate, with no exemption, and that the individual must correctly perceive her average tax rate. This behavior
is the same as using the budget adjustment rule ρ3 because the individual accounts for the effect of taxes on her income
and on her virtual income—the extra income she gets because the marginal tax rate is lower at lower levels of income,
unlike a linear tax with no exemptions—but not on relative prices. A depiction of this kind of budget adjustment rule
for a two-bracket tax is provided in Figure 8 in the appendix.
22This assumption may be relaxed depending on the setting to which the model is applied; if we wish to study the
welfare consequences of confusing price schedules instead of confusing taxes, for example, then A2 would no longer
be appropriate. Nevertheless, we can replace A2 with any "refinement" stating under which conditions individuals will
reveal their true preferences, and then use behavior under this condition to understand welfare (Bernheim and Rangel,
2009).
Mathematically, the summary statistic of interest is
θcj =
∂xc
∂tj
/
∂x∗c
∂tj
.
A2 implies that ∂x
∗c
∂tj
= ∂x
c
∂p when t = tˆ, but there could be other ways of obtaining
∂x∗c
∂tj
using choice data.
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∂xc
∂tj
≡ ∂x
∂tj
+ x
∂x
∂Z
.
The first of these is a conventional compensated price effect, derived from the Slutsky equation. Whenever the indi-
vidual behaves optimally—when tˆ = t—we will have ∂x
c
∂p < 0. The second is a definition similar to a conventional
compensated tax effect, but which need not have the properties of conventional compensated price effects because it
does not result from full optimization. We denote elasticity of demand for x with respect to a change in the after tax
price coming from a price change as εx,q|p = ∂x∂p
p+t
x . Similarly, let the elasticity of demand with respect to the after-
tax price coming from a change in tax j be εx,q|tj =
∂x
∂tj
p+t
x , and denote compensated versions of these elasticities by
εcx,q|p and ε
c
x,q|tj , respectively.
CLK and Chetty (2009) introduce the following statistics, which summarize the deviation from full optimization
for a tax tj . I will call these the degree of uncompensated error, θj , and the degree of compensated error, θcj , defined
as follows:
θj ≡ ∂x
∂tj
/
∂x
∂p
θcj ≡
∂xc
∂tj
/
∂xc
∂p
Let x0 = x(p, t0, Z) denote demand at some vector of initial tax rates t0, and denote the true initial tax rate—the
sum over the elements of t0—by t0. Following Auerbach (1985) and Mohring (1971), CLK define the excess burden
of introducing a tax using equivalent variation:
EB(t) = Z − e(p,0, V (p, t, Z))−R(0, t, Z).
where e() is the expenditure function and R() is tax revenue at a tax rate t.23
Proposition 1 (Chetty (2009)). Assume there is only one type of misperceived tax, tj .24 Under assumptions A1 and
A2, the excess burden of a small tax increase ∆tj starting from a small initial tax rate t0 is approximately given by:
EB(∆tj |t0) ' −1
2
(∆tj)
2θcj
∂xc
∂tj
−∆tj ∂x
c
∂tj
[tˆ0 + θ
c
j(t0 − tˆ0)] (6)
= −1
2
(∆tj)
2θcjx0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
+ ∆tjx0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
[tˆ0 + θ
c
j(t0 − tˆ0)] (7)
where all derivatives are evaluated at t = tˆ0 ≡ tˆ(t0).
Whether misperception increases or decreases excess burden depends on whether θcj ≷ 1. Panel I of Figure 4
gives a graphical depiction of the result for the case where there are no income effects on the demand for x and t0 = 0,
so that we observe total excess burden. Panel II depicts marginal excess burden, when t0 > 0. To obtain excess burden
23Traditionally, one thinks of excess burden as the amount the individual would willingly pay in order to replace the
current tax regime with efficient lump-sum taxation. That intuition does not carry through to the world of optimization
errors, because the individual does not rationally value all transactions. One can think of excess burden instead as
the amount that an individual who was fully aware of her biases, despite making mistakes, would be willing to pay
to replace the current tax regime with lump-sum taxation. Alternatively one can use different intuition and think of
excess burden as "the amount of additional tax revenue that could be collected from the consumer while keeping his
utility constant if the distortionary tax were replaced with a lump-sum tax", or "the total value of the purchases that
fail to occur because of the tax." (Chetty, 2009).
24Proposition 1 may be modified to accommodate multiple mis-perceived taxes but such an extension is not useful
for the results in this paper.
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when there are no income effects, we can integrate the difference between marginal utility and price over the change
in x due to the tax rate change. To calculate excess burden as a function of misperceptions and the BAR, we must
calculate the compensated tax effect and relate it to the compensated effect of a price change or, equivalently, a change
in the perceived tax rate tˆ.
Lemma 1 (The Compensated Tax Effect with No Debiasing). When individuals behave in the manner described by
equations (1) through (4) and there is no debiasing, then the compensated effect of a change in the tax rate starting
from any point where tˆ = t is given by
∂xc
∂tj
=
∂xc
∂p
∗ ∂tˆ
∂tj
+
[
x
∂x
∂Z
− ρ x
p+ t
](
1− ∂tˆ
∂tj
)
(8)
εcx,q|tj = ε
c
x,q|p
∂tˆ
∂tj
+ [ωxηx,Z − ρ]
(
1− ∂tˆ
∂tj
)
(9)
where all expressions are evaluated at the current tax rate, t = tˆ.
The proof of this lemma is given in the appendix. Equation (8) illustrates that a tax rate increase has two effects
on demand. First, planned consumption (xˆ, yˆ) may change, depending on how the rate change is perceived. The first
term of equation (8) corresponds to the change in planned choices due to a change in perceptions. When a change
in tax rates goes completely unnoticed by the consumer, ∂tˆ/∂tj = 0 and this term disappears. Notably, ∂tˆ/∂tj can
depend on how the tax change is implemented. With price-exclusive and price-inclusive taxes, if we assume tˆ = tI ,
we will have ∂tˆ/∂tI = 1 and ∂tˆ/∂tE = 0.
The second effect of a tax change is that new budget adjustment is required to meet the budget constraint. The
second term in equation (8) shows how the budget adjustment process affects the compensated tax effect. When the
tax change is fully perceived, ∂tˆ/∂tj = 1 and the second term is zero because no new budget adjustment is necessary.
When the individual accounts for the effect of misperception on income but not relative prices, ρ = ρ3 = ωxηx,Z and
this term disappears. For any other value of ρ budget adjustment causes the tax to have a distortionary income effect,
because the individual fails to properly account for the effect of taxes on her purchasing power.
Proposition 2 (How Does Excess Burden Depend on the Budget Adjustment Rule?). Assume that the government
introduces a small misperceived tax tj into an untaxed market. Behavior is characterized by the function tˆ(tj), ρ, and
equations (1) through (4). The excess burden of this tax is approximately
EB(tj) ' −1
2
t2j
εcx,q|p ∂tˆ∂tj + [ωxηx,Z − ρ]
(
1− ∂tˆ∂tj
)
εcx,q|p
2 xεcx,q|p
p
(10)
= −1
2
t2j
(
∂tˆ
∂tj
)2
x0
εcx,q|p
p
− ξ t
2
jx
p
(
∂tˆ
∂tj
+
1
2
ξ
εx,q|p
)
(11)
where ξ = (ωxηx,Z − ρ)
(
1− ∂tˆ∂tj
)
and all expressions are evaluated at t = 0.
The proof is given in the appendix. Like equation (8), the excess burden of a misperceived tax has a relative
price component and a budget adjustment component. The first term of equation (11) shows how the misperception
of relative prices mutes (∂tˆ/∂tj < 1) or amplifies (∂tˆ/∂tj > 1) traditional excess burden directly. The second term
of this equation shows that the additional excess burden is a quadratic function of the budget adjustment rule and the
distance between the true change in the tax rate and the perceived change in the tax rate,
(
1− ∂tˆ∂tj
)
. When the tax
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is fully ignored, so ∂tˆ/∂tj = 0, we will find that the further ρ is from its lump-sum equivalent value, the larger is
the efficiency cost from budget adjustment. Finally, note that whenever ρ = ρ3 the second term is eliminated and the
excess burden of this tax is the same as a tax of rate tˆ, since t2
(
∂tˆ
∂tE
)2
' tˆ2.25
Proposition 3 (How does the desirability of low-salience taxes depend on the budget adjustment rule?). Suppose that
the government has recourse to two types of taxes, tI and tE , and that
1. Consumers only notice tI : tˆ = tI .
2. No individuals debias (see section 5.2).
Then the introduction of a small tax that individuals ignore, tE , causes less excess burden than the introduction
of a rate-equivalent tax that individuals perceive fully, tI , if and only if ρ < −εx,q|p, where εx,q|p is evaluated at
tI = tE = 0.
See the appendix for the proof. When consumption of the taxed good x is reduced sufficiently in the course
of budget adjustment in the presence of low-salience taxes, low-salience taxes are no longer desirable on efficiency
grounds. To understand the necessary condition for this to occur, consider a one percent increase in the after-tax price.
If this tax is perfectly salient, it results in an −εx,q|p percent reduction in demand for x. If the tax is perfectly non-
salient, it results in a ρ percent decrease in consumption of x. Whichever tax generates the larger reduction in demand
for the taxed good causes more inefficiency.
While it is true that the budget adjustment rule is "in θ," meaning that a consistent estimate of the two elasticities
in θ would be sufficient for policy recommendations, the influence of budget adjustment rules on the compensated
tax effect (the numerator of θ) implies that small-scale, experimental evidence on behavioral biases may not allow
researchers to properly estimate the correct compensated demand elasticity. An experiment typically makes a small
tax more or less salient for a short amount of time. In the experimental setting, we are likely thinking of good y
as a numeraire or background good, so it makes sense to think that ρ = 0, and y bears the full burden of budget
adjustment. When we think about optimal tax, though, we think of good y as an untaxable good like leisure. To
apply the experimental estimates of θ to this case, we would need to assume that the budget adjustment rule used in
the small-scale experiment is the same as that used in a broader context. When an individual ignores a large tax on
consumption, does she then work more to offset the fact that her consumption expenditure is higher than she planned?
We do not yet know, so budget adjustment rules deserve more attention.
Another possibility, not addressed here, is that the budget adjustment rule depends on the tax rate, or on income.
Assuming the individual only has recourse to the three budget adjustment rules described in Figure 3, one can show
that as tax rates change, which of the three budget adjustment rules leads to the highest utility can change. Another
possibility is that some budget adjustment rules are more costly to employ than others. Furthermore, a sufficiently
sophisticated budget adjustment rule could even lead to a fully optimal choice ex ante, even in the presence of misper-
25More specifically, take a Taylor Series expansion of tˆ(t) to write
tˆ(t) = tˆ(0) +
∂tˆ
∂t
t+
1
2
∂2tˆ
∂t2
t2 + ...
Note that tˆ(0) = 0. Square both sides and ignore third order and higher terms—those of the form λtn where λ is a
constant and n ≥ 3—to find that t2j
(
∂tˆ
∂tj
)2
' tˆ2. This approximation will be accurate up to the inclusion of third
order and higher terms, just like all excess burden approximations in this paper.
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ception.26 Such logic brings the model closer to the general notion of bounded rationality covered in section 5.1, but
more empirical evidence on the determinants of budget adjustment rules would be necessary to fully understand this
issue.
5 Debiasing
Do individuals rationally allocate scarce decision-making tools, so that they will make better decisions when more
utility is at stake? Theories of optimal attention and bounded rationality suggest that the answer is yes, while psycho-
logical theories of hard-wired bias in perception and judgment imply that the answer is no.27 Behavioral economics
has not come to a consensus on this question, and it is possible that the answer differs by the kind of bias one consid-
ers. There is evidence that sometimes framing and salience effects do exist for large taxes.28 A related complication
concerns imperfect knowledge rather than imperfect perception: individuals should make mistakes indefinitely if their
information set is flawed and they never realize it—i.e. if they "don’t know what they don’t know" about some tax. It
is plausible that people eventually find out about sufficiently costly mistakes, perhaps through exogenous shocks to the
information set from conversations with financial professionals, acquaintances, or reading the news. Direct evidence
on information search suggests that some individuals do search for information at opportune times for decision-making
(Hoopes, Reck and Slemrod, 2015).
This section provides some insights about how the efficiency cost of taxation and optimal tax policy depend
on assumptions about bounded rationality and debiasing. We explore how the curse of debiasing can cause naive
applications of the theory of taxes and mistakes to backfire, and how cognitive costs of debiasing affect the desirability
of misperceived taxes.
To address this issue, we begin with a technical extension of proposition 1 to allow for non-linear dependence
between demand for the taxed good x and the tax rate. We will maintain the local linearity assumptions on prices and
incomes for simplicity. To do so, we distinguish between the average degree of error, which is the average value of
the relative responsiveness over the range of tax not perceived, and the marginal degree of error, which is the relative
responsiveness to an incremental change in the tax rate.
For simplicity we will limit ourselves to one type of misperceived tax tj . Define the marginal degree of compen-
sated error at some tax rate t0 to be
θcj,t0 ≡
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣
t=t0
∂xc
∂p
∣∣∣
t=tˆ0
.
Second, define the average degree of compensated error at some tax rate t0 as
Θc ≡
1
t0−tˆ0
∫ t0
tˆ0
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣
t=t′
dt′
∂xc
∂p
∣∣∣
t=tˆ0
=
1
t0 − tˆ0
∫ t
tˆ0
θcj,t′dt
′
26Specifically, budget adjustment leads to a fully optimal choice when the individual pre-determines how to adjust
her budget, i.e. the value of ρ, with full knowledge of the tax rate, despite mis-perceiving taxes in choosing xˆ and yˆ.
Formally, individuals would maximize over ρ their realized utility given their behavior, as determined by equations (1)
through (4). This kind of choice behavior might explain the phenomenon of "mental accounting" (Thaler, 1980).
27See chapter 2 of Congdon, Kling and Mullainathan (2011) for a more thorough overview of these questions.
28See for example Gallagher and Muehlegger (2011) Cabral and Hoxby (2012), Chetty et al. (2014).
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Note that were we to revert to the assumption that demand is linear in tax rates, so ∂xc/∂tj is constant, we would
have θcj,t0 = Θ
c = θcj , and proposition 1 is all that is necessary to characterize excess burden. Let Θ and θj,t0 denote
the uncompensated versions of Θc and θcj,t0 , respectively.
Proposition 4 (Extension to Non-Linearities in Tax Rates). Assume there is only one type of misperceived tax, tj .
Under assumptions A1 and A2, and the assumption that demand is locally linear in (p+ tˆ) and Z but not in tax rates,
the excess burden at a tax rate tj is
EB(tj) = −1
2
t2jΘ
c 1
t− tˆ
∫ t
tˆ
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t′
dt′ (12)
= −1
2
t2j (Θ
c)2
∂x
∂p
(13)
= −1
2
t2j (Θ
c)2x0
εx,q|p
p
(14)
where x0 = x(p,0, Z) and ∂x∂p is evaluated at t = 0. The excess burden of a small tax increase ∆tj starting from an
initial tax rate t0 is approximately:
EB(∆tj |t0) ' −1
2
(∆tj)
2θcj,t0
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t0
−∆tj ∂x
c
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t0
[tˆ0 + Θ
c(t0 − tˆ0)] (15)
=
1
2
(∆tj)
2θcj,t0x0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
+ ∆tjx0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
[tˆ0 + Θ
c(t0 − tˆ0)] (16)
where ∂x
c
∂tj
is evaluated at t = t0, and ∂x
c
∂p at t = tˆ0.
The proof of this theorem is in the appendix. The average degree of error Θc matters for total excess burden.
Marginal excess burden depends on the marginal degree of error θc because this parameter governs the difference
between demand at the initial tax rate and demand at the new tax rate. Marginal excess burden also depends on the
average degree of error because it determines demand at the initial tax rate. Panels III and IV of Figure 4 depict excess
burden and marginal excess burden in this setting, when there are no income effects.
5.1 An Axiomatic Approach to Debiasing
We can derive some results for debiasing without a positive model, using an axiomatic approach. In addition to
assumptions A1 and A2, we now also assume the following:
A3. At a sufficiently high tax rate, all individuals optimize fully.29
∀j ∃ tj s.t.∀tj ≥ tj , x(p, t0, ...tj , ...tJ , Z) = arg max
x
u(x) + v(Z − (p+ t)x).
This assumption states that, whatever optimization errors occur at low tax rates, they are eliminated at sufficiently
high tax rates.30 Referring to Panels III and IV of Figure 4, A3 requires that the tax demand curve become the same as
the price demand curve at tax rates above some high tax rate t. This assumption incorporates a variety of ways through
29Note that in the applications explored here, a high tax rate corresponds to a high utility cost of ignoring the tax. A
more general formulation of A3 would require that sufficiently costly mistakes cannot occur.
30In the fully specified model in the next section, this assumption will be true if there are no cognitive costs and
the support of the distribution f(δ) is bounded above, e.g. if there are finitely many individuals with a fixed cost of
debiasing.
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which debiasing may occur, including the deliberate decision to optimize in high-stakes decisions and endogeneity of
the budget adjustment rule.
Proposition 5 (The Curse of Debiasing). Suppose that the government has recourse to two taxes, tI and tE , and that
1. Consumers respond perfectly to changes in tI , so θctI = 1.
2. Consumers initially under-respond to changes in tE , so θctE < 1 when tE = 0.
3. Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are true.
4. Optimal demand x∗ is strictly positive at all prices and tax rates.
Then there exists a tax rate t′E at which an increase in tE causes higher marginal excess burden than an increase in
the noticed tax tI .
Panels III and IV of Figure 4 shows how the curse of debiasing works. Panel III depicts the first two assumptions of
the proposition: the misperceived tax initially causes lower excess burden than fully perceived tax. Initially, debiasing
does not matter, so excess burden in panels I and III are similar. Assumption A3 forces there to be a tax rate at which
a change in tE causes higher marginal excess burden than a change in tI . The excess burden of a tax change where
the curse of debiasing bites is depicted in Panel IV of Figure 4. Marginal excess burden is much higher in panel IV,
where we assume debiasing occurs, than in Panel II, where it does not. A more extreme example, in which debiasing
occurs discretely at the tax rate tE , is depicted in Figure 5. In either case, what we call the curse of debiasing erases
the social benefits of misperceived taxes when the government relies too heavily on them. Note also that when Θ is
always less than 1—which can be justified by a model like the one in the next section—the total excess burden of
a misperceived tax is still weakly less than the total excess burden of a fully perceived tax, despite marginal excess
burden being subject to the curse of debiasing.
That with too much reliance on a particular tax instrument, that instrument becomes undesirable relative to other
tax instruments is a nearly universal feature of optimal tax theory. Another way to think of this result is that it implies
that the same holds true for choices along the lines of whether the government should use taxes that are not salient (or
are otherwise misperceived) or taxes that individuals respond to perfectly, provided that individuals debias.
Most of the motivation for debiasing in this section comes from the idea of bounded rationality, where the cost
of perfectly optimizing is high enough that the consumer tolerates some error, but A3 need not be limited to this
idea. Upon realizing that the government is attempting to exploit their biases (even benevolently), consumers could
adversely react by deliberately debiasing, like individuals who shelter income from the taxation because they dislike
government policies. Nothing substantive about the model changes in this scenario, though upcoming results about
cognitive costs could not be applied to debiasing out of distaste for policy.
5.2 A Positive Approach to Debiasing
Using the fully specified positive model, this section examines when the curse of debiasing will occur and how adding
cognitive costs affects efficiency cost and the attractiveness of misperceived taxes. We will start with the model in
section 3. Assume further that there are two types of taxes tE and tI and that the individual only pays attention to the
latter, so tˆ = tI . To further simplify the model, assume ρ = ρ3, so that the individual takes account of the impact of
her mis-perceptions on income but not on relative prices, and that there are no income effects on demand, so ρ3 = 0.
The qualitative results in this section will not be changed so long as the conditions in proposition 5 still obtain.
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Figure 4: Excess Burden and Marginal Excess Burden, with and without Debiasing (No Income
Effects)
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I. No debiasing, no existing taxes III. With Debiasing, no existing taxes
II. No debiasing, existing taxes IV. With Debiasing, existing taxes (curse of debiasing)
Notes: Panels I and II are based on CLK (2009) and Chetty (2009). Panels III and IV add debiasing. In all panels,
the tax demand curve x(p0, t) governs behavior and the price demand curve x(p, 0) = u′(x) determines welfare. The
curves differ due to the presence of misperception, whose consequences are determined by the marginal and average
degree of error θ and Θ. In panels I and III, we assume that there are no existing taxes and a misperceived tax at rate
t0 is introduced. We integrate the marginal utility curve over the change in x to obtain excess burden, represented by
the shaded gray area. In panels II and IV, we add a tax of ∆t onto a tax of t0. The debiasing assumption A3 causes the
tax demand curve to bend toward and eventually unite with the price demand curve. The curse of debiasing (panel IV)
causes the excess burden to be much larger than it would be if consumers did not debias (panel II). The figure does not
depict the excess burden of perfectly perceived taxes for clarity, but these may be examined using the price demand
curve only, in the usual way.
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Now we add debiasing. Denote choices under optimization errors by (x, y) and denote choices from full opti-
mization, after debiasing, by (x∗, y∗). Let G(tE) denote the gain to an individual of debiasing fully, in money-metric
utility:31
G(tE) =
[u(x∗) + v(y∗)]− [u(x) + v(y)]
∂V
∂Z
,
where ∂V∂Z is evaluated at (x
∗, y∗). The numerator is the gain to debiasing in utility units, and we divide by ∂V∂Z , the
marginal value of wealth at the optimal consumption level, to obtain money-metric utility.
Assume that individuals know the value of G(tE).32 Then they will consume (x∗, y∗) whenever G(tE) is greater
than some parameter δ, and they will otherwise consume (x, y).
Intuitively, we can think of δ as reflecting the opportunity cost of attention, the mental anguish of thinking about
some taxes, or simply a component of an arbitrary cognitive system determining which taxes an individual notices. As
such, we will consider both the case where δ does not enter the utility function, and the case where welfare is reduced
by δ whenever an individual chooses (x∗, y∗) instead of (x, y).
Next, we assume that δ is heterogeneous in the population, following Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2007). Assume
that δi is distributed identically and independently across a measure one continuum of individuals i with a probability
density function f(δ) and a cumulative density function F (δ). The fraction of debiased agents at a tax rate tE—those
for whom δi < G(tE)—can be written as F (G(tE)). Differences between individuals could be related to a hetero-
geneous opportunity cost of attention or heterogeneous cognitive abilities. Another way to think of the heterogeneity
would be to think of a single representative individual who makes transactions involving the purchase of x repeatedly,
and has a varying cognitive cost each time due to her mental state, whether she is in a hurry, and so on.33
Lemma 2 (The Compensated Tax Effect with Debiasing34). Suppose individuals behave in the manner described in
Section 3 and the government has recourse to two taxes tE and tI . Suppose also that
1. Consumers only notice tI , tˆ = tI .
2. The budget adjustment rule is ρ = ρ3.
3. There are no income effects on the demand for x under full optimization.
4. A fraction F (G) of individuals debias.
Then the compensated effect of an increase in tE of ∆tE for an initial tax rate tE0 is given by
∂Xc
∂t
∣∣∣∣
tE0
= f(G)
dG
dtE
(x∗ − x) + F (G)∂x
∗c
∂p
(17)
where X is aggregate demand for good x, G = G(tE0).
31The approach used by Chetty (2009) to approximate the function G implies that G is indeed a function of tE .
More generally we could write G as a function of (t− tˆ). Other variables affecting the gain to optimizing G, such as
demand elasticities and x’s share of the budget, affect the function G(tE) and ∂G/∂(t − tˆ) in intuitive ways but are
suppressed here for clarity.
32We must assume the value of G is known to avoid the problem of infinite regress, which plagues models of
bounded rationality. The difficulty with this assumption is part of the reason I take a more axiomatic approach in
Section 5.1.
33This characterization also has the advantage that if we observe multiple purchases at a given tax rate, we should
still expect individual demand not to exhibit large discrete jumps when the tax rate increases only slightly.
34Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2016) also derive this result and generalize it to a heterogeneous agents framework.
The result appearing here was derived independently and pre-dates these authors’ work.
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The proof is in the appendix to this paper.35 We can use lemma 2 and the definition of Θct and θt to derive that the
average degree of compensated error is the fraction of optimizing agents
ΘctE0 = F (G(tE)),
and the marginal degree of error is the fraction of optimizing agents plus a term approximating the change due to
debiasing at a tax rate tE0:
θctE0 ' F (G) + f(G)
∂G
∂tE
tE0.
The derivations of both of these facts are also given in the appendix.
Assume first that there are no cognitive costs. Then by direct applications of proposition 4 and lemma 2, we can
understand total and marginal excess burden in this model. The average degree of error is the fraction of debiased
individuals, which is always weakly less than 1. As such, the total excess burden of an ignored tax tE will always
be less than the total excess burden of a rate-equivalent tax that individuals notice tI . The same will be true for any
specification of tˆ and ρ where ∂xc/∂tj < ∂xc/∂p when tj = 0. The marginal degree of error, which affects only
marginal excess burden, is not always less than one, because it also depends on the number of individuals who are
indifferent between debiasing and not, f(G), and the change in the gain to optimizing from an increase in the tax
rate, ∂G/∂tE . From the perspective of marginal excess burden, low-salience taxes are undesirable if these quantities
are sufficiently large, so that θtE0 > 1. Proposition 5 implies that this must happen at some tax rate, as long as
everyone eventually debiases (so the support of f(δ) is bounded above). With estimates of the distribution f and the
function G—which can be shown to depend on familiar demand elasticities—the tax rate where enough individuals
debias—where f(G) ∂G∂tE tE0 is large enough—to cause θtE0 > 1 can be fully characterized.
Now assume instead that debiasing incurs a cost equal to δi measured in money metric utility. Just as the tax rate
is high enough that individual’s with cost δi debias, excess burden is increased by f(δi)δi. In this case, the efficiency
cost of taxation will be the excess burden as measured above, plus cognitive costs incurred by any individuals who
debias. Denoting the former by EB0(tE), we will have
EB(tE) = EB0(tE) +
∫ G(tE)
0
δf(δ)dδ (18)
= −1
2
t2E(Θ
c)2
∂xc
∂p
+ ΘE[δ|G(tE) > δ] (19)
= Θ2EB(tI) + ΘE[δ|G(t− tˆ) > δ], (20)
where EB(tI) is the excess burden of a rate-equivalent perfectly perceived tax tI . For small values of tE , we will
have that EB(tE) < EB(tI). When tE is high enough that Θ = 1, we will have that EB(tE) > EB(tI). Finally,
equation (20) is always increasing in tE . These three statements are sufficient to prove the following:
Proposition 6 (The Curse of Debiasing with Cognitive Costs). Assume the government has recourse to two taxes tE
and tI and that
1. Consumers only notice tI , tˆ = tI
2. The budget adjustment rule is ρ = ρ3.
35Note that under the simplifying assumptions on ρ and tˆ employed here, ∂x
c
∂tE
= 0 by equation (8) (see also the
discussion of equation (34) in the appendix). In a less restrictive setting, we would add (1 − F (G)) ∂xc∂tE to the right-
hand-side of equation (17).
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3. There are no income effects on demand for x under full optimization.
4. Individual i debiases whenever G(tE) > δi.
5. Debiasing incurse a cognitive cost of δi.
6. The support of the distribution of cognitive costs f(δ) is bounded above.
Then there will be a unique tax rate t′E such that tE > t
′
E if and only if the total excess burden of taxation is higher
under an ignored tax tE than under a rate-equivalent perceived tax tI .
Figure 5 shows that in the case where everyone debiases at the same tax rate, moving the tax rate from just
below the debiasing threshold for just above it causes total excess burden to jump discretely from zero to twice the
excess burden of a rate-equivalent perfectly perceived tax. When low-salience taxes cause cognitive costs, the curse
of debiasing affects not just marginal excess burden, but also average excess burden, because causing individuals to
debias also causes them to inefficiently incur cognitive costs.36
6 The Example of Ironing
To illustrate that the model outlined above yields useful insights outside the relatively simple context of tax salience,
this section describes in detail an application to what Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) call ironing. Doing so provides
new insights on the welfare implications of ironing and clarifying the analysis of Liebman and Zeckhauser. A more
general lesson to be taken from this section is that one can always examine welfare effects so long as one has a
mechanism for recovering preferences, but doing so requires requires careful attention to how preferences are revealed
by choices, even in the context of a fully specified positive model.
Motivated by survey evidence suggesting that some individuals think their average tax rate is their marginal tax
rate Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) propose a model of "ironing." To address this issue, we first need to import the
model to an income tax setting, such as Saez (2001). Denote taxable income by x, and assume utility is decreasing
in x.37 As in Saez (2001), y is now disposable income. The individual attempts to maximize utility v(y) − u(x)
subject to the budget constraint y = (1− τˆ)x+ Z where Z is now virtual income, income gained or lost from having
different marginal tax rates at lower values of x than the chosen x. The price p is normalized to 1, reflecting the units
of earnings. This process generates planned choices xˆ and yˆ, like before. The budget adjustment rule then determines
how x and y differ from xˆ and yˆ.
Imagine we begin in the no-tax equilibrium, and then add a non-linear income tax. The individual reveals her
preferences according to the change in compensated demand from a change in the perceived tax rate τˆ , i.e. ∂xc/∂τˆ ,38
which determines the denominator of the statistic θc.
Liebman and Zeckhauser assume that individuals use the third budget adjustment rule described in section 3,
ρ3. The individual accounts for the effect of taxes on (virtual) income but not on marginal prices.39 For welfare
calculations, Liebman and Zeckhauser also assume that income effects on x are negligible, which further simplifies
36It may be possible to generalize this finding under a more general rationality concept, assuming that whenever the
individual chooses to change her choice rule, she incurs a cost equal to the utility gain from doing so.
37In recent models examining the income tax, earnings are denoted by z rather than x. In this paper I always call
the taxed behavior x for clarity.
38An identical alternative would be to continue to let the price vary and evaluate derivatives at p = 1.
39The main result in this section could also be derived from the equations characterizing ironing in Liebman and
Zeckhauser (2004):
u′(x) = −(1−ATR)v′(y)
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Figure 5: Debiasing and Marginal Excess Burden
x(p, 0) = u′(x)
xx(p0, 0)
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x(p0, t+ ∆t)
= x(p0, t), t < t
p0 + ∆tI
EB(∆tI |tE − )
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Notes: The figure is drawn assuming tI = 0 initially. The tax demand curve is drawn in red, and is vertical until
the individual debiases because we assume ρ = 0 and tˆ = tI , so demand will not change at all as tE increases, until
debiasing occurs. Then, the individual moves discretely to the fully optimal choice, so the tax and price demand curves
become the same curve. The marginal excess burden of increasing tE just over the debiasing cutoff tE is the area of
the dark and light shaded areas, while the marginal excess burden of increasing tI given the same existing tax rate for
tE is given by just the darker shaded triangle. The red triangle with diagonal hatching is the gain to optimizing at a tax
rate of t¯, which should be added onto excess burden calculations whenever tE > t and debiasing incurs a cognitive
cost commensurate with the utility gain from so doing.
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the budget adjustment rule to ρ = ρ3 = 0. I shall ignore debiasing for expository clarity–Liebman and Zeckhauser
also do not include it)–but one could easily add it.
Proposition 7. Assume that
1. Individuals engage in ironing, so τˆ = ATR ≡ ∫ x
0
τ(s)ds/x.
2. The budget adjustment rule is ρ = 0.
3. There are no income effects on demand for x.
4. No individuals debias (see section 5.2).
Then the excess burden of a non-linear tax τ(x) will be given by
EB(τ(x)) ' −1
2
τ2
ATR
τ
∂x
∂τ
(21)
=
1
2
τATRx0
εx,1−τ |τ
1−ATR (22)
=
1
2
ATR2x0
εx,1−τ |ATR
1−ATR (23)
where εx,1−τ |τ = ∂x∂(1−τ)
1−τ
x is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, and εx,1−τ |ATR =
∂x
∂(1−ATR)
1−ATR
x is the elasticity of taxable income under full optimization, i.e. the elasticity of demand with respect
to the net of tax rate following the introduction of a linear tax equal to ATR (which also equals the elasticity of x with
respect to the price). Derivatives and elasticities are evaluated at the no-tax equilibrium τ = ATR = 0.
Equation (21) highlights that in this context, θ = ATRτ . When Liebman and Zeckhauser approximate the dead-
weight loss under ironing, they use equation (23), which resembles the Harberger-Browning approximation but with
the "preferences" elasticity, which will not equal the "behavioral" elasticity for a non-linear tax. Proposition 7 indicates
that using an estimate of the behavioral elasticity in this context, as Liebman and Zeckhauser do, is incorrect, because
it uses the average tax rate where it should use the marginal tax rate. Such an approximation integrates over the "tax
demand curve" instead of the "price demand curve" (see Panel I of Figure 4). This approximation does not account
for the fact that the elasticity that reveals preferences (i.e. the elasticity with respect to the true marginal tax rate) is
different from the elasticity that determines behavior (i.e. the elasticity with respect to perceived marginal tax rate).
Liebman and Zeckhauser note the possibility of an error in approximation in a footnote in their paper. Proposition 7
tells us how to make the desired correction, which is simply to multiply their calculated excess burden by τ/ATR.
Using an elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal tax rate of 0.4, from Gruber and Saez (2002),40
Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) approximate the efficiency cost of US income taxation to be $56.7 billion under
y = ATRx.
Note that the second equation is equivalent to y = (1 − τ)x + Z where Z is virtual income. For a more detailed
illustration of why these two equations are behaviorally equivalent to the model in Section 3 with ρ = ρ3, even in the
presence of a non-linear tax and the requirement that the individual correctly perceive her ATR, refer to the discussions
of budget adjustment rules and ironing in the appendix.
40It is still not clear whether this estimate is appropriate. If individuals really iron, then the estimate of the elasticity
of taxable income from Gruber and Saez (2002) is incorrect, because d log(x)d log(1−τ) from some small change in the shape
of the tax schedule is no longer a proper estimate of the elasticity of taxable income over the entire tax schedule.
How an individual changes behavior from some change in the shape of the tax schedule is governed by how much the
average tax rate changes, not the marginal tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the average tax rate will be different
for individuals at different income levels. For this reason, calculations using estimates of the preferences elasticity are
more practical in this situation.
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ironing and $109.0 if individuals behaved fully optimally. Applying the correction factor τ/ATR using the aggregate
statistics from 2003 in Liebman and Zeckhauser41 we obtain that the excess burden under ironing should is approx-
imately $77.4 billion. This does not affect the qualitative result that ironing reduces excess burden relative to full
optimization—though that result does rely on assumptions about the budget adjustment rule and the size of income
effects, which can be examined by a straightforward application of proposition 2. However, the finding here illustrates
that the efficiency implications of misperception are sensitive to distinguishing between preferences elasticities and
behavioral elasticities when quantifying welfare effects using data on suboptimal choices.
7 Conclusion
How economists should characterize optimal policy in the presence of suboptimal behavior is a central, unanswered
question in behavioral economics. The analysis presented in this paper shows that one reason policy implications are
slow to emerge is that detecting misperceptions alone provides little to no about optimal policy. The theory suggests
that, in order to know how to design efficient tax policy in the presence of optimization errors, we also need to know
the answers to the following empirical questions:
1. whether and how individuals debias when policy changes make mistakes more costly,
2. if so, whether debiasing incurs cognitive costs,
3. what budget adjustment rules individuals use, and
4. which mis-perceptions the most for behavior.
The first two points reflect the results in this paper that when behavioral biases initially make a tax socially desirable
relative to fully perceived taxes, increasing our reliance on these types of taxes in an attempt to minimize inefficiency
can backfire due to the curse of debiasing. I have shown how debiasing increases the efficiency cost of the tax, reduces
the desirability of exploiting biases for social gain, and can also inefficiently impose cognitive costs on taxpayers.
Whether individuals debias should be examined empirically, perhaps by examining how estimated biases change as
tax rates change or when tax rates interact with other policies that make mistakes costly. Cognitive costs could be
inferred by how much individuals are willing to pay to have their mis-perceptions corrected by an outside party such
as a financial adviser.
Since the first draft of this paper appeared, two teams of authors have examined debiasing in an experimental
setting. Feldman, Goldin and Homonoff (2015) found a null result; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones (2016) implemented
a larger-scale experimental approach with considerably more statistical power and did find significant evidence of
debiasing. Whether these phenomena can be found with real-world tax policies is still an open question, and, perhaps
naturally, neither of these studies addresses the question of whether debiasing incurs cognitive costs.
41In this calculation, I use aggregate statistics on taxable income, revenue, and deadweight loss from Liebman and
Zeckhauser, with a marginal tax rate of τ = 0.314 and an average tax rate of ATR = 0.230 in the correction factor.
These values match their approximations of total excess burden. The first is obtained by finding the marginal tax rate
that generates Liebman and Zeckhauser’s results for the deadweight loss under rational behavior, i.e. solving
EB(t) =
1
2
τ2x
x,1−τ
1−ATR
for τ using their aggregate statistics and deadweight loss approximation. The second is obtained by dividing aggregate
taxable income $4233.3 billion in 2003, by total income tax revenue $974.7 billion. A more precise analysis would
simulate the deadweight loss for a sample of taxpayers with varying incomes.
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The third item above reflects that mis-perception alone does not fully determine behavior or utility without a
budget adjustment rule. Given any mis-perception, it is possible to specify a budget adjustment rule for which the
efficiency cost of taxation is either improved or worsened by the presence of mis-perceptions, relative to a perfectly
perceived tax. For example, whether ironing really reduces the excess burden of a tax whenever average tax rates
are less than marginal tax rates will depend on the budget adjustment rule. Furthermore, the budget adjustment rule
used by biased individuals in a small scale experiment may be different from the budget adjustment rule used for
large, permanent taxes. Budget adjustment rules could be examined empirically by observing the difference between
the planned choice bundle based on misperception, as measured by surveys or financial planning, and the actual
consumption bundle. One could also recover budget adjustment rules by comparing choices in a situation where some
people notice a tax and some do not. Directly examining budget adjustment rules and applying the results in this
paper would significantly expand our ability to obtain policy implications from a wide range of findings in behavioral
economics.
The fourth item in the list above refers to the fact that for complex taxes like the US income tax, there are
several candidates for behavioral biases with implications for welfare. These include the diminished salience of tax
collected by withholding, mis-perception of the non-linearity of the tax schedule (e.g. ironing), ignorance of various
tax expenditures or tax preferences, ignorance of the penalties for evasion, and reactions to the uncertainty created by
frequent changes to tax rates. Improving policy to be mindful of behavioral biases would require understanding which
mis-perceptions matter most, an important question for future research. Using a model like the one in this paper allows
us to derive different empirical predictions for each of these biases, which could be tested.
Another way to think of the results is that it allows us to examine efficiency cost and optimal policy in situations
where we are willing to make assumptions, perhaps with some empirical support, about misperceptions, budget ad-
justment and perhaps even debiasing, but where we lack the ideal dataset with which to estimate the compensated
elasticities that are the sufficient statsitics of the Chetty, Looney and Kroft (2009) model. Given the frictionless un-
compensated elasticity of demand (e.g. the price elasticity), the income elasticity, a specified misperception, a budget
adjustment rule, and an assumption about debiasing, one can use the theory in this paper to recover efficiency cost
without ever having to estimate the compensated elasticity of demand with respect to the tax rate. Estimating this
compensated elasticity can be difficult because of issue with budget adjustment rules in field experiments or short-run
analysis described above, and becuse the variation in tax rates necessary to do so may be unavailable. The theory
above describes a way around these difficulties.
Finally, the insights from this analysis are not unique to the theory of taxation. Hidden incentives are a ubiquitous
feature of the real world. How individuals meet their budget constraints when incentives are hidden is of substantive
interest for characterizing economic behavior in general. The basic model of misperception used in this paper can be
easily generalized to any misperception of prices. The parameterization of the budget adjustment rule employed here
has useful features, namely that it is flexible and it interacts with well-understood demand elasticities in intuitive ways.
Future work could use this kind of model of consumer behavior to examine thoroughly the normative consequences
of misperception outside the world of taxation. In addition, a second instance of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) hints that
the curse of debiasing is probably a very general concept, occurring whenever one agent attempts to exploit the biases
of another, boundedly rational one.
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Appendix to Chapter 1 (Preference Identification Under Inconsistent
Choice)
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of 1.1 is provided in the body of the paper.
To prove 1.2, let α = p(yi0 = 1; yi1 = 0) denote the fraction of frame defiers and note
that now p(ci = 0) = p(yi1 = 1; yi0 = 0) + α. It is straightforward to show that
E[yi0] = p(ci = 1)E[y∗i |ci = 1] + α (1)
E[yi1] = p(ci = 1)E[y∗i |ci = 1] + p(ci = 0)− α (2)
Substituting these into the definition of Yc, we have
Yc =
p(ci = 1)E[y∗|ci = 1] + α
p(ci = 1) + 2α
(3)
Subtract 12 from both sides of (3) to obtain
Yc − 12 =
p(ci = 1)(E[y∗|ci = 1]− 12)
p(ci = 1) + 2α
(4)
In addition, subtracting E[y∗|ci = 1] from both sides of (3) yields
Yc − E[y∗i |ci = 1] =
α(1− 2E[y∗|ci = 1]))
2α + p(ci = 1)
(5)
This expression gives the bias in Yc when frame monotonicity fails. To complete the proof,
note that by (4), Yc > 12 =⇒ E[y∗|ci = 1] > 12 , and then by (5), E[y∗|ci = 1] > 12 =⇒
E[y∗i |ci = 1] > Yc. This proves 1.2.i. Repeating these two steps with the inequalities reversed
proves 1.2.ii. Finally, 1.2.iii follows directly from 4. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
By the law of iterated expectations, we can write:
E[y∗i ] = E[y∗i |ci = 1]p(ci = 1) + E[y∗i |ci = 0]p(ci = 0) (6)
First we assume frame monotonicity to prove 2.1. In the proof of proposition 1.1 we showed
that E[y∗i |ci = 1]p(ci = 1) = p(y∗i = 1; ci = 1) = Y0, and p(ci = 0) = Y1 − Y0 > 0.
Substituting these into (6) yields
E[y∗i ] = Y0 + E[y∗i |ci = 0](Y1 − Y0) (7)
Proposition 2.1 follows from the fact that (7) is strictly monotonic in E[y∗i |ci = 0] and
E[y∗i |ci = 0] ∈ [0, 1].
To prove 2.2, note that by (1) and (2),
p(ci = 1) = Y0 + 1− Y1 − 2α (8)
E[y∗i |ci = 1] =
Y0 − α
Y0 + 1− Y1 − 2α (9)
Note that (9) implies that consistent preferences are point-identified when the prevalence of
frame defiers, α, is known. Substituting (8) and (9) into (6) yields
E[y∗i ] = Y0 − α + E[y∗i |ci = 0](Y1 − Y0 + 2α) (10)
Because p(ci = 0) = Y1 − Y0 + 2α ≥ 0, this expression is increasing in E[y∗i |ci = 0].
For the lower bound, set E[y∗i |ci = 0] = 0: E[y∗i ] ≥ Y0 − α. This expression is decreasing
in α, so we obtain a lower bound with the maximum possible α. By (9), E[y∗i |ci = 1] ≤ 1
implies α ≤ 1 − Y1. It follows that E[y∗i ] ≥ Y0 − (1 − Y1), which is only binding when
Y0 − (1− Y1) ≥ 0.
For the upper bound, set E[y∗i |ci = 0] = 1 in (10): E[y∗i ] ≥ Y1 + α. This expression is
increasing in α, so we obtain an upper bound by setting the maximum possible α. By (9),
E[y∗i |ci = 1] ≥ 0 implies α ≤ Y0.1 It follows that E[y∗i ] ≤ Y0 + Y1, and this upper bound is
binding whenever Y0 + Y1 ≤ 1. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Throughout the proofs of Lemma 1 and Proposition 3 we suppress the notation for condi-
tioning on wi = w, so that, for example, E[y∗i |w] ≡ E[y∗i |wi = w].
1Combining insights from these two cases, it follows that α ≤ min{Y0, 1 − Y1}. Which of these two
constraints is binding determines whether we obtain an upper or a lower bound for E[y∗i ].
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To prove L1.1, note that Bayes Rule implies
p(wi = w|ci = 1) = p(ci = 1|w)
p(ci = 1)
p(wi = w) (11)
In the proof of Proposition 1.1, we showed that p(ci = 1) = Y0+1−Y1 under unconditional
unconfoundedness (A3). Repeating the proof of Proposition 1 while conditioning on w, under
conditional unconfoundedness (A3’), yields p(ci = 1|w) = Y0(w) + 1− Y1(w). By the law of
total probability, p(ci = 1) = Ew[Y0(w) + 1−Y1(w)]. Substituting these two expressions into
(11) yields p(wi = w|ci = 1) = qwpw.
The proof that p(wi = w|ci = 0) = swpw is analogous. 
Proof of Proposition 3
To prove 3.1, note that by the law of iterated expectations
E[y∗i ] = Ew[E[y∗i |w]] (12)
Repeating the proof of Proposition 1.1 while conditioning on w yields E[y∗i |ci = 1, w] =
Yc(w). Conditional decision quality independence (A5) implies E[y∗i |w] = Yc(w). Substitut-
ing this into (12) yields the desired result.
To prove 3.2, we begin by observing that
E[y∗i |ci = 0] =
p(y∗i = 1; ci = 0)
p(ci = 0)
Applying the law of iterated expectations to the numerator yields
E[y∗i |ci = 0] =
Ew[p(y∗i = 1; ci = 0|w)]
p(ci = 0)
(13)
By the definition of conditional probability, we know that for any w
p(y∗i = 1; ci = 0|w) = E[y∗i |ci = 0, w] p(ci = 0|w)
As above, conditional decision quality independence (A5) implies E[y∗i |ci = 0, w] = E[y∗i |w] =
Yc(w). Equation (13) then implies2 that
[y∗i |ci = 0] = Ew
[
p(ci = 0|w)
p(ci = 0)
Yc(w)
]
Substituting the result from L1.2 that p(ci=0|w)
p(ci=0) = p(wi = w|ci = 0) = sw yields the desired
2The fact that p(ci = 0) is constant with respect to w allows us to move it inside the expectations operator
in this expression.
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result. 
Proof of Proposition 4
By decision quality monotonicity (A7), we can divide the population into three groups based
on (cih, cil): the always consistent (A) with cih = cil = 1, the sometimes consistent (S) with
cih = 1; cil = 0, and the never consistent (N) with cih = cil = 0. Let pij denote the share
of the population in each group for j = A, S,N , and let E[y∗i |j] denote the fraction of each
group preferring y∗.
For each fixed z = zk, the conditions are identical to those in Proposition 1.1. Following
the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 1.1, we have Y0k = p(y∗ = 1; cik = 1) =
E[y∗|cik = 1] p(cik = 1).
At each given z we know which groups are consistent, so we know that
Y0l = E[y∗i |A]piA
Y0h = E[y∗i |A]piA + E[y∗i |S]piS
Y0h − Y0l = E[y∗i |S]piS (14)
We also showed in the proof of Proposition 1.1 that p(cik = 1) = Y0l + 1 − Y0h. It follows
that
p(cil = 1) = piA = Y0l + 1− Y1l
p(cih = 1) = piA + piS = Y0h + 1− Y1h
piS = Y1l − Y0l − (Y1h − Y0h) (15)
Dividing (14) by (15) yields the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Throughout the proof we let c¯(z) = E[ciz]. Fix any D ∈ Z+. Our technical assumptions –
requiring F (z) = 0, F (z¯) = 1, and F strictly increasing – imply that F has a well-defined
inverse function over the unit interval [0, 1]. Because we have assumed F (z) and g(z) are
continuous and infinitely differentiable, the function h = g ◦ F−1 will be continuous and
infinitely differentiable as well. As a result, it has a well-defined Taylor Series approximation
of degree D about any point in (0, 1). Noting that h(c(z)) = E[y∗i |z∗i = F−1(c(z))] =
E[y∗i |z∗i = z] proves 5.1.
Now note that the preferences of the consistent choosers at some z′, E[y∗i |ciz′ = 1] =
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E[y∗i |z∗i ≤ z′], can be expressed using the definition of conditional probability as
E[y∗i |ciz′ = 1] =
´ z=z′
z=z g(z)f(z)dz
F (z′)
We employ a change of variables, letting c = F (z), dc = f(z)dz. From above, g(z) = h(c(z)),
so we obtain
E[y∗i |ciz′ = 1] =
´ c=F (z′)
c=0 h(c)dc
F (z′)
Substituting our approximation for h(c) into 5.1, evaluating the integral in the numerator,
and dividing by F (z′) = c(z′) yields the desired result in 5.2.
The result in 5.3 follows from evaluating the expression in 6.2 at c = 1. 
B The Optimal Choice of Frame
This section motivates the parameters we focus on in the body of the paper by highlighting
their relevance for setting the optimal policy. In this Section we derive formulas for the
optimal frame as well as for the optimal decision-quality state (when the decision-quality
state is a choice variable for the policymaker). The model we consider is simple but appealing
in that the welfare conclusions are robust to a range of alternative positive models (in the
spirit of Chetty (2009)).
We derive three results. First, when decision-makers’ welfare depends solely on the option
they end up selecting, the optimal frame depends solely on the preferences of the inconsistent
decision-makers. Intuitively, the choice of frame does not affect the choices made by the
consistent decision-makers and consequently the planner should ignore the preferences of
that group when determining the optimal frame.
Second, when decision-makers experience normatively-relevant opt-out costs from choos-
ing against the frame – for example by selecting an option other than the default – the
preferences of the consistent decision-makers become relevant as well. In particular, when
the planner’s goal is to maximize the fraction of decision-makers that select their most-
preferred option (e.g., when preference intensity is homogenous) and minimize the fraction
incurring an opt-out cost, the optimal frame depends on the weighted average of consis-
tent and inconsistent decision-makers’ ordinal preferences, where the weights depend on the
magnitude of the opt-out costs and the fraction of consistent choosers in the population.
Third, we consider the problem faced by a planner who must decide whether to adopt a
(potentially more expensive) decision-quality state, i.e., one in which more decision-makers
will choose consistently. We show that the social welfare benefits achieved by improving
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individuals’ decision-making in this way depend on the difference in preferences between
the decision-makers who are inconsistent at the high decision-quality state and the decision-
makers who would be induced to choose consistently by the policy change. Intuitively,
when this difference is large, a greater fraction of the sometimes-consistent decision-makers
benefit from the increase in the decision-quality state and the social planner may provide
the never-consistent with a better-tailored frame.
B.1 Setup
Assume a continuum population of measure 1 chooses from a fixed menu X = {0, 1}. A
benevolent planner selects which option is favored by the frame, d ∈ {0, 1}. The decision
quality state is given by z ∈ Z, which could be fixed (if Z is a singleton set) or set by policy,
with some associated implementation cost κ(z).3 We assume that the planner’s objective is
to maximize the probability that individuals choose their preferred option, and possibly also
to minimize the probability that they choose the option not favored by the frame (due to
the presence of opt-out costs, for example). For simplicity, the relative weight the planner
attaches to these two objectives is described by a single parameter, γ. Formally, the planner’s
problem is
max
d∈{0,1},z∈Z
ˆ
i
[
1{yid = y∗i } − γ1{yid Ó= d}
]
di− κ(z)
where 1{} is an indicator function equal to 1 when the expression inside the brackets is
true and zero otherwise. This simple objective function corresponds to the case in which
the planner seeks to maximize social welfare with 1) homogeneous preference intensity, 2)
homogeneous opt out costs, and 3) equal pareto weights across individuals. In the more
general setting, heterogeneity in these variables is reflected in the solution to the optimal
policy problem, but much of the intuition behind the characteristics of the optimal policy
will still hold. These restrictions require that an agent ending up with her preferred option
contributes equally to social welfare whether her preferred option is 0 or 1, and that opting
out is equally costly for all decision-makers who opt out, regardless of their preference or the
default. 4
3The units of κ(z) is the number of individuals the planner would need to give their preferred option to
justify incurring a cost of κ(z).
4With a different social welfare function, such as one that incorporates the intensity of each individual’s
preference for the available options, the parameters we identify will be insufficient to fully characterize optimal
policy without additional restrictions. In general, identifying the intensity of individuals’ preferences requires
richer data and/or stronger positive assumptions than the type we employ here. In particular, implementing
the solution to a utilitarian planner’s problem would require estimating the joint distribution of (1) decision-
makers’ cardinal preferences and (2) the welfare cost to a decision-maker of choosing against the frame.
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B.2 Results
We prove two simple propositions characterizing the solution to the planner’s problem. The
first considers the optimal frame when the decision-quality state is fixed. The second con-
siders the joint choice of the optimal frame and the optimal decision-quality state, assuming
for simplicity that there are no opt-out costs.
Proposition A.1
Suppose Z is singleton, Z = {z}. Assume the consistency principle (A2) and frame mono-
tonicity (A4).5 Let c = E[ciz]. Let ρ = γcγc+1−c . The optimal frame is d1 if and only if
(1− ρ)E[y∗i |ci = 0] + ρE[y∗i |ci = 1] >
1
2 (16)
Proof: Note that the planner’s problem above is equivalent to the following
max
d∈{1,0},z∈Z
p(yid = y∗i )− γp(yid Ó= d)− κ(z)
Since z is fixed by assumption, the solution to the planner’s problem simplifies to the
comparison of the objective function evaluated at d = 1 and d = 0. We will therefore have
that d = 1 is superior if and only if
p(yi1 = y∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
− γp(yi1 = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
> p(yi0 = y∗)︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
− γp(yi0 = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(17)
We next derive each of these probabilities.
By frame monotonicity, the consistency principle, and the law of iterated expectations,
terms one and three simplify to:
p(yi1 = y∗i ) = p(ci = 1) + E[y∗i |ci = 0]p(ci = 0)
p(yi0 = y∗) = p(ci = 1) + E[1− y∗i |ci = 0]p(ci = 0)
By frame monotonicity, terms two and four simplify to:
γp(yi1 = 0) = γp(yi1 = yi0 = 0) = γE[1− y∗i |ci = 1]p(ci = 1)
γp(yi0 = 1) = γp(yi1 = yi0 = 1) = γE[y∗|ci = 1]p(ci = 1)
5The assumption of frame separability is embedded in the planner’s problem. Unconfoundedness is neces-
sary for the statistical estimation of the relevant preference parameters from data, but not for understanding
the relationship between these parameters and optimal policy, our focus here.
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Combining terms and simplifying, we have that d = 1 is optimal if and only if
E[y∗i |ci = 0]
p(ci = 0)
γp(ci = 1) + p(ci = 0)
+ E[y∗i |ci = 1]
γp(ci = 1)
γp(ci = 1) + p(ci = 0)
>
1
2
Substituting the definitions of ρ and c yields the desired result. 
Discussion of Proposition A.1 The optimal frame will tend toward d = 1 when (1) the
fraction of inconsistent choosers who prefer y = 1 is large, and (2) the fraction of consistent
choosers who prefer y = 1 is large. The first group is helped by the frame being d = 1,
because the default directly influences their choices. The second group is helped by the
frame being d = 1, because they will not incur an opt-out cost to receive their preferred
option. The left-hand side of (16) shows that the relative importance of the consistent
group is determined by a weight ρ, which is increasing in opt-out costs γ and the size of the
consistent subgroup (c). When choosing against the frame is assumed to have no normatively
relevant cost, the optimal policy depends only on the preferences of inconsistent choosers.
To see this, note that when γ = 0, ρ = 0, so the condition for optimality of d = 1 simplifies
to E[y∗i |ci = 0] > 12 .
Finally, note that the optimal policy does not depend on γ when the majority of consis-
tent and inconsistent decision-makers prefer the same option. The magnitude of the opt-out
costs only matters when consistent and inconsistent choosers are better off under differ-
ent defaults. Otherwise the default that minimizes opt-outs, as recommended by Thaler
and Sunstein (2003), will tend to be socially optimal. In contrast, when inconsistent and
consistent choosers have different preferences (which requires that decision-quality indepen-
dence fails) and the inconsistent choosers preferences dominate (i.e. ρ is small), minimizing
opt-outs will lead to a sub-optimal policy.
Proposition A.2
Suppose the planner can choose between two decision quality states, Z = {zh, zl}. Suppose
κ(zh) > κ(zl), and let ∆κ = κ(zh) − κ(zl) be the change in per-person cost of increasing
the decision-quality state from zl to zh. Assume the consistency principle (A2), frame mono-
tonicity (A4), decision-quality exclusivity (A6), decision quality monotonicity (A7), and that
γ = 0. Then the solution to the planner’s problem is given case-wise by
1. (1, zl) if
(a) Y ∗N > 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS >
1
2 , and ∆κ > (1− Y ∗S )piS, OR
(b) Y ∗N > 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS <
1
2 and ∆κ > Y
∗
S piS + (2Y ∗N − 1)piN
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2. (0, zl) if
(a) Y ∗N < 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS <
1
2 and ∆κ > Y
∗
S piS, OR
(b) Y ∗N < 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS >
1
2 and ∆κ > piS(1− Y ∗S ) + (1− 2Y ∗N)piN ,
3. (0, zh) if
(a) Y ∗N < 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS <
1
2 and ∆κ < Y
∗
S piS, OR
(b) Y ∗N > 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS <
1
2 and ∆κ < Y
∗
S piS + (2Y ∗N − 1)piN
4. (1, zh) if
(a) Y ∗N > 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS >
1
2 and ∆κ < (1− Y ∗S )piS, OR
(b) Y ∗N < 12 and
Y ∗NpiN+Y
∗
S piS
piN+piS >
1
2 and ∆κ < (1− Y ∗S )piS + (1− 2Y ∗N)piN
where Y ∗N ≡ E[y∗i |cih = cil = 0], Y ∗S ≡ E[φi|cih > cil], piN = 1 − E[cih], and piS = E[cih] −
E[cil].
Proof: When γ = 0 the planner’s objective evaluated at each of the four possible d by zk
combinations is
p(yidk = y∗i )− κ(zk)
In the proof of Proposition A.1, we showed that these four expressions can be re-written for
fixed zk as
d = 1 : p(cik = 1) + E[y∗i |cik = 0]p(cik = 0)− κ(zk) (18)
d = 0 : p(cik = 1) + E[1− y∗i |cik = 0]p(cik = 0)− κ(zk) (19)
By decision-quality monotonicity and the existence of consistent choosers, we can divide
the population into always-consistent (A), never-consistent (N) and sometimes-consistent
(C), exactly as in Propositions 4 and A.1. The fraction preferring y = 1 in each population
are given by Y ∗A , Y ∗N , and Y ∗S , respectively, and the size of each population is given by piA,
piN , and piS, respectively.
Using this notation, p(cil = 1) = piA, p(cih = 0) = piN , p(cil = 0) = 1 − piA = piN + piS.
By the law of iterated expectations and the definition of conditional probability,
E[y∗i |cil = 0] =
Y ∗S piS + Y ∗NpiN
piS + piN
E[1− y∗i |cil = 0] =
(1− Y ∗S )piS + (1− Y ∗N)piN
piS + piN
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Using these expressions to simplify equations (18) and (19) for both values of zk yields:
d = 1, z = zl : piA + Y ∗S piS + Y ∗NpiN − κ(zl) (20)
d = 0, z = zl : piA + (1− Y ∗S )piS + (1− Y ∗N)piN − κ(zl) (21)
d = 1, z = zh : piA + piS + Y ∗NpiN − κ(zh) (22)
d = 0, z = zh : piA + piS + (1− Y ∗N)piN − κ(zh) (23)
Note that the first three terms in each of these will be the total number of individuals
who receive their preferred option when the planner chooses that (d, z) combination.
First, consider situations where the planner chooses d = 1 regardless of z. This requires
(20)>(21) and (22)>(23), which simplify to the first two conditions in (1a) and (4a). The
planner will set zh if (22)>(20), which simplifies to ∆κ < (1 − Y ∗S )piS, which yields (4a).
With the inequality reversed, we get (1a).
Second, consider situations where the planner chooses d = 0 regardless of z. This requires
(20)<(21) and (22)<(23), which simplify to the first two conditions in (2a) and (3a). Then
the planner chooses zh if (23)>(21), which simplifies to ∆κ < Y ∗S piS. This yields the final
condition in (2a) and (3a).
Third, consider the situation where the planner would want to choose d = 1 under zh
and d = 0 under zl. This requires (20)<(21) and (22)>(23), which provides the first two
conditions in (1b) and (3b). In this situation, the planner chooses zh if (22)>(21) and
zl otherwise. Performing this comparison, we have that the planner chooses zh if ∆κ <
Y ∗S piS + (2Y ∗N − 1)piN , which is the final condition in (3b). When the inequality is reversed,
we obtain the final condition in (1b).
Finally, consider the situation where the planner would want to choose d = 0 under
zh and d = 1 under zl. This requires (20)>(21) and (22)<(23), which provide the first two
conditions in (2b) and (4b). In this situation, the planner chooses zh if (23)>(20). Comparing
these, we see that the planner chooses zh if ∆κ < (1−Y ∗S )piS +(1−2Y ∗N)piN ,which is the final
condition in (4b). When the inequality is reversed, we obtain the final condition in (2b). 
The planner should switch to zh from zl if the number of individuals who receive their
preferred option increases by enough to justify the increase in implementation cost ∆κ. We
divide the cases first based on two possibilities for the solution to the problem: the optimal
choice of frame either depends on the choice of decision-quality environment or it does not.
When the optimal choice of frame does not depend on z, switching to zh from zl helps only
those individuals who are consistent at zh but not zl (group S), and who prefer the option
not associated with the frame. In other words, when the never-consistent choosers prefer the
same frame as the sometimes- and never-consistent choosers together, the planner should only
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take into account how many sometimes-consistent choosers will receive their preferred option
under the improved decision-quality state. Parts (1a), (2a), (3a), and (4a) correspond to
these possibilities. In the second set of possibilities, the optimal frame changes as the planner
increases from zl to zh. This case obtains if the individuals who become consistent at zh
(group S) have different preferences from the group who never choose consistently (group N).
Here, moving from zh to zl not only gives individuals in group S who prefer the non-framed
option their preferred option, but it also allows the planner to set a better default for group
N. For example, suppose the planner would want to set d = 0 in zl but d = 1 in zh. This
corresponds to Parts (1b) and (3b) of the proposition. Then we must have that Y ∗S < 12 ,
Y ∗N >
1
2 , and the preferences of the S group dominate when determining optimal policy under
zl, which occurs if there are more of them or their preferences are more homogenous. In this
case the benefit of switching to zh includes not only the benefit of giving those in group S
who prefer the non-framed option their preferred option, but also the benefit of setting a
frame in accordance with the preferences of the remaining group who are never consistent,
group N. How large this benefit is depends on how far Y ∗N is from 12 (i.e. how bad the zl
frame was for this group) as well as the size of group N.
C Alternative Positive Models of Default Sensitivity
In this Appendix we consider the relationship between our framework and positive models
of framing effects. In many cases, a range of alternative models of framing effects will be
observationally equivalent given the available data, meaning that any one of them might
explain decision-makers’ observed sensitivity to the frame in question. As emphasized by
Bernheim (2009), such model uncertainty poses a challenge for welfare analysis, since the
preferences implied by a decision-maker’s observed choice behavior depend on the positive
model of behavior that maps the decision-maker’s preferences into his or her choices. An
important advantage of our approach is that it can shed light on decision-makers’ preferences
without specifying the exact positive model of behavior that generates the observed framing
effect, at least within the class of positive models consistent with the assumptions set out in
the body of the paper (such as frame monotonicity and the consistency principle).
To illustrate, we consider the application of our framework to alternative behavioral
models that have been proposed to explain why decision-makers exhibit sensitivity to default
effects. An important lesson of this exercise is that our reduced-form framework is not a
replacement for structural modeling. That is, although the framework is sufficiently general
to accommodate many of the models we consider, the specific positive model shapes the
interpretation of the reduced-form parameters that our proposed approaches recover and
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has important implications for which of the proposed approaches are likely to succeed in a
given setting.
In each model, we assume that every decision-maker (DM) i chooses from a fixed menu
X = {0, 1}. DM’s valuations of the two options are given by ui(0) and ui(1), with the
difference denoted by u¯i = ui(1)− ui(0). We assume that the distribution of ui is described
by cumulative density function F (.).6 We denote the default by d ∈ {d0, d1}, where the
subscript indicates which option is the default. We continue to denote y∗i = 1{ui(y) > ui(x)}
and ci = 1{yi1 = yi0}.
C.1 Inattention
One reason why people might be drawn to the default option is that they do not pay attention
to the other menu items. Here, we develop a model of default sensitivity based on inattention,
using the approach of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012).
C.1.1 Setup
In the model of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay (2012), one assumes that an individual
pays attention only to some subset of the menu X, but that she maximizes her preferences
over the alternatives that she considers.7 In order to incorporate framing effects, we must
specify an attention filter Γ which depends on d. The attention filter Γ is a mapping from
(X, d) to a subset of X, Γ(X, d) ⊆ X.8 Given a utility function representation of individual
i’s preferences, ui(.), we can write the consumer’s choice as the solution to the utility-
maximization problem restricted to Γi(X, di).
yi(di) = arg max
y∈Γi(X,di)
ui(y) (24)
Claim: When X is binary, frame monotonicity and the consistency principle will be satisfied
if the individual always pays attention to the default option. Formally, the sufficient condition
6Our focus in the body of the paper is only with decision-makers’ ordinal preferences, but in some of
the models considered here, differences in preference intensity will explain some of the variation in decision-
makers’ consistency.
7Instead of reflecting inattention to a subset of the menu, an alternative possibility for why some decision-
makers tend to select the default option is that they follow the default as a decision-making heuristic, or
shortcut. The model is formally equivalent to the limited attention model for binary menus, but the two
models depart with more than two options. That is, the heuristic model is a special case of the limited
attention model where the attention filter consists solely of a single option (whichever option happens to be
the default).
8Masatlioglu et al.’s key assumption is that ∀X, Γi(X, d) = Γi(X\x, d) whenever x /∈ Γi{X, d}. This
assumption is not directly relevant to our setting because our focus is on binary choices. However, in the
non-binary case it will place additional restrictions on when preferences are revealed by choices.
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is
∀i, ∀j ∈ {0, 1} j ∈ Γi(X, dj) (25)
Proof: Suppose condition (25) is satisfied. Recall that frame monotonicity is only violated
when (yi0, yi1) = (1, 0). Suppose that yi0 = 1. Then 1 ∈ Γi{x, d0} by (24). By (25),
0 ∈ Γi{x, d0}. By (24) again then, ui(1) > ui(0). Finally, 1 ∈ Γi{x, d1} by (25), so we know
that yi1 = 1. This yi0 = 1 =⇒ yi1 = 1, ci = 1, and y∗i = 1. Using a similar set of steps, we
know that yi1 = 0 =⇒ yi0 = 1, ci = 1, y∗i = 0. 
Intuitively, when DMs choose y = 1 under d = 0, they are “revealing” that they pay
attention to y = 1 under default d0, since a DM cannot choose an alternative not in the
attention set Γ(.).Given the assumption that all DMs also pay attention to the default option,
by choosing y = 1 a DM reveals that she prefers y to x. Thus, when inattention drives default
effects and individuals always pay attention to the default option, the assumptions underlying
our reduced-form approach will obtain.9 In related work on stochastic choice, Manzini and
Mariotti (2014) make an assumption analogous to Equation (25) to model DMs who (with
some probability) may or may not consider options besides the default.
In this model, variation in whether decision-makers are consistent is governed by vari-
ation in Γi. The relationship between preferences and consistency is thus governed by the
relationship between ui and Γi. In the next two sub-sections, we consider two alternative
possibilities for what might drive variation in Γi and what each implies for the relationship
between consistency and preferences.
C.1.2 Heterogeneous Attention Costs
Here we consider a model in which paying attention to the non-default option requires the
DM to incur some utility cost ki ≥ 0. We assume decision-makers fail to consider the non-
default option whenever the cost of paying attention to the non-default option, ki exceeds a
threshold value k. For example, ki may reflect the decision-maker’s cognitive ability, other
demands on his or her attention, or prior experience with the choice being made. A decision-
maker is consistent, so ci = 1, if and only if ki < k.
Assuming that ki is distributed in the population with a cumulative distribution function
G(.), we will have that E[ci] = G(k). Whether decision-quality independence holds in this
model depends on the empirical correlation between the determinants of decision-makers’
9One could imagine extending this approach to incorporate additional data. Note that, like frame mono-
tonicity, property (25) could be tested if one is able to observe an individual’s choice across multiple frames,
or if one could observe attention directly (such as by interviewing decision-makers after their choice or by
employing an eye scanner). In addition, note that when we move beyond the binary case, assumption (25)
would justify the assumption that active choices reveal a preference for the chosen option over the default
option, but not the stronger assumption that active choices reveal preferences over the entire menu.
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attention costs, ki, and their preferences, represented by ui. In particular, we will have
cov(ci, y∗i ) = 0 ⇐⇒ p(ki < k; u¯i > 0) = p(ki < k)p(u¯i > 0). Thus a sufficient condition for
decision-quality independence is if ki is distributed independently of ui.
When ki and u¯i are correlated, this correlation should be taken into account to estimate
the distribution of preferences in the population. There are two empirical strategies one
might employ. The first is to collect data on variables likely to be highly correlated with ki
and u¯i and implement a matching-on-observables approach. Our reasoning in the application
in Section 4 was similar: younger, lower-income workers may pay less attention to savings
decisions because retirement is further off, and they may prefer to save less because they will
make more later or are currently paying down debt. When these are the dominant factors
determining attention and preferences, matching on these observable characteristics yields a
credible identificaiton strategy.
A second strategy would be to use decision-quality instruments to exogenously increase ki
or decrease k¯. For example, providing decision-makers with practice making similar decisions
or manipulating the time required to attend to other available options are natural candidates
for decision-quality instruments.
With variation in a decision-quality instrument, this model begins to resemble the one
in Section 3.3.2 of the paper. With a joint normal distribution for u¯i and log(ki) and a
homogeneous effect of a change in the decision-quality instrument z on log(ki), this becomes
identical to the latent variable model outlined in that section, so we can trace out the
propensity to optimize as a function of the fraction of optimizers at a given level of z, and
extrapolate to recover the full distribution of u¯i and ki. One can naturally imagine similar
models relying on weaker functional form assumptions.
C.1.3 Stakes-Based Attentiveness
In this model, the DM decides whether to pay attention by comparing the cost of doing so
against the benefit they stand to gain. In making this decision, the agent knows the absolute
value of the difference in utility between the available options, but not which option has the
higher utility. That is, agents know the utility amount at stake, but not which option they
prefer. For example, consider an employee selecting a retirement savings plan. The employee
may know how much selecting the right retirement savings plan matters to her and how costly
it is to learn about the menu of plans, but she may not actually know which plan is best for
her without incurring utility costs from making the comparison.
Assume the DM knows the utility “stakes” of the meta-decision of whether to consider
the non-default option, |u¯i|, and must decide whether to incur the cost of attention, ki.10 As
10If agents could not account for the amount at stake, this model would reduce to the previous one in
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above, we assume that individuals who pay the cost select their most-preferred option under
both defaults whereas individuals who do not simply select the default.
Suppose that decision-makers believe (ex-ante) that y = 0 is best with probability ωi.
Consider the DM’s problem when the default is d0. If she pays attention, with probability
ω she will end up staying with y = 0 and with probability 1 − ω she will discover that she
prefers y = 1 (i.e., that u¯ > 0) and pick y = 1. Whichever option she prefers, she will
incur the attention cost C. If she doesn’t pay attention, she will end up with y = 0 with
certainty. Thus the net utility gain to paying attention when the default is d0 is given by
(1− ω) |u¯| − C. The decision-maker will choose to pay attention to both options under the
following condition:
Γi(X, d0) = X ⇐⇒ (1− ωi) |u¯i| − ki > 0
Similarly, when the default is d1, the DM will choose to consider the non-default option when
Γi(X, d1) = X ⇐⇒ ωi |u¯i| − ki > 0
Thus for an agent to choose to consider both options under both frames, it must be the case
that
Γi(X, d0) = Γi(X, d1) = X =⇒ ki|u¯i| < ω < 1−
ki
|u¯i|
Note that the condition is guaranteed to fail when ki ≥ |u¯i| (since ω ∈ [0, 1]), i.e. when the
cost of attentiveness exceeds the potential benefits. Note that we can also write the above
condition for attentiveness in both frames as ki < min{(1−ωi) |u¯i|, ωi |u¯i|}, which highlights
that a DM with sufficiently low ki will always consider both options.
Because this model is a special case of the general inattention model described above, we
know that frame monotonicity and the consistency principle will be satisfied. Note though
that although DMs who are fully attentive under both defaults will be consistent, the converse
is not true. For example, a DM who prefers y = 1 and has ω < min
{ |u¯|
C
, 1− |u¯|
C
}
will choose
y = 1 consistently, even though she follows the default under d1 and only considers both
options under d0.
In general, decision-quality independence will not hold in this setting. Even when at-
tention costs ki are orthogonal to preferences, |u¯|i may nonetheless be correlated with both.
That is, individuals with high |u¯i| will be more likely to pay attention to both options (and
thus to choose consistently) and also may be more likely to prefer one option to the other
(i.e., preference intensity may be correlated with ordinal preferences). However, conditional
decision-quality independence may still hold when one can observe sufficient characteristics
which heterogeneity in attentiveness depended solely on individual characteristics. If agents knew the precise
utility gain that they would achieve by considering the non-default option, the model would become formally
identical to the costly opt-out model considered below.
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to control for both ki and |u¯i|, in which case matching on observables will allow us to recover
population preferences. That is, under stakes-based attention models, the observer should
control for variation among decision-makers associated with the costs of attention and the
perceived utility stakes in the underlying decision. In the 401(k) application in Section 4,
we know that income is highly correlated with the value of deferred tax on pension con-
tributions, so conditioning on income should help control for variation in the stakes of the
decision at hand. One could also solicit and control for 1) the individual’s knowledge of the
definitions of various aspects of retirement plans, and 2) for the self-reported importance of
the savings decision. Similarly, valid decision-quality instruments will consist of variation
in the choice environment that affects the cost of attention or the perceived stakes of the
decision monotonically for all individuals. For example, a researcher might emphasize the
importance of the decision to some participants in an experimental intervention.
C.2 Costly Opt-Outs
In this model, we assume a DM can incur a perceived utility cost γi ≥ 0 in order to choose an
option that is not the default. Here we assume that the utility cost is neoclassical, such as an
administrative fee for opting into an alternative retirement plan. Although we initially focus
on the case in which γi reflects a real cost (i.e., the perceived cost equals the true cost), this
formal model also captures “as if” transaction costs that nonetheless shape decision-makers’
behavior, as explored in Appendix C.3 below. In independent work, Bernheim, Fradkin and
Popov (2015) develop a model like this one, with a little more structure on the distribution of
ui and γi, to estimate the distribution of privately optimal contribution rates to a 401(k) plan
and opt-out costs. Because we are primarily focused on the relationship between positive
models and the identification strategies described in the body of our paper, however, our
discussion of the implications of these models is largely orthogonal to their work,
A defining feature of this class of model is that the decision-maker knows the potential
utility gain from choosing the non-default option and selects it if and only if the benefit from
doing so exceeds the perceived opt-out cost. DM’s choice is thus given by
yi(d) = arg max
y∈X
ui(y)− γi1{ci Ó= d}
When di = d0, the solution to this problem is given by yi0 = 1 ⇐⇒ u¯i > γi. When
d = d1, the solution is given by yi1 = 1 ⇐⇒ −u¯i < γi. We can summarize the three distinct
possibilities for the choices of individual i as follows:
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(yi0, yi1) =

(0, 0) if − u¯i > γi
(0, 1) if -u¯i < γi, u¯i < γi
(1, 0) if u¯i > γi
(26)
From (26), it is straightforward to verify that the consistency principle and frame mono-
tonicity will hold. The two statistics studied in our paper will be given in this model by
y∗i = 1 ⇐⇒ u¯i > 0
ci = 1 ⇐⇒ |u¯i| > γi
When transaction costs are homogenous, γi = γ ∀i, the average (ordinal) preferences of the
consistent decision-makers is given by: E[y∗i |ci = 1] = P (ui > 0 |ui ∈ (−∞,−γi] ∪ [γi,∞)),
or
E[y∗i |ci = 1] =
1− F (γ)
1− F (γ) + F (−γ)
Similarly, for the inconsistent decision-makers we have E[y∗i |ci = 0] = P (ui > 0 |ui ∈ (−γ, γ)),
or
E[y∗i |ci = 0] =
F (γ)− F (0)
F (γ)− F (−γ)
Note that heterogeneity in decision-makers’ consistency in this model is driven by het-
erogeneity in the intensity of their preferences as well as the size of their transaction costs.
Consequently, decision-quality independence will not generally be satisfied:11
cov(y∗i , ci) = p(u¯i > γi)− p(u¯ > 0)p(u¯i < −γi or u¯i > γi)
which will equal zero if and only if the distribution of preferences happens to satisfy p(ui >
γi|ui > 0) = p(ui < −γi|ui < 0). That decision-quality independence usually fails here is
not surprising: whether an individual is consistent in this model depends strongly on her
preferences.
Nevertheless, additional structure can make the statistics on ordinal preferences studied
in the body of the paper sufficient for optimal policy. Consider a utilitarian social planner
choosing d ∈ {d0, d1} to maximize
W (d) =
ˆ
i
ui(y(d))− ργi1{yi(d) Ó= d}di.
where ρ ∈ [0, 1] governs the normative relevance of “as-if” opt out costs. One can show
that when 1) u¯i and γi are independent and 2) the distribution of u¯i is single-peaked and
symmetric, that the optimal default for a utilitarian social planner is d = 1 if and only if
11cov(y∗i , ci) = E[y∗i cii]− E[y∗i ]E[cii] = p(y∗i = cii = 1)− p(y∗i = 1) p(cii = 1).
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Figure 6: Sometimes Consistent Choosers in the Costly Opt-out Model
0 γ γ′−γ−γ′ ui(1)− ui(0)
ASNNSA
y∗i = 0 y∗i = 1
E[y∗i |ci = 1] > 12 .12 Moreover, these sufficient conditions for E[y∗i |ci = 1] > 12 to determine
the optimal policy obtain regardless of whether γ is a real utility cost that enters the planner’s
objective or merely a normatively irrelevant “as-if” cost, i.e. it holds for any ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Decision-quality instruments are immensely useful in this model, both for accounting for
selection into the consistent subgroup and for identifying preference intensity. In this model
changes in the cost of opting out constitute valid decision-quality instruments. Reductions
in these costs could be obtained, for example, by easing the administrative requirements
(such as paperwork) for choosing the non-default option. Suppose that transactions costs
change from γi to γ′i ≤ γi, with γ′i < γi for some i. Then variation in transactions costs will
meet the criteria for being a decision-quality instrument and we will have:
(yi0(γ), yi0(γ′), yi1(γ′), yi1(γ)) =

(0, 0, 0, 0) if u¯i < −γi
(0, 0, 0, 1) if u¯i ∈ [−γi,−γ′i]
(0, 0, 1, 1) if u¯i ∈ [−γ′i, γ′i]
(0, 1, 1, 1) if u¯i ∈ [γ′i, γi]
(1, 1, 1, 1) if u¯i > γi
(27)
The second and fourth cases correspond to the sometimes-consistent decision-makers whose
ordinal preferences are captured by the statistic YS in Section 3.3. Figure 6 depicts the
different cases in Equation (27), given two values of a decision-quality instrument.
Because of the two-sided, symmetric nature of selection into the consistent subgroup in
this model, we can identify the cardinal utility parameters governing the distribution of u¯i
and γi. With sufficient (observable) variation in γi and/or functional form assumptions on
12If the conditional distributions of γi and ui have these properties when conditioning on given observable
characteristics, using our matching on observables approach to tailor defaults by individual characteristics,
as discussed in Section 4, would also lead to optimal policies.
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the joint distribution of γi and u¯i, one can back out the underlying structural parameters
using maximum-likelihood estimation or semi-parametric techniques. The setup of these
estimation strategies is similar to that of the one in Section 3.3.2, except that selection is
two-sided here and one-sided in Section 3.3.2.
Here we will focus on the situation where γ is homogeneous and known.13 Figure 7
illustrates the recovery of preference intensity given arbitrarily rich (exogenous) variation
in γ. The top panel depicts Equation (26) for some γ. From this panel we can see that
Equation (26) implies that given some γ, E[yi0(γ)] tells us about the fraction of consistent
choosers with u¯i > γ, while E[yi1(γ)] tells us about the fraction of consistent choosers with
u¯i < −γ. The bottom panel shows how given rich variation in γ, so that we know E[yi0(γ)]
and E[yi1(γ)] as a function of γ ∈ [0,∞), we can recover the full cumulative distribution
function of u¯i, where the units of u¯i are measured in the same units as γ.
C.3 Variants of the Costly Opt-Out Model
This section considers models in which default sensitivity arises for reasons apart from trans-
action costs but that can be formally modeled along the same lines. An important motivation
for these models is the fact that default sensitivity is observed among decision-makers even
when the stakes are large and opt-out is inexpensive (Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov, 2015;
Carroll et al., 2009; Chetty et al., 2014), which suggests that pure neoclassical transaction
costs are insufficient to explain behavior. Note that although the positive behavioral models
are similar, the distinction between misperceived and real transaction costs does matter for
setting the optimal policy, as misperceived costs should not be incorporated into the social
welfare function (i.e. they should be excluded from the γ parameter in Appendix B).
C.3.1 Procrastination
The model in this section shows how present bias can contribute to default sensitivity by
inflating perceived opt-out costs, which must be presently-incurred, relative to a benefit
that is realized in the future (Laibson, 1997). The model is a simplified version of the one
presented in Carroll et al. (2009), which employs non-binary menus and a richer dynamic
structure.
There are two time periods in the model, t = 1, 2. At t = 1, decision-makers choose
between y = 0 and y = 1. As above, considering the non-default option requires incurring
13We defer to future work situations in which γ is heterogeneous and may have units that are difficult to
quantify. Identifying a model with heterogeneous γ might utilize exogenous variation in u¯. This variation
could come from varying the relative price of y = 0 and y = 1, for example, but allowing for such variation
leads to a considerably more sophisticated model than the binary choice model we employ here.
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Figure 7: Identifying Preference Intensity with a Decision-Quality Instrument
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some opt-out cost of ci, for example, the disutility of expending mental energy for the
decision-maker to figure out which option she prefers. At t = 2, the decision-maker receives
the option she selected at t = 1 and realizes the associated utility. The DM’s time preference
is captured by δi ∈ (0, 1]. Additionally, the DM may also be present-biased, in that she
perceives the utility consequences of current period decisions to be greater than future ones
(over and above her discount rate δi). We denote the DM’s present bias by βi ∈ (0, 1]. Thus,
for a DM who prefers y = 1 facing a default of d0 in t = 1, the (perceived) net utility effect
of selecting the non-default option is given by
Ui(1, d0) = βiδiui − ci
Let γi ≡ ciδi denote the current value of true utility costs from the perspective of the second
period, which will be equivalent to opt-out costs in the previous section (since they are
valued in the same period that utility over the menu options is realized). In this model, a
decision-maker selects the non-default option if and only if the benefit to doing so exceeds
the opt-out costs from the present-biased perspective:
yi0 = 1 ⇐⇒ ui > γi
βi
(28)
yi1 = 0 ⇐⇒ ui < −γi
βi
(29)
Comparing Equations (28) and (29) to Equation (26) reveals that the procrastination model
is formally equivalent to the standard costly opt-out model if we re-define the “opt-out cost”
to be the true current value of opt-out costs inflated by the degree of the DM’s present-bias.
Thus the key question for identifying the inconsistent choosers’ preferences is understanding
the empirical correlation between ui and γiβi in the population of decision-makers. From the
perspective of social welfare, the only difference between this model and the previous one is
that when we adopt the long-run view of welfare, only a fraction of the as-if opt-out costs
are normatively relevant.
C.3.2 Status-Quo Bias
One candidate explanation for default effects is that decision-makers are more likely to choose
whichever option represents a continuation of the status quo and perceive the default to be
such a continuation. In this model, the frames denote which option represents a continuation
of the status quo and which represents a change. A straightforward way to model status quo
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bias is to assume that individuals incur a utility cost when deviating from the status quo.14
That is, if the status quo is for an individual to end up with y = 0, she will only select y = 1
when the utility gains to doing so exceed a positive threshold. The only difference between
this model and the one in Appendix C.2 is that the utility loss associated with deviating
from the status quo is non-neoclassical. However, such behavior can be modeled in exactly
the same way as default sensitivity that arises in response to a neoclassical transaction
cost. Good candidates for decision-quality instruments would be variations in the extent to
which an option is framed as a continuation of the status quo, such as by emphasizing or
downplaying that aspect of the option at the time of decision-making.
C.3.3 Anchoring
In this model designating some option as the default creates a psychological pull towards
that option, due to an anchoring effect. Relative to utility over x and y, DM i chooses as if
she values the psychological pull of the default option at δi. DM’s decision utility of option
y ∈ X is given by
uˆi(y, d) ≡ ui(y) + δi1{y = d}
where 1{y = d} indicates whether option y is the default. We assume that an individual
maximizes her decision utility, i.e. that yi(d) = arg max uˆ(y, d). When d = d0, the solution
to this problem is given by yi0 = 1 ⇐⇒ u¯i > δi. When d = d1, the solution is given by
yi11 = y ⇐⇒ u¯i > −δi. We can summarize the three distinct possibilities for the choices of
individual i as follows:
(yi0, yi1) =

(0, 0) if u¯i < −δi
(0, 1) if − δi < u¯i < δi
(1, 1) if u¯i > δi
(30)
Equation (30) reveals that although the psychological motivation is quite different, this
model too is formally equivalent to the costly opt-out models described above. For the
binary case considered here, the difference between the two models reduces to whether the
effect of the frame on decision-making is modeled as a cost (as above) or as a benefit (as
here).15 Candidate decision-quality instruments might vary the psychological pull of the
default option (δ), for example by varying its prominence relative to the rest of the menu.
14Researchers and psychologists disagree about whether a status quo bias is normatively relevant or not –
that is, whether status quo effects arise from non-standard preferences as opposed to an optimization failure.
15Outside of the binary setting, Bernheim, Fradkin and Popov (2015) note that another way to distinguish
between the models and the opt-out costs models is that anchoring should cause choices to cluster around
the default, whereas opt-out costs should create a trough in the distribution of choices around the default.
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C.3.4 Rational Attention
Here we consider the possibility that the opt-out costs are the psychological costs of paying
attention to the non-default option. When the individual rationally incurs these costs, the
model in Appendix C.1 becomes a model of rational inattention.16 Formally, we can suppose
that the individual faced with default d first chooses Γ(d0)
d0 : max
Γ(d0)∈{{0},{0,1}}
ui(y(Γ(d0)))− γi1{1 ∈ Γ(d0)} s.t. y(Γ(d0)) = arg max
y∈Γ(d0)
ui(y) (31)
d1 : max
Γ(d1)∈{{1},{0,1}}
ui(y(Γ(d1)))− γi1{0 ∈ Γ(d1)} s.t. y(Γ(d1)) = arg max
y∈Γ(d1)
ui(y) (32)
The constraint in this optimal attention problem corresponds to the choice rule described
by equation (24) in Appendix C.1, and the key assumption from that Section, that the
individual always pays attention to the default option (Equation (25) before), is embedded
in the possible choices of Γ(.). When we endogenize attention in this way, the inattention
model becomes exactly identical to the opt-out costs model, as characterized by Equation
(26). This model is also a version of the planner-doer model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006),
where the behavior of the “doer” is given by Equation (24) and the behavior of the “planner”
– who regulates the behavior of the doer at some cost – by Equations (31) and (32).
C.4 Defaults as Advice
Here we present a simple model based on the idea that decision-makers who lack information
about the utility of the available options may interpret the default as advice from the planner
about which option is likely to be in their best interest. That is, decision-makers have some
prior beliefs about the utility they would derive from either choice and they update that
prior based on a signal in the form of the default. The model we develop here is a simplified
version of that of Caplin and Martin (2012).
There are three potentially interesting types of preference information in this setting: (1)
preferences baseed on individuals prior beliefs before observing the default, (2) preferences
based on individuals beliefs after observing the default, and (3) ex post (full information)
preferences. In this setting, our approach will identify information on the first of these
types of preferences, based on individuals’ priors. With more structure, one can also use the
observed choice data to learn about the distribution of the second type of preferences (2),
16As with many models of rational inattention, this model is subject to an infinite regress critique (Conlisk,
1996). One might wonder, for instance, how the individual allocates attention to the problem of allocating
attention among menu options. We assume the individual perfectly understands the costs and benefits of
attention allocation, but acknowledge that this does not fully overcome the conceptual difficulty.
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and subjective beliefs in the signal value of defaults – the main reason that (1) and (2) differ.
Formally, denote individual i’s expected utility of y = 1 relative to y = 0 by E[u¯i] =
E[ui(1) − ui(0)]. Upon observing the default, the individual updates this expected utility
to E[u¯i|d] and chooses y = 1 iff E[u¯i|d] > 0. For simplicity, we will assume the change in
expected relative utility upon updating is symmetric across the two defaults and denoted by
vi ≥ 0:17
E[u¯i|d1] = E[u¯i] + vi (33)
E[u¯i|d0] = E[u¯i]− vi (34)
Frame monotonicity will be satisfied in this model, since E[u¯i|d1] ≥ E[u¯i|d0].18 In fact,
this model is quite similar to the model of costly opt-out in Appendix C.2, with a different
interpretation of the underlying parameters. Combining (33) and (34) yields
(yi0, yi1) =

(0, 0) if − E[u¯i] > vi
(0, 1) if -E[u¯i] < vi, E[u¯i] < vi
(1, 1) if E[u¯i] > vi
(35)
which closely resembles (26). The key difference between this model and the costly opt-out
one is that instead of ex post preferences (u¯) and cognitive costs (γ), our methods will identify
information about prior beliefs (E[u¯i]) and the signal value of defaults (vi). In particular,
the preferences of consistent choosers will be be the fraction of consistent choosers for whom
17We can use a slightly different set-up to develop the same intuition and make the updating upon learning
the default more explicit. Suppose each DM i has prior belief P (u¯i > 0) = αi, and believes the default is
correct with probability βi > 12 , regardless of whether the signal is d0 or d1 (which assumes some symmetry
like in the other model considered here). The signal she receives is independent of her prior. An individual
updates her subjective probability that y is preferred to x as follows:
P (u¯i > 0|d1) = P (u¯i > 0, d1)
P (u¯i > 0, d1) + P (u¯i < 0, d1)
= αiβi
αiβi + (1− αi)(1− βi)
P (u¯i > 0|d0) = P (u¯i > 0, d0)
P (u¯i > 0, d0) + P (u¯i < 0, d0)
= αi(1− βi)
αi(1− βi) + (1− αi)βi
Suppose that the individual chooses y = 1 iff p(u¯i > 0|d) > 12 , which would be true if the subjective
distribution of u¯i were symmetric for all i. Then the analogue to equation (35) is as follows:
(yi0, yi1) =

(0, 0) if α < 1− βi
(0, 1) if 1− βi < α < βi
(1, 1) if α > βi
which conveys a similar intuition about using our approach to learn about prior beliefs (αi in this model)
and the signal value of defaults (βi in this model).
18Note that this obtains even without the symmetry assumption employed above, so long as E[u¯] is shifted
(weakly) upward by d1 and downward by d0. Frame monotonicity fails when some individual perceives the
default-setter as providing bad advice, i.e. vi < 0 for some i.
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ui > 0. Consistent choosers are those who choose the option favored by their prior beliefs
regardless of the frame, which implies that their signal value was small relative to the strength
of their prior. As in the costly opt-out model with arbitrary heterogeneity, decision-quality
independence will not hold in general. One can imagine adding interventions analogous to
decision-quality instruments here by attempting to manipulate the perceived signal value
of the default option. For example, one could provide some decision-makers with a salient
disclaimer that the default is not intended to convey advice.
Because preferences based on prior beliefs are not ex post preferences, the relationship
between the parameters we represent and the optimal default is more nuanced than the one
we explored in Section B. This should not be surprising: when the planner’s choice of default
affects beliefs about preferences because individuals assume that the planner has preference-
relevant information they do not have, it should not be possible to infer their preferences
directly from their choices under alternative default policies. Nevertheless, when individuals’
priors reflect private information not available to the planner, a planner who initially sets a
policy based on his own information19 could potentially improve the optimal policy by also
recovering information about individuals’ priors using the techniques proposed in our paper.
D Generalizations
D.1 Non-Binary Frames, Varying Intensity
Consider choice situations in which an individual i chooses from a binary menu X = {0, 1}
under one of multiple frames that vary in their intensity, d ∈ {d0, d1, ..., dJ}. For example,
if y = 0 has greater up-front costs than y = 1, the frames might describe the extent to
which those costs are made salient to the decision-maker, with d1 denoting the frame in
which the costs are least salient and dJ denoting the frame in which they are most salient.
Alternatively, the decision could be one in which the decision-maker must choose whether
to purchase a good for a given price, and the frame describes the reference point with which
the decision-maker has been presented (if decision-makers are subject to an anchoring effect,
the larger the reference point the more they might be willing to pay).
The key assumption that will let us apply the tools from the rest of the paper to this
19When the planner has no information about preferences that does not come from observing choices under
different defaults, there is a striking recursion embedded in the optimal framing problem for this model: the
planner’s optimal choice of default must depend on inferring preference information from choices, but default
effects only occur in the first place because individuals assume the planner already has some preference
information.
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setting is that the frames can be ordered according to their intensity:
yi(dj) ≥ yi(dj′) ∀i , j > j′ (36)
where the ordering of frames is without loss of generality. In words, (36) requires that if a
decision-maker chooses an option under one frame, he or she will also choose that option
under any frame that pushes more intensely in that option’s direction. With (36), frame
monotonicity applies with respect to any two frames.
We also assume a global consistency principle:
yi(dj) = yi(dj′) ∀j, j′ =⇒ yi(dj) = y∗i (37)
This is a natural extension of the consistency principle discussed earlier: if a decision-maker
would select the same option in each frame, we assume that choice is her preferred one.
When (36) and (37) hold, the multi-frame setting can be reduced to the binary one
studied in the rest of the paper. In particular, one can apply Proposition 1 after setting
d0 = d0 and d1 = dJ to obtain information about the set of decision-makers consistent
with respect to all of the observed frames. Additionally, even when (37) does not hold,
one can apply the matching estimator (Corollary 4.1) to recover information about the
characteristics of consistent and inconsistent decision-makers at any two observed frames so
that the researcher can investigate heterogeneity in which decision-makers are susceptible to
low-intensity framing effect as opposed to both high- and low-intensity ones.
Additional structure beyond the global consistency principle allows one to recover even
more information on preferences. To illustrate this, we note that this problem has an inter-
esting relationship to the model of decision-quality instruments presented in Section 3.3. We
alluded in Section 3.3to the idea that valid decision-quality instruments can include those
varying the intensity of a given framing effect. Formally, let d1 = (zl, d0), d2 = (zh, d0),
d3 = (zh, d1), and d4 = (zl, d1) be the four possible frames. The consistency principle from
Section 3.3, at zl, is equivalent to the global consistency principle (37). The idea in the
previous paragraph, using the two most extreme frames, is exactly analogous to recover-
ing the preferences of the consistent group at zl: YC(zl) = E[y∗i |cil = 1]. The consistency
principle at zh in Section 3.3also implies a second condition for consistency across d2 and
d3, which will imply that YC(zh) = E[y∗i |cih = 1]. Frame separability in this model implies
decision quality exclusion, and frame monotonicity implies decision quality monotonicity, so
that all changes in behavior between d1 and d2, and between d3 and d4 tell us about the
preferences of individuals consistent across (d1, d4) but not across (d2, d3), which allows us to
recover the preferences of decision-makers whose choices depend on the intensity of framing,
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YS = E[y∗i |cih > cil].
D.2 Multi-Dimensional Frames
This sub-section considers choice settings that differ along multiple dimensions so that frames
cannot be ordered by intensity. Consider choice situations in which an individual i chooses
from a binary menu X = {x, y} under a frame vector d = (d1, ..., dJ), so that each component
of d encodes some feature of the choice environment. We assume each frame component dj of
d is discrete with two possible realizations: dj ∈ {d0j, d1j}.20 For example, a decision-maker’s
choice between two options might be affected both by which option is presented first and by
which option is framed as the default. In this example, d1 could describe the order of the
options and d2 could describe which option is the default
As before, denote choices under frame d by yi(d). We will assume component-wise frame
monotonicity:
∀i ,∀j yi(d1j, d¬j) ≥ yi(d0j, d¬j) (38)
where d¬j is the vector consisting of all frame components other than j. Equation (38) implies
that frame monotonicity holds for each component of the frame vector when all components
are held fixed. It also requires that the direction of the effect of any one decision characteristic
on choice be independent of other decision characteristics. For example, it must not be the
case that making y = 0 the default induces more decision-makers to select y = 0 when 0 is
listed first but that making 0 the default induces more decision-makers to select y = 1 when
0 is listed second.
As above, we assume a global consistency principle:
yi(d) = yi(d′) ∀d, d′ =⇒ yi(d) = y∗i (39)
This principle means that whenever the individual would choose the same option in every
frame, she prefers the option that she chooses.
When (38) and (39) hold, we can proceed similarly to the previous subsection us-
ing data on the two most extreme frames. To do this we can apply Proposition 1 with
d0 = (d01, d02, ..., d0J) and d1 = (d11, d12, ..., d1J) to recover the preferences of globally con-
sistent decision-makers, those whose choice is insensitive to all framing effects. We use this
approach in the empirical illustration in Appendix D.2.1. Further possibilities are generated
by considering what additional structure might allow us to learn about preferences from the
20It is straightforward to combine this approach with the one in the previous section, extending this setup
to settings in which each frame component has multiple possible realizations that vary in their intensity.
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behavior of individuals who are consistent with respect to all frame components but one, all
frame components but two, and so on.
D.2.1 Application to Privacy Controls
In this section we re-examine data collected by Johnson, Bellman and Lohse (2002), whose
work inspired our running example of online privacy controls. In this study, the authors
initially asked participants to complete an online survey about their health. Participants
were then asked whether they would like to receive additional surveys.21 There were two
sources of framing effects for these solicited preferences. First the question was either framed
negatively (“Do NOT notify me about more health surveys”) or positively (“Notify me about
more health surveys.”). Second, the answers to the question were pre-selected to be either
yes or no, so that the consumer would have to actively change their answer to avoid the
default. We therefore employ the extension of our approach to multi-dimensional framing
effects considered in Appendix D.2. In particular, y indicates whether the individual gave
permission to be contacted for additional surveys, d0 is the situation in which the question
was framed positively and the default was non-participation (“opt-in”), and d1 is the situation
in which the question was framed as a loss and the default was participation (“opt-out”).
We do not use data from the other two frame combinations. This exclusion drops 139 of the
sample of 277 individuals in the original study, leaving 138 observations. Although we do
have some demographic variables, our sample size makes results from dividing the population
into demographic groups imprecise.
Table 7 presents the results from this application. Several interesting patterns emerge.
First, framing affects the participation decisions of almost half (48.2 percent) of the survey-
takers; only 51.8 percent of the population are globally consistent, meaning their choice
depends neither on the positive or negative wording of the question nor on the default,
pre-selected answer. Second, of the globally consistent subgroup, over 90 percent prefer to
participate. The size of this estimate is attributable to the fact that, under d1, very few
individuals opt out of participation, while under d0, many more individuals opt in. Given
that a very high fraction of globally consistent individuals participate in the surveys, we
conclude that under decision-quality independence, an opt-out policy would maximize the
fraction of participants ending up with their preferred option.
21We focus on the data reported in “Study 1” of Johnson, Bellman and Lohse (2002).
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Table 7: Participation in Online Surveys
Total
Participation rate under d1
0.9563
(0.0251)
Participation rate under d0
0.482
(0.067)
Fraction consistent 0.518(0.070)
Fraction of consistent who prefer
participation
0.929
(0.039)
Note: standard errors are estimated using the delta method (see Appendix E.2).
D.3 Non-Binary Menus with Ordered Options
This section develops an approach for preference recovery over non-binary menus. There
are many interesting possibilities for generalizations, but we focus here on choice situations
g ∈ G consisting of a fixed, finite menu of K ordered options X = {1, 2, ..., K} and one
of two frames, d ∈ {dh, dl}. Intuitively, one can think of dh and dl as a “high” frame and
a “low” frame. For example, we might suppose that an individual chooses from a menu
of insurance plans, ordered from low-cost, low-benefit plans to high-cost, high-benefit plans,
and the frame either emphasizes or de-emphasizes the individual’s risk of developing a serious
illness. We will assume that we observe each individual i in exactly one frame, as before.
Recall that in the binary case, the consistency principle and frame monotonicity imply that
individuals who choose the “low” option in the “high” frame prefer the low option. We will
use this same intuition to develop an identification strategy for the non-binary setting.
The preferences of agent i are represented by choice function y∗i ∈ X. We continue to
assume frame separability (A1), so that y∗i does not depend on d.
We strengthen the frame monotonicity assumption as follows:
D1 (Frame monotonicity for many options) For all individuals, yi(dh) ≥ yi(dl).
This frame monotonicity assumption imposes an implicit ordering on the menu and assumes
that all individuals are pushed in the same direction by the frames. We also strengthen the
consistency principle with the following assumption
D2 (Partition-Consistency principle) For all individuals i and options k ∈ X,
yi(dl) ≥ k =⇒ y∗i ≥ k
yi(dh) ≤ k =⇒ y∗i ≤ k.
(40)
The name of this assumption comes from the following: suppose that we partition the menu
into X ′ = {J, J + 1, ...K} and X ′′ = X \ X ′, for some J and K ≥ J. If the individual
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consistently chooses within X ′ across both frames, so yi(dh) ∈ X ′, and yi(dl) ∈ X ′, then
assumption (40) implies that y∗i ∈ X ′. Note also that the partition consistency principle
implies the consistency principle used in previous sections: if yi(dh) = yi(dl), then assumption
(40) implies that yi(d) = y∗i . Finally, note that the partition consistency principle and frame
monotonicity together imply that ∀i, yi(dh) ≥ y∗i ≥ yi(dl).
For each k = 1, ..., K, we define partition consistency at k, cki , as follows
cki ≡ 1{yi(dh) ≤ k and yi(dl) ≤ k}+ 1{yi(dh) > k and yi(dl) > k}
Intuitively, cki captures whether an individual consistently chooses an option above or below
k. Note also that frame monotonicity implies that one of the conditions inside each indicator
function will be implied by the other condition.
Proposition A2 Let Gj(k) ≡ P (yi(dj) ≤ k|di = dj) for k = 1, ..., N, j = h, l and let
Gj(0) ≡ 0. Let Yk ≡ Gh(k)Gh(k)+1−Gl(k) for k = 0, ..., K. Frame separability (A1), frame monotonic-
ity (D1), partition consistency (D2), and unconfoundedness (A4) imply that for k = 1, ..., K,
(A2.1) The fraction of partition-consistent individuals at k with y∗i ≤ k is given by P (y∗i ≤
k|cki = 1) = Yk.
(A2.2) The fraction of partition-consistent individuals at k is given by E[cki ] = Gh(k) + 1−
Gl(k).
(A2.3) The fraction of the population who prefer option k is bounded as follows: p(y∗i =
k) ∈ [Gl(k)−Gh(k − 1), Gh(k)−Gl(k − 1)].
(A2.4) If we additionally assume strong decision-quality independence,∀k, y∗i ⊥ cki , then
the fraction of the population who prefer option k is p(y∗i = k) = Yk − Yk−1.
Proof
Throughout the proof, we denote the fraction of individuals preferring some option k by
φ¯k ≡ p(y∗i = k).
Proof of (A2.1) and (A2.2): Fix some k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}. Let X ′ = {x1, ...xk}and
X ′′ = {xk+1, .., xK} Note that we can write the many-choices problem into a binary menu
choice problem between X ′ and X ′′. Similarly, note that frame separability (A1), frame
monotonicity (D1), partition consistency (D2), and partition unconfoundedness (A4) imply
the binary analogues to these assumptions A1-A4. As such, (A2.1) and (A2.2) follows directly
from the application of Proposition 1 to this problem.
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Proof of (A2.3): First suppose that k = 1. Applying Proposition 2 to the binary menu
choice problem with X ′ = {1} and X ′′ = {2, ..., K} implies that
E[φ1] ∈ [Gl(1), Gh(1)] (41)
Note that this confirms the desired result for k = 1 since Gh(0) = Gl(0) = 0 by definition.
Next, applying the same proposition for k = 2, we have φ1 + φ2 ∈ [Gl(2), Gh(2)]. Combined
with (41), this implies
φ2 ∈ [Gl(2)−Gh(1), Gh(2)−Gl(1)] (42)
Similarly with k = 3, we have that φ1 +φ2 +φ3 ∈ [Gl(3), Gh(3)], and applying (41) and (42)
implies that φ3 ∈ [Gl(3) − Gh(2), Gh(3) − Gl(2)]. Proceeding recursively, suppose that for
some k, we know that for any k′ < k,
φk′ ∈ [Gl(k′)−Gh(k′ − 1), Gh(k′)−Gl(k′ − 1)] (43)
Then application of Proposition 2 to the binary menu choice problem withX ′ = {x1, ..., xk}
yields φ1 +φ2 + ...+φk ∈ [Gl(k), Gh(k)], so φk ∈ [Gl(k)− (φ1 +φ2 + ...+ φ¯k+1), Gh(k)− (φ1 +
φ2 + ...+ φ¯k+1)]. Applying the lower and upper bounds from (43) and simplifying yields the
desired result.
Proof of (A2.4): Along with (A2.1), strong decision-quality independence implies that
for any k,
P (y∗i ≤ k|cki = 1) = P (y∗i ≤ k) = Yk (44)
Applying (44) at k = 1 yields
φ¯1 = Y1 (45)
Applying (44) at k = 2 yields φ¯1 + φ¯2 = Y2 and substituting equation (45) yields
φ¯2 = Y2 − Y1
As in the proof of (A2.3), we proceed recursively to obtain the desired result. Given some
k, suppose that for any k′ < k we have
φ¯k′ = Yk′ − Yk′−1 (46)
Applying (44) at k yields φ¯1+φ¯2+...,+φ¯k = Yk. Applying (46) for φ¯1, ..., φ¯k−1 and simplifying
yields the desired result. 
Discussion of Proposition A2 If we partition the menu of choices into options above
and below some option k, then frame monotonicity and the partition-consistency principle
115
transform the problem to a binary problem, allowing us to use earlier propositions to identify
individuals whose preferred choice is above or below k. The first two results, (A2.1) and
(A2.2), are therefore the analogue of Proposition 1 in this setting.
Return to the insurance example described above, where the frame either emphasizes or
de-emphasizes the risk of serious illness. When some individuals choose a low-benefit, low-
cost plan under the frame that emphasizes the risk of serious illness, our assumptions imply
that they prefer an option with costs and benefits at least as low as the ones they choose.
The first two results in Proposition A2 allow us to estimate the fraction of decision-makers
who consistently choose an insurance plan that is above or below some specified cost-benefit
level, and among those people, how many prefer the low-cost plan.
As in Proposition 2, we can also bound population preferences, reflected in (A2.3). In
this case, the many-options problem has a new and interesting structure. Even if individuals
are highly susceptible to framing effects when they prefer some option far away from k,
our estimate for the fraction of people preferring option k can still be precise, because
the partition consistency principle permits us to ignore individuals who consistently choose
options above or below k.
Finally, with a stronger version of the decision-quality independence assumption, we
can recover the distribution of preferences for the full population. Strong decision-quality
independence guarantees that the tendency to be partition-consistent for any partition is un-
related to an individuals’ preferences.22 Under strong decision-quality independence, obtain-
ing the preferences of partition-consistent individuals will yield the distribution of preferred
choices in the population. The equivalence of this problem to the binary problem implies
that we could generalize other identification strategies from the binary case. For example,
we can identify the preferences of the population using observables via a conditional strong
decision-quality independence assumption (the generalization of the matching approach),
and in the absence of any decision-quality independence assumptions we can study variation
induced by a decision-quality instrument.
E Estimating Asymptotic Variance in Finite Sample
The body of the paper ignores finite sample concerns, but any empirical application, includ-
ing the ones we undertake in Section 4, should account for finite sample concerns and report
standard errors for the estimators we propose. This section derives estimators of asymptotic
22This assumption implies our earlier definition of decision-quality independence, because individuals
who are consistent across frames will be partition-consistent for all partitions. If we were to assume that
individuals are partition-consistent only if they are fully consistent across frames, which is trivially true in
the binary case, then the two assumptions about decision-quality independence would be equivalent.
116
variance, which may be used to construct standard errors of the estimators of the population
parameters of interest. Because all variables we work with in this paper are discrete and
the data are presumed to come from independent random sampling of the population, our
derivations here rely only on the characteristics of the binomial and multinomial distribu-
tions, along with the delta method. The standard errors we derive are incorporated into
Stata program files that are available upon request from the authors.
E.1 Standard Errors for Proposition 1
To facilitate compact exposition, let us introduce some statistical notation. Note that yi0
and yi1 are two-valued random variables. Let Y0 and Y1denote the population moments we
wish to estimate from data as before. Let y¯0 and y¯1 denote the sample averages under d0
and d1, respectively. From the properties of the binomial distribution,
√
n
 y¯0 − Y0
y¯1 − Y1
 a∼ N (0,Σ)
where
Σ =
 1α0Y0(1− Y0) 0
0 1
α1
Y1(1− Y1)

and αj = njn for j ∈ {0, 1}, where nj denotes the number of individuals observed under frame
dj.
The first statistic from Proposition 1 is Yc, which expressed as a function of the primitive
parameters of the model is
Yc =
Y0
Y0 + 1− Y1 (47)
which we estimate consistently via
Yˆc =
y¯0
y¯0 + 1− y¯1
Using the delta method, we know that V (yˆc) Ä 1nOY ′c ΣOYc, where OYc is evaluated at
(Y0, Y1). Taking derivatives of (47) yields
OYc =
 1−Y1(Y0+1−Y1)2
Y0
(Y0+1−Y1)2
 .
Simplifying the expression for V (yˆc) yields
V (yˆc) Ä (1− Y1)
2Y0(1− Y0)
α0(Y0 + 1− Y1)4n +
Y 20 Y1(1− Y1)
α1(Y0 + 1− Y1)4n
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which, letting c = Y0 + 1− Y1 and using that V (y¯j) = Yj(1−Yj)nj for j = 0, 1, simplifies to
V (yˆc) =
(1− Yc
c
)2
V (y¯0) +
(
Yc
c
)2
V (y¯1) (48)
We can consistently estimate the variance of the asymptotic distribution of our estimator
yˆc by replacing all the terms in (48) with the corresponding sample means, i.e. replacing Y0
with y¯0 and Y1 with y¯1.
Note also that we can estimate the variance of the asymptotic distribution of our estimator
for c ≡ E[ci]. Write the estimator itself as:
ˆ¯c = y¯0 + 1− y¯1
and the variance of this estimator is simply:
V (ˆ¯c) = V (y¯0) + V (y¯1) (49)
E.2 Standard Errors for Matching Estimator
The standard errors for the matching-on-observables estimator are considerably more com-
plicated, due to the presence of multiple demographic groups and the use of weights that
must themselves be estimated from data. We discuss two solutions here, one based on an
estimation strategy imposing parametric restrictions for how observable characteristics are
related to choices under either frame, and another adopting a fully non-parametric approach.
First, one can simply estimate our model via
E[yi|d, w] = f(wi, θ) + 1{di = d1}g(wi, θ′)
where f() and g() are specified up to vectors of parameters θ and θ′, which are estimated
from data. For example, we could implement a linear model with uni-dimensional w:
E[yi|d, w] = α + βwi + 1{di = d1}(γ + δwi)
This equation can be estimated by a least squares linear probability model, and then the
ingredients of the matching estimator are given by
Yˆc(w) =
αˆ + βˆwi
1− γˆ − δˆwi
Eˆ[ci|w] = 1− γˆ − δˆwi
Eˆ[ci] =
1
n
∑
i
(1− γˆ − δˆwi)
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Eˆ[y∗i ] =
1
n
∑
i
Yˆc(w)
Eˆ[y∗i |ci = 0] = Yˆc(w) =
1
n
∑
i
1− Eˆ[ci|w = wi]
1− Eˆ[ci]
Yˆc(wi)
This estimation strategy can be implemented via straightforward post-regression estimation,
and standard errors may be estimated using the a straightforward non-parametric bootstrap.
When wi is discrete, taking values w1, ..., wJ one may derive straightforward delta-
method-based standard errors. We provide analytical formulae for the variance and the
gradients of parameters of interest, which may be straightforwardly incorporated into a
matrix-based programming language, such as MATLAB, to calculate the variance of the
estimators with discrete demographic groups. MATLAB code illustrating this procedure,
used for the illustration in the body of the paper, is also available upon request from the
authors.
The primitive parameters of the discrete-characteristics model are, for each w,Y0w, Y1w,
and pw = p(wi = w). When the w’s are non-stochastic, such as when the researcher
wishes to estimate preferences for a population with a known distribution of observable
characteristics, the last of these may be excluded; the resulting modification of the vari-
ance estimation procedure below is straightforward. We denote the estimators of these
quantities by y¯0w, y¯1w, and pˆw. Now we construct the variance covariance matrix of the vec-
tor primitive parameters. Letting θ = (Y0w1 , Y0w2 , ..., Y0wJ , Y1w1 , ..., Y1wJ , pw1 , ..., pwJ )′, and
θˆ = (y¯0w1 , y¯0w2 , ..., y¯0wJ , y¯0w1 , ..., y¯0wJ , pˆw1 , ..., pˆwJ ), we know that
√
n(θˆ − θ) a∼ N(−→0 ,Σ)
Denoting the fraction of individuals with observable characteristic w observed in frame dj
by αjw ≡ njwn , we can write the variance matrix as follows:
Σ(θ) =

M0
M1
P

where M0 is a dianogal matrix with entries of the form Y0wj(1−Y0wj)/α0wj , M1 is a diagonal
matrix with entries of the form Y1wj(1− Y1wj)/α1wj , and P is given by:
P =

pw1(1− pw1) −pw1pw2 ... −pw1pwJ
−pw1pw2 pw2(1− pw2) ... −pw2pwJ
... ... ... ...
−pw1pwJ −pw2pwJ ... pwJ (1− pwJ )
 .
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All blank entries of the Σ matrix are zeroes.23
The matching approach employs many different combinations of these primitive param-
eters. We begin with the weights for the subset of inconsistent choosers,
sw ≡ p(wi = w|ci = 0) = Y1w − Y0w∑
w=v(Y1v − Yov)pv
pw
Carefully taking derivatives of this function and simplifying using the definition of sw, we
obtain the following for any w and w′:
∂sw
∂Y0w′
= − 1{w = w
′} − sw∑
w=v(Y1v − Yov)pv
pw′
∂sw
∂Y1w′
= 1{w = w
′} − sw∑
w=v(Y1v − Yov)pv
pw′
∂sw
∂pw′
= 1{w = w
′}sw − Sw′sw
pw′
were 1{} is an indicator function equal to 1 when the expression inside the square brackets is
true and zero otherwise. These three expressions can be used to generate the entire gradient
of sw.
Next we consider the weights for the subset of consistent choosers, qw ≡ p(wi = w|ci =
1) = pxw+1−pyw
px+1−py pw. Proceeding similarly to before, rewrite Rw as
qw =
Y0w + 1− Y1w
Σw=v(Y0v + 1− Y1v)pv pw
Taking derivatives and simplifying, we obtain the following for any w and w′:
∂qw
∂Y0w′
= 1{w = w
′} −Rw
Σw=v(Y0v + 1− Y1v)pv pw
′
∂qw
∂Y1w′
= − 1{w = w
′} −Rw
Σw=v(Y0v + 1− Y1v)pv pw
′
∂qw
∂pw′
= 1{w = w
′}Rw −RwRw′
pw′
Next we consider the estimators for the preferences of various subgroups. First, define the
preferences of the inconsistent subgroup
YN = ΣwswYcw
Taking derivatives of this – which may be done more easily using several expressions derived
23To be specific, we know that the off-diagonal elements in the first 2 ∗ J rows and the first 2 ∗ J columns,
which govern the covariance of the various Ykj estimates, are zero because the estimation sample for each
one is distinct. We know that the entries of Σ governing the covariance of Ykj and pw, for some k and j, are
zero because of the unconfoundedness assumption.
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above – we obtain the following for any w:
∂YN
∂Y0w
= sw
1− Ycw
cw
+ pw1− c(YN − Ycw)
∂YN
∂Y1w′
= sw
Ycw
cw
− pw1− c(YN − Ycw)
∂YN
∂pw
= sw
pw(1− c) [Ycw − (1− c)YN ]
where cw ≡ Y0w + 1 − Y1w = E[ci|w] and c = Σw=v(Y0v + 1 − Y1v)pv. From these three
expressions we construct the gradient of YN .
Proceeding similarly for the full population, YFP =
∑
w pwYcw, we obtain, for any w
∂YFP
∂Y0w
= pw
1− Ycw
cw
∂YFP
∂Y1w
= pw
Ycw
cw
∂YFP
∂pw
= Ycw
which allows us to construct the gradient of YFP .
We can also obtain the gradient of Yc =
∑
w qwYcw in terms of the primitive parameters
of this model.24Taking derivatives of the expression for Yc yields
∂Yc
∂Y0w
= qw
1− Ycw
cw
+ pw
c
(Ycw − Yc)
∂Yc
∂Y1w
= qw
Ycw
c
− pw
c
(Ycw − Yc)
∂Yc
∂pw
= qw
pwc
(Ycw − cYc)
Using all of the above expressions, we can generate a gradient of each parameter of
the matching-on-observables models. Putting all these expressions together, we construct a
gradient matrix of the form:
G(θ) = (Osw1 , ...,OswJ ,Oqw1 , ...,OqwJ ,OYN ,OYFP ,OYc)
To be clear, each of the columns of G(θ) is the gradient of a particular (nonlinear) function
of the primitive parameters of the model.
24This part is not necessary to obtain a standard error on Yc, because we know how to obtain a simpler
formula for the asymptotic variance of our estimator of Yc using the result in the previous section of this
Appendix. Doing it the hard way here yields an identical standard error estimate. The usefulness of the
expressions derived here is that these expressions may be used to estimate the (asymptotic) covariance of,
say, the estimators for Yc and YN , which is necessary for the statistical test of the null hypothesis of decision-
quality independence against the alternative hypothesis of conditional decision-quality independence.
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We can now estimate the full variance-covariance matrix of all the parameters given by
Vˆ (θˆ) = 1
n
G′ΣG
where G and Σ are evaluated at θˆ. The square root of the diagonals of the matrix Vˆ (θˆ)
will be asymptotically correct standard errors for the parameter estimates themselves. The
off-diagonal elements are the estimated covariance of different estimates, which are useful
for tests of hypotheses involving more than one parameter of the model, such as tests of
decision-quality independence in this framework.
E.3 Standard Errors for Proposition 4
Using similar notation to before, let Yjk ≡ E[yijk] for j = 0, 1 and k = h, l, and denote the
estimator for each population moment by y¯jk. Similarly to the previous section, we begin by
noting that
√
n


y¯0h
y¯0l
y¯1h
y¯1l
−

Y0h
Y0l
Y1h
Y1l


a∼ N(−→0 ,Σ)
where Σ is a diagonal matrix with entries of the form 1
αjk
Yjk(1− Yjk).
The new statistic in Proposition 4 is
Ys =
Y0h − Y0l
Y1l − Y0l − (Y1h − Y0h) (50)
which we can estimate consistently with:
Yˆs =
y0h − y0l
y1l − y0l − (y1h − y0h)
Using the delta method, we obtain V (Yˆs) Ä 1nOY ′s ΣOYs, where OYS is evaluated at
(Y0h, Y0l, Y1h, Y1l). Taking the gradient of (50) gives
OYs =
(
Y1l − Y1h
(∆c)2
,
Y1h − Y1l
(∆c)2
,
Y0h − Y0l
(∆c)2
,
Y0l − Y0h
(∆c)2
)′
where ∆c = Y1l−Y0l− (Y1h−Y0h). Plugging this into the formula for V (YˆS) and simplifying
yields
V (Yˆs) =
(1− Ys
∆c
)2
[V (y¯xh) + V (y¯xl)] +
(
Ys
∆c
)2
[V (y¯yh) + V (y¯yl)]
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where V (y¯jk) = 1njkYjk(1 − Yjk). Replacing each Yjk with the estimator y¯jk, we obtain a
consistent estimate of the asymptotic variance of YˆS. Note that when ∆c is small, the variance
of this estimator can be quite large, reflecting a familiar facet of instrumental variables
estimation.
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Appendix to Chapter 3 (Taxes and Mistakes)
A Derivations and Proofs
Budget Adjustment Rules
The third budget adjustment rule in Section 3 corresponds to assuming that a consumer mentally reduces his wealth by
the amount of excess tax paid, and then chooses an optimal bundle given this level of wealth and the perceived relative
price. This is the same as stating that the consumer chooses the bundle on the true budget line where the marginal rate
of substitution equals the perceived relative price. Behavior will be given by
u′(x) = (p+ tˆ)v′(y) (24)
(p+ t)x+ y = Z ⇔ (p+ tˆ)x+ y = Z − (t− tˆ)x (25)
We wish to understand this behavior as an attempt to choose based on perceived marginal prices and a budget
adjustment rule. Before the consumer adjusts to meet the true budget constraint, we have equations (1) and (2) from
Section 3:
u′(xˆ) = (p+ tˆ)v′(yˆ) (26)
(p+ tˆ)xˆ+ yˆ = Z (27)
Recall that the budget adjustment rule ρ, defined as the share in the total reduction in expenditure falling on x as
we move from (xˆ, yˆ) to (x, y), is given by equation (3):
(p+ t)x = (p+ t)xˆ− ρ(t− tˆ)xˆ (28)
Proposition 0. The behavior described by equations (24) and (25) corresponds to a budget adjustment rule
ρ3 ' (p+ t) ∂x
∂Z
∣∣∣∣
t=tˆ
x
xˆ
= ωx|t=t ηx,z|t=tˆ
where the approximation ignores third-order and higher derivatives of the utility function.
Proof. Taking a Taylor Series expansion of u′(x) and v′(y) we can write
u′(x) ' u′(xˆ) + u′′(xˆ)(x− xˆ)
v′(y) ' v′(yˆ) + v′′(yˆ)(y − yˆ)
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Applying equation (26) and the above approximations, we have that equation (24) becomes approximately
u′′(xˆ)(x− xˆ) ' (p+ tˆ)v′′(yˆ)(y − yˆ) (29)
Subtracting equation (27) from equation (25) and re-arranging yields
y − yˆ = (p+ tˆ)xˆ− (p+ t)x = (tˆ− t)xˆ− (p+ t)(x− xˆ)
Plugging this into equation (29) and re-arranging gives
x− xˆ ' −(p+ tˆ)v
′′(yˆ)
u′′(xˆ) + (p+ tˆ)2v′′(yˆ)
(t− tˆ)x (30)
Differentiating equations (26) and (27) with respect to Z and re-arranging gives
∂xˆ
∂Z
∣∣∣∣
t=tˆ
=
∂x
∂Z
∣∣∣∣
t=tˆ
=
(p+ tˆ)v′′(yˆ)
u′′(xˆ) + (p+ tˆ)2v′′(yˆ)
(31)
The first equivalence comes from the fact that xˆ = x when tˆ = t. Now we can write equation (30) as:
x− xˆ = − ∂x
∂Z
(t− tˆ)x (32)
From equation (28) we now know that (p+ t)(x− xˆ) = −ρ(t− tˆ)xˆ so equation (32) becomes
−ρ(t− tˆ)xˆ = −(p+ t) ∂x
∂Z
(t− tˆ)x (33)
which simplifies to the desired result. Apply the definition of ωx and ηx,Z , taking care to evaluate the former at t = t
and latter at t = tˆ, to obtain the second characterization of ρ3.
The Compensated Tax Effect
Lemma 1 (The Compensated Tax Effect with No Debiasing). When individuals behave in the manner described by
equations (1) through (4) and there is no debiasing, then the compensated effect of a change in the tax rate starting
from any point where tˆ = t is given by
∂xc
∂tj
=
∂xc
∂p
∗ ∂tˆ
∂tj
+
[
x
∂x
∂Z
− ρ x
p+ t
](
1− ∂tˆ
∂tj
)
(34)
where all expressions are evaluated at the current tax rate, t = tˆ.
Proof. Equation (34) is derived by taking the derivative with respect to tj of equation (3), which we can re-write as
x = xˆ(1− ρ t− tˆ
p+ t
) (35)
Taking the derivative with respect to tj and re-arranging gives
∂x
∂tj
=
∂xˆ
∂tˆ
∂tˆ
∂tj
(
1− ρ t− tˆ
p+ t
)
− ρ xˆ
p+ t
(
1− ∂tˆ
∂tj
− t− tˆ
p+ t
)
(36)
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When we evaluate this derivative at tˆ = t, t−tˆp+t = 0. Note that
∂xˆ
∂tˆ
= ∂x∂p when t = tˆ. We then apply the definitions
of ∂x
c
∂tj
and ∂x
c
∂p so that equation (36) becomes
∂xc
∂tj
=
(
∂xc
∂p
− x ∂x
∂Z
)
∂tˆ
∂tj
− ρ xˆ
p+ t
(
1− ∂tˆ
∂tj
)
+ x
∂x
∂Z
(37)
Re-arranging terms then yields the result.
An application in Section 5.2 uses that the compensated tax effect is zero even in the presence of misperceived
taxes—i.e. when tˆ 6= t—in the case where 1) ∂tˆ/∂tj = 0 2) ρ = ρ3, and 3) there are no income effects on demand
for x under full optimization, so ∂xˆ/∂Z = 0. This may be seen using equation (36) where ∂tˆ/∂tj = 0, plugging in
for ρ = 0 and ∂tˆ/∂tj = 0, and then add xˆ∂xˆ/∂Z = 0 to obtain the compensated tax effect (which is the same as the
uncompensated effect because there are no income effects).
Lemma 2 (The Compensated Tax Effect with Debiasing). Suppose individuals behave in the manner described in
Section 3 and the government has recourse to two taxes tE and tI . Suppose also that
1. Consumers only notice tI , tˆ = tI .
2. The budget adjustment rule is ρ = ρ3.
3. There are no income effects on the demand for x under full optimization.
4. A fraction F (G) of individuals debias
Then the compensated effect of an increase in tE of ∆tE for an initial tax rate tE0 is given by
∂Xc
∂t
∣∣∣∣
tE0
= f(G)
dG
dtE
(x∗ − x) + F (G)∂x
∗c
∂p
(38)
where X is aggregate demand for good x, G = G(tE0).
Proof. We can write aggregate demand as
X(p, t, Z) = F (G(t− tˆ))x∗ + [1− F (G(t− tˆ))]x(p, t, Z)
where x∗ is demand under full optimization and x is demand as described by proposition 1. Differentiating with
respect to t we obtain
∂x
∂tE
= f(G)
∂G
∂t
(x∗ − x) + F (G)∂x
∗
∂p
+ [1− F (G)]∂x
∂t
Because there are no income effects in the positive model with debiasing, we can write
∂xc
∂tE
= f(G)
∂G
∂t
(x∗ − x) + F (G)∂x
∗c
∂p
+ [1− F (G)]∂x
c
∂t
Equation (34) implies that when ρ = ωxη = 0 and ∂tˆ/∂tE = 0, we will have ∂x
c
∂tE
= 0. This proves the result.
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Excess Burden and Budget Adjustment Rules
Proposition 2 (How Does Excess Burden Depend on the Budget Adjustment Rule?). Assume that the government
introduces a small misperceived tax tj into an untaxed market. Behavior is characterized by the function tˆ(tj), ρ, and
equations (1) through (4). The excess burden of this tax is approximately
EB(tj) ' −1
2
t2j
εcx,q|p ∂tˆ∂tj + [ωxηx,Z − ρ]
(
1− ∂tˆ∂tj
)
εcx,q|p
2 xεcx,q|p
p
(39)
where ξ = (ωxηx,Z − ρ)
(
1− ∂tˆ∂tj
)
and all expressions are evaluated at t = 0.
Proof. The result follows directly from lemma 1 and proposition 1. Re-write the equation for excess burden from
proposition 1 in the presence of no existing taxes, using the definition of θc, as
EB(tj) ' −1
2
t2jθ
c
j
∂xc
∂tj
(40)
= −1
2
t2j (θ
c
j)
2 ∂x
c
∂p
(41)
= −1
2
t2j
(
∂xc
∂tj
∂xc
∂p
)2
∂xc
∂p
(42)
Then insert the expression for ∂x
c
∂tj
from lemma 1 to obtain the result.
Proposition 3 (How does the desirability of low-salience taxes depend on the budget adjustment rule?). Suppose that
the government has recourse to two types of taxes, tI and tE , and that
1. Consumers only notice tI : tˆ = tI .
2. No individuals debias (see section 5.2).
Then the introduction of a small tax individuals ignore, tE , causes less excess burden than the introduction of a rate-
equivalent tax that individuals perceive fully, tI , if and only if ρ < −εx,q|p, where εx,q|p is evaluated at tI = tE = 0.
Proof. The excess burden of a price inclusive tax will be
EB(tI) ' −1
2
t2I
∂xc
∂p
(43)
The excess burden of a price exclusive tax will be
EB(tE) ' −1
2
t2E(θ
c)2
∂xc
∂p
(44)
When the taxes are rate-equivalent, we will have EB(tE) < EB(tI) ⇐⇒ (θc)2 < 1 ⇐⇒ θc < 1 ⇐⇒ −εcx,q|t <
−εcx,q|p. (Note that we know θ ≥ 0). Using the elasticity formulation of proposition 1 and that ∂tˆ∂tE = 0, we have that
EB(tE) < EB(tI) ⇐⇒ − [ωxηx,Z − ρ] < −εcx,q|p (45)
Re-arrange this equation and use the Slutsky equation εx,q|p = εcx,q|p − ωxηx,Z to obtain the result.
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Figure 8: Budget Adjustment Under Ironing
x
y
(x, y)
Budget (no tax)Budget (ATR)
Budget (tax)
(xˆ, yˆ)
Budget (ATR) with virtual income
Budget(no tax) with virtual income
Budget (MTR)
Notes: The budget line with tax is drawn for a two-bracket linear tax on x with a higher marginal tax rate in the top
bracket. We assume for comparison with figure 3 that u′(x) > 0, i.e. that x is a good and not income. An ironing
individual assuming she faces a linear tax equal to the ATR she ends up paying will consume (x, y). Virtual income,
the income not lost to taxation due to a lower marginal tax rate for some levels of x is equal to the length of the blue
dotted line. This is calculated by comparing the budget line under the non-linear tax with the budget line for a linear
tax with marginal tax rate equal to the top marginal tax rate (note that the price of y is normalized to 1). We add virtual
income to the budget and assume the individual faces a linear tax equal to ATR to find the planned consumption bundle
(xˆ, yˆ). Movement from (xˆ, yˆ) to (x, y) is determined by the income elasticity and x’s share of the budget, just like in
the third panel of figure 3.
Ironing
Figure 8 describes how the budget adjustment rule ρ3 works in the Schmeduling model, where there are non-linear
taxes. The figure illustrates why assuming that an individual assumes she faces a linear tax with rate equal to her
average tax rate (and no exemption) is the same as assuming that she accounts for the impact of taxes on her virtual
income but misperceives relative prices. The same techniques could be used to examine other budget adjustment rules.
Proposition 4. Assume that
1. Individuals engage in ironing, so τˆ = ATR ≡ ∫ x
0
τ(s)ds/x.
2. The budget adjustment rule is ρ = 0.
3. There are no income effects on demand for x.
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4. No individuals debias (see section 5.2).
Then the excess burden of a non-linear tax τ(x) will be given by
EB(τ(x)) ' −1
2
τ2
ATR
τ
∂x
∂τ
(46)
=
1
2
τATRx0
εx,1−τ |τ
1−ATR (47)
=
1
2
ATR2x0
εx,1−τ |ATR
1−ATR (48)
where εx,1−τ |τ is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate, and εx,1−τ |ATR is the elasticity
of taxable income under full optimization, i.e. the elasticity of demand with respect to the net of tax rate following the
introduction of a linear tax equal to ATR (which also equals the elasticity of x with respect to the price). Derivatives
and elasticities are evaluated at the no-tax equilibrium τ = ATR = 0.
Proof. Applying proposition 2, adapted to the income tax case, normalizing to p = 1 so t = τ , and assuming
ρ = ωxη = 0 gives42
EB(τ) = −1
2
τ2
(
∂τˆ
∂τ
)2
x0
εcx,q|p
1 + τˆ
(49)
Note that τ2
(
∂τˆ
∂τ
)2 ' τˆ2 (see footnote 25). Note also that εcx,q|p = εcx,q|τˆ = −εcx,q|1−τˆ . Plugging in τˆ = ATR yields
equation (48).
Noting that εcx,q|τˆ = ε
c
x,q|τ
∂τˆ
∂τ we can rewrite equation (49) as
EB(τ) ' 1
2
τ2
∂τˆ
∂τ
x0
εcx,q|τ
1 + τˆ
(50)
Note that when we introduce a nonlinear tax we will have θ = ∂τˆ∂τ ' ATRτ , so we will have
EB(τ) ' 1
2
τATRx0
εcx,q|τ
1 + τˆ
42One difference between this and the formulation in proposition 2 is that the denominator of the elasticity is
evaluated at τˆ instead of at τ0 = 0. We are free to use the latter, to be consistent with Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004),
because to a second order approximation this will not matter. To see why note that
1
1− τˆ = 1− τˆ + τˆ
2 − τˆ3 + ...
so multiplying by τ2 and ignoring third order terms we will have
τ2 ' τ
2
1−ATR
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Debiasing
Proposition 5 (Extension to Non-Linearities in Tax Rates). Assume there is only one type of misperceived tax, tj .
Under assumptions A1 and A2, and the assumption that demand is locally linear in (p+ tˆ) and Z but not in tax rates,
the excess burden at a tax rate tj is
EB(tj) = −1
2
t2jΘ
c 1
t− tˆ
∫ t
tˆ
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t′
dt′ (51)
= −1
2
t2j (Θ
c)2
∂x
∂p
(52)
= −1
2
t2j (Θ
c)2x0
εx,q|p
p
, (53)
where x0 = x(p,0, Z) and ∂x∂p is evaluated at t = 0. The excess burden of a small tax increase ∆tj starting from an
initial tax rate t0 is approximately:
EB(∆tj |t0) ' −1
2
(∆tj)
2θcj,t0
∂xc
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t0
−∆tj ∂x
c
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t0
[tˆ0 + Θ
c(t0 − tˆ0)] (54)
=
1
2
(∆tj)
2θcj,t0x0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
+ ∆tjx0
εcx,q|tj
p+ t0
[tˆ0 + Θ
c(t0 − tˆ0)] (55)
where ∂x
c
∂tj
is evaluated at t = t0, and ∂x
c
∂p at t = tˆ0.
Proof. The proof is virtually identical to the proof in Chetty (2009), but instead of approximating the difference
between fully optimizing demand and actual demand by x∗−x ' (1− θj)∂x∂p (t− tˆ), I approximate it, using that there
is only one type of misperceived tax, as
x∗(p, t, Z)− x(p, t, Z) = (x∗(p, t, Z)− x(p+ tˆ,0, Z))− (x(p, t, Z)− x(p+ tˆ,0, Z))
'
(
∂x
∂p
− 1
t− tˆ
∫ t
tˆ
∂x
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t=t′
dt′
)
(t− tˆ)
= (1−Θ)∂x
∂p
(t− tˆ)
to allow for nonlinearity in tax rates. The rest of the proof follows the one in Chetty (2009), almost to the letter.
For the marginal excess burden approximation, note that by the fundamental theorem of calculus,
θj,t0 =
∂Θ
∂tj
∣∣∣∣
t0
.
So for a small tax change ∆tj , we will have
(x∗(p, t0 + ∆tj , Z)− x∗(p, t0, Z))− (x(p, t0 + ∆tj , Z)− x(p, t0, Z)) ' (1− θj,t0)
∂x
∂p
∆tj
Taking a Taylor series expansion of equation (51) about t0, applying this approximation and ignoring third-order or
higher terms yields the desired result.
Proposition 6 (The Curse of Debiasing). Suppose that the government has recourse to two taxes, tI and tE , and that
1. Consumers respond perfectly to changes in tI , so θctI = 1.
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2. Consumers initially under-respond to changes in tE , so θctE < 1 when tE = 0.
3. Assumptions A1, A2, and A3 are true.
4. Optimal demand x∗ is strictly positive at all prices and tax rates.
Then there exists a tax rate t′E at which an increase in tE causes higher marginal excess burden than an increase in
the noticed tax tI .
Proof. The first step of the proof shows that whenever the marginal degree of error for a change in tE , θt0E > 1,
an increase in tE causes higher marginal excess burden than an identical increase in tI . The second step proves the
existence of a tax rate t0E at which θt0E > 1 using the mean value theorem.
Step 1. Write the difference between the marginal excess burden of a small increase in tE minus the marginal
excess burden of a small increase in tI , given initial tax rates tI0 and tE0 as follows, using proposition 4/ 5 and the
fact that ∂x/∂tI = ∂x/∂p43
D = EB(∆tE |tE0, tI0)− EB(∆tI |tE0, tI0) (56)
=
−1
2
(∆tE)
2θct0E
∂xc
∂tE
−∆tE ∂x
c
∂tE
[t0I + Θ
ct0E ]
−{−1
2
(∆tI)
2 ∂x
c
∂tI
−∆tI ∂x
c
∂tI
[t0I + Θ
ct0E ]}
(57)
where derivatives are evaluated at (t0I , t0E). Now imposing that the increase in the per-unit tax rate be the same for
both taxes, ∆tE = ∆tI = ∆t, and recalling that θctj =
∂xc
∂tj
/
∂x
∂p , we write equation (57) as:
−1
2
∆t2[(θct0E )
2 − 1]∂x
c
∂p
−∆t[t0I + Θct0E ][θct0E − 1]
∂xc
∂p
(58)
We therefore know that D > 0 iff θct0E > 1.
Before the second part of the proof can be completed, we need to derive a relationship between θct0E and θt0E .
Write
θtc0E =
θ ∂x∂p + x
∂x
∂Z
∂x
∂p + x
∂x
∂Z
and use the negativity of the compensated price effect to derive that for non-Giffen goods (which are ruled out by
additive separability), we will have
θct0E > 1 ⇐⇒ θ
∂x
∂p
+ x
∂x
∂Z
<
∂x
∂p
+ x
∂x
∂Z
⇐⇒ θ∂x
∂p
<
∂x
∂p
⇐⇒ θt0E > 1
Step 2 Write the difference between optimal demand and true demand as
x∗(p+ t0I , t0E , Z)− x(p+ t0I , t0E , Z) ' (1−Θ)∂x
∂p
t0E (59)
When tE0 = 0, x∗−x = 0 by A2. By A3, there is a tax rate t′ such that when tE = t′E , x∗−x = 0. Take a derivative
43Applying proposition 4 in this way requires that we let tˆ be any components of the tax for which the individual
optimizes fully at all tax rates. That is x(p, tˆ, Z) = x∗(p+ tˆ, Z).
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of equation (59) to obtain44
∂(x∗ − x)
∂tE
= (1− θt0E )
∂x
∂p
(60)
By the second condition of the proposition, we can take a small tax rate tE such that θt0E < 1. At this tax rate,
x∗ − x < 0. The mean value theorem therefore implies the existence of a tax rate t∗E such that
∂(x∗ − x)
∂tE
> 0⇔ θt∗E > 1⇔ θct∗E > 1
Finally, we need to derive θ and Θ for the positive model in section 5.2. We assume ∂tˆ/∂t = 0, and ρ = ωxη = 0.
Specifically, we will see that
ΘctE0 = F (G(tE)),
and
θctE0 ' F (G) + f(G)
∂G
∂tE
tE0.
First consider the marginal degree of error:
θct0E ≡
∂xc
∂tE
∣∣∣
t=tE0
∂xc
∂p
∣∣∣
t=tˆ0
.
Equation (38) implies that
∂Xc
∂tE
∣∣∣∣
tE0
= F (G)
∂x∗c
∂p
+ f(G)
dG
dtE
(x∗ − x)
Applying our simplifying assumptions again, we can approximate (x∗ − x) by
x∗ − x ' (∂x/∂p)tE0 = (∂xc/∂p)tE0
So we will have
∂Xc
∂tE
∣∣∣∣
t0E
= F (G)
∂x∗c
∂p
+ f(G)
dG
dtE
tE0
∂xc
∂p
Dividing by ∂xc/∂p gives the desired expression for θct0 .
Second, consider the average degree of compensated error at some tax rate t0:
Θc ≡
1
t0−tˆ0
∫ t0
tˆ0
∂xc
∂tE
∣∣∣
t′
dt′
∂xc
∂p
∣∣∣
tˆ0
=
1
t0 − tˆ0
∫ t
tˆ0
θct′dt
′
=
1
t0E
∫ tE
0
θcE,t′dt
′
44This uses the fact that
∂Θ
∂t
=
1
t0E
(θt0E −Θ)
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Using the expression we just derived for θtE0 we observe that the anti-derivative of the argument of the integral∫ t
tˆ0
θct′dt
′ will be F (G)(t − tˆ) = F (G)t0E , and by evaluating this expression at the limits of integration, noting that
F (G(tˆ− tˆ)) = F (G(0)) = 0 and dividing by t− tˆ = t0E we obtain that Θ = F (G).
Note that Proposition 6 is proven in the text of the paper, prior to the statement of the proposition.
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